Eliciting information from sources and suspects by May, Lennart
ELICITING INFORMATION 
FROM SOURCES AND SUSPECTS
Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophischen 
Fakultät der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel
vorgelegt von
Lennart May
Kiel, 21.07.2017
Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Thomas Bliesener 
Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Günter Köhnken
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 20.11.2017
Durch den Prodekan, Prof. Dr. Elmar Eggert, zum Druck genehmigt: 24.11.2017
Abstract 
 
Gathering information in human interactions is a critical aspect for police and intelligence interviewers. 
However, quite recently and rather slowly researchers have started to focus on using available information 
in order to collect case-related information in such interactions. This thesis advances this line of research by 
conducting three studies on how to use available information to elicit new information from sources and 
suspects. Two of the studies were about the Scharff-technique and one was about the Strategic Use of 
Evidence (SUE)-technique. Study I compared two combinations of the Scharff tactics and the Direct 
Approach. Participants (N = 93) took the role of a source and were instructed to strike a balance between not 
revealing too little or too much information. Overall, the sources in both Scharff conditions revealed more 
new information, perceived the interviewer to hold more knowledge, and found it more difficult to understand 
the interviewer’s information objectives, compared to the sources in the Direct Approach. The sources 
interviewed by the Scharff conditions underestimated how much new information they revealed, whereas the 
sources interviewed by the Direct Approach overestimated the amount of new information revealed. Study 
II examined two ways of introducing the presentation of the known information when using the illusion of 
knowing it all tactic of the Scharff-technique. Again, participants took the role of a source but without having 
the chance to reveal information. In two separate experiments (each N = 60), the sources’ perceptions of the 
interviewer’s knowledge and knowledge gaps were mapped. This study found that by just starting the 
presentation of the known information made the sources believe the interviewer had more knowledge and 
they searched less actively for gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge, compared to when the interviewer used 
an extreme convinced introductory statement about his or her case-related knowledge. Study III tested two 
different ways of eliciting and disclosing statement-evidence inconsistencies using the SUE-technique 
against an early disclosure of the evidence. Participants (N = 88) performed a mock crime and were instructed 
to claim innocence. Both SUE conditions resulted in more inconsistencies and the suspects overestimated the 
interviewer’s knowledge to a higher extent than the Early disclosure condition. However, only the non-
judgemental version of the SUE-technique resulted in more new information (vs. the Early disclosure 
condition) and created a more fostering interview atmosphere (vs. the confrontational version of the SUE-
technique). In line with the three studies, this thesis developed an interviewing framework consisting of a 
conceptual and tactical tier. The conceptual tier explains the cognitive and verbal processes of the 
sources/suspects in interviews and the mechanisms behind the Scharff and SUE tactics. The tactical tier 
includes the Scharff-technique and SUE-technique and shows ways in order to influence the 
sources’/suspects’ perceptions and verbal behaviours. Overall, the developed two-tier interviewing 
framework can help to train practitioners and initiate further research. 
Keywords: HUMINT interview, Suspect interview, Information gathering, Information elicitation, Scharff, 
Strategic use of evidence  
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INTRODUCTION 
For several decades, suspect interviews have been the focus of psycho-legal research. As a 
result of this, researchers have identified the risk factors of false confessions and have 
developed alternatives on how to better conduct suspect interviews (for an overview see Bull, 
2014). However, research to date has provided few specific “tools” on how to exactly gather 
information from suspects. The research on human intelligence (HUMINT) gathering is still at 
an early stage, and therefore hardly any “tools” are available in the field of intelligence 
interviewing. This thesis sets out to develop an interviewing framework for eliciting information 
from suspects and sources. For this purpose, the research presented here employed an 
experimental approach, which is useful for examining interviewing interactions in a controlled 
setting (Meissner, Hartwig, & Russano, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1. The two-tier structure of the interviewing framework developed in this thesis. 
 
This thesis starts with a brief overview of the current research on suspect and HUMINT 
interviewing. Next, the interviewing framework developed in this thesis is presented. Figure 1 
illustrates this interviewing framework which consists of a conceptual and tactical tier, drawing 
inspiration from Granhag and Hartwig’s (2015) model. These two tiers set the stage for this 
thesis. Broadly speaking, the conceptual tier describes general assumptions on the 
suspects’/sources’ cognitive and verbal processes. By taking the interviewees’ perspective the 
interviewer can use these assumptions strategically in order to obtain new information in the 
interview. The tactical tier includes practical ways to reach sub-goals during the interview. In 
this thesis, two sets of tactics are examined: the Scharff-technique and the Strategic Use of 
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Evidence (SUE)-technique. After introducing the developed interviewing framework, the 
empirical studies of this thesis are summarized. Then, the findings are discussed in the scope 
of the tactical and conceptual tier of the interviewing framework. Finally, further considerations 
on the conceptual tier will be discussed for training and research purposes.  
 
Defining the Scope of this Thesis 
Gathering information from humans is a critical aspect in solving and preventing crimes 
(Memon, Vrij, & Bull, 2003; Redlich, 2007). Specifically, in criminal settings the police 
interviewer often strives for new information about past activities from suspects (Vrij & 
Granhag, 2014). This information can be of relevance in order to confirm or drop the suspicion 
against the suspects and ultimately solve crimes. In contrast, in HUMINT settings the police or 
intelligence interviewer typically aims to collect new information about past or future activities 
from sources (Vrij & Granhag, 2014). Sources are persons showing a link to terrorist 
organizations, organised crime or other types of serious crimes. The information collected by 
sources is critical in solving committed crimes and also preventing planned crimes (Evans, 
Meissner, Brandon, Russano, & Kleinman, 2010; Vrij & Granhag, 2014). 
This thesis is about a specific form of information-gathering in criminal and HUMINT 
settings, which is called information elicitation. Here, information elicitation is defined as a 
sophisticated interviewing style that incorporates interviewees’ perspectives in order to collect 
new information. This description includes three points that are critical for this thesis. First, 
independent of the exact time-relation described above (past vs. future), the interviewer in a 
criminal and HUMINT setting has the primary goal to collect new information that was 
previously unknown to him or her (Evans et al., 2010; Vrij & Granhag, 2014). Second, in order 
to approach this goal, the interviewer continuously considers the interviewees’ goals, strategies 
and verbal responses. Third, the interviewer typically holds information prior to the interviews, 
which s/he can use strategically in order to achieve his or her goal. Specifically, in countries 
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such as Germany, interviewing a person as a suspect postulates that there is at least some 
evidence indicating that s/he was involved in a crime (Eisenberg, 2015). Similarly, the 
HUMINT interviewer often already holds information before the interview that is collected by 
other HUMINT interactions or other means (e.g. Open Source Intelligence or Signal 
Intelligence; e.g. personal communication with police/intelligence service members, 2016; 
Soufan, 2011). In general, suspects and sources can differ in their willingness to share 
information. This thesis assumes that information elicitation is especially relevant when 
interviewing suspects and sources who are willing to reveal a limited amount of information, 
i.e., they are willing to reveal some information but not their whole knowledge of the topic in 
question. 
Considering these key points, this thesis has the goal to establish an interviewing 
framework for information elicitation in a criminal and HUMINT context that achieves two 
broad objectives. First, the developed interviewing framework aims to provide conceptual 
notions that explain suspects’/sources’ cognitive and verbal processes during the interview and 
the tactical mechanism for training and research purposes. Second, the developed interviewing 
framework aims to provide tactical ways on how to use the available information in order to 
collect new information from suspects and sources that are motivated to share only a limited 
amount of information. Before presenting this interviewing framework in more detail, the 
relevant literature on suspect and HUMINT interviewing must first be outlined first. 
 
Research on Suspect Interviewing 
In general, there is a vast body of international research on suspect interviewing. In the past this 
research was accelerated due to spectacular false confession cases for serious offences in the 
United States (e.g. the Central Park Jogger Case) and the United Kingdom (e.g. the Birmingham 
Six). In many of these cases, innocent suspects falsely confessed due to coercive police 
interviewing behaviours (for an overview see Gudjonsson, 2003). 
 	 4 
Early research on suspect interviewing. In the years after these high-profile false 
confession cases in the US and the UK, the scientific community focused mainly on two 
contrary interview approaches1: the Reid-technique as “the bad guy” and the PEACE-model as 
“the good guy”. 
The Reid-technique consists of a pre-interrogation phase aiming to determine whether 
suspects are guilty or innocent, and an interrogation phase aiming to get a confession (Inbau, 
Reid, Buckley, & Jane, 2013). The pre-interrogation phase should be conducted in a non-
custodial setting and without informing the suspects on their legal rights. In this phase the 
interrogator should establish rapport with the suspects, gather background information, and 
employ the behaviour analysis interview (BAI). According to Inbau and colleagues (2013) 
guilty suspects show more cues of deceit (vs. innocent suspects), and their BAI aims to detect 
deception by searching for verbal and non-verbal cues of deceit. However, this approach 
ignores empirical findings that have shown non-verbal cues to be unreliable (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006; DePaulo et al., 2003), and have found the BAI to be generally unreliable (Vrij, Mann, & 
Fisher, 2006). Furthermore, it seems plausible, but is scientifically untested, that guilty suspects 
deceive more frequently than innocent suspects. That means, by employing the pre-
interrogation phase the interrogator risks making a misjudgement about the suspects’ guilt (e.g. 
assess innocent suspects as guilty). Based on a guilty judgement the Reid-technique then 
                                                
1 According to Shepherd (2007) the term interrogation was used until 1990 to describe the questioning process 
aiming to obtain confessions, and in which the suspects were expected to be uncooperative, to resist and to lie. 
Shepherd introduced the term investigative interview in order to describe a new perspective of obtaining 
information (instead of confessions) through questioning without getting only confirmation of assumptions and 
beliefs. Loftus (2011) distinguished between interrogation and interview in the way that interrogations are 
conducted in a more coercive manner, whereas interviews are conducted in a more non-accusatory manner. 
According to Alison and colleagues (2013) the term interrogation is preferred in the US, whereas the term 
interview is favoured in Europe. The term interview is clearly preferred for the kind of research conducted in this 
thesis, however both terms are used interchangeably in order to hold on previous phrasings (e.g. counter-
interrogation strategy). Moreover, in some contexts only the term interrogation is reasonable (e.g. enhanced 
interrogation techniques). 
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instructs the interrogator to introduce the actual interrogation phase and confirm his or her 
assumption of guilt by producing a confession. Therefore, this phase consists of nine steps of 
highly manipulative, persuasive and suggestive tactics in order to break down the suspects and 
force confessions (Kassin et al., 2010). Differently put, once entered into the main interrogation 
phase it is extremely difficult or impossible for an innocent suspect to show his or her innocence 
(on critical overviews on the Reid-technique see Gudjonsson, 2003; Kelly & Meissner, 2015). 
Turning to the UK, as a consequence of the false confessions, the recording of suspect 
interviews was made mandatory (Home Office, 1991). This led to a large-scale assessment of 
suspect interviewing practices in the UK which revealed considerable deficiencies (Baldwin, 
1993). A major change came from the introduction of the PEACE model that was developed by 
police practitioners and researchers (Bull, 2014). The PEACE model consists of five phases 
that build the acronym: Planning and preparation, Engage and explain, Account, Closure and 
Evaluation. The goal of this model is to gather accurate and reliable information from suspects 
or witnesses in order to establish the truth about the matter under investigation (Bull, 2014). In 
its initial stage it was mainly based on the cognitive interview and the conversation management 
approach (Milne & Bull, 2000). The cognitive interview was developed by Fisher and 
Geiselman (1992) to assist cooperative interviewees in retrieving information about an event 
by using psychological mnemonics (e.g. a “Report everything” instruction; for a meta-analysis 
on the cognitive interview see Köhnken, Milne, Memon, & Bull, 1999). The conversation 
management approach by Shepherd (2007) was developed for questioning interviewees who 
did not show sufficiently cooperative behaviour. Here, the interviewers were instructed to 
conduct all interviews in a fair and open-minded manner by accepting the suspects as 
conversational partners (see also Shepherd, 1991, 1993). Field studies showed that the 
widespread introduction of the PEACE model improved the general quality of police 
interviewing practice in the UK (Clarke & Milne, 2001). Overall, the PEACE-model can help 
the interviewer to structure the interview process by simultaneously ensuring flexibility, and 
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scientific knowledge can be assigned to each of the five phases. In line with this it is the 
intention of the developed interviewing framework for information elicitation to be compatible 
with the PEACE model. 
As outlined, the Reid-technique and the PEACE model differ fundamentally on how the 
interviewer should face the suspects. For the Reid-technique, the interrogator assesses the 
suspects’ guilt and then substantiates this assumption by breaking down the suspects and 
collecting confessions. In contrast, for the PEACE-model the interviewer conducts the full 
interview in an open-minded manner and consequently aims to collect incriminating and/or 
exonerating information. Comparing the efficacy of these two interview approaches, Meissner 
and colleagues (2014) conducted two meta-analyses. In the first meta-analysis including field 
studies, they found that information-gathering approaches (such as the PEACE model) and 
accusatory interrogation approaches (such as the Reid-technique) increased the likelihood of 
confessions. However, field studies typically suffer from a lack of ground truth, and hence the 
veracity of the confessions was rather unclear. In the second meta-analysis including 
experimental studies, they found that both interviewing approaches increased the likelihood of 
true confessions (vs. a direct questioning approach), but only the accusatory interrogation 
approach increased the likelihood of false confessions. That means, the information-gathering 
approach proved comparatively more diagnostic (i.e. ratio of true to false confessions), and 
outperformed the accusatory interrogation approach. 
Further research on suspect interviewing. The PEACE model has also been 
introduced successfully in other countries, for example Australia (Cain, Westera, & Kebbell, 
2016) and Norway (Fahsing, Jakobsen, & Öhrn, 2016). Furthermore, new research lines on 
suspect interviewing emerged, of which two areas will be outlined next. 
First, researchers surveyed interviewers and suspects in order to gain insights into the 
interviewing interactions. For example, police officers in the US (Kassin et al., 2007) and in 
Slovenia (Areh, Walsh, & Bull, 2015) reported the use of some psychologically manipulative, 
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confrontational and pressuring tactics. Convicted suspects in turn reported that a main reason 
for false confessions was police pressure (Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, 2001), and confessors 
perceived their interviewers’ tactics as being more humane and ethical and less dominant 
compared to deniers (Holmberg & Christianson, 2002; Kebbell, Alison, Hurren, & Mazerolle, 
2010; Snook, Brooks, & Bull, 2015). These findings indicate that interviewers use accusatorial 
interviewing tactics, even though these tactics increase the risk of false confessions. 
Furthermore, humane and ethical interviewing styles seem to be generally more fruitful when 
aiming for incriminating information (confessions). However, these interpretations need to be 
considered with caution, as also other case characteristics – other than the interviewing styles 
– might have influenced the dynamic of the interview (e.g. the perception of evidence). Also, 
it is not clear whether the ethical and humane interviewing styles led to the suspects confessing 
or whether the confessions led to humane and ethical interviewing styles.  
Furthermore, there is traditionally large research interest on the detection of deception 
(for an overview see Vrij, 2008). For example, in experimental studies researchers have shown 
that the interviewer can elicit cues to deceit by requesting suspects to sketch localities (Vrij, 
Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2012) or to report the stories in reversed order (Vrij et al., 2008), and by 
asking unanticipated questions (Vrij et al., 2009) or asking questions before disclosing the 
evidence (Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). However, the transfer of such empirical findings 
into practice seems partially challenging. In general, the credibility of the suspects’ statement 
should be analysed after the interview as it is too complex to be done during the interview. This 
is a critical point as practitioners often rely on non-verbal behaviours in order to detect 
deception during the interaction (e.g. Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Redlich, Kelly, 
& Miller, 2014), which are in fact unreliable (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo et al., 2003). 
During the interview the interviewer should only compare the suspects’ statement with the 
already available information. In doing so, s/he can estimate whether the information revealed 
is consistent or inconsistent with the known information. However, the interviewer should be 
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cautious with determining the reasons for inconsistencies during the interview (e.g. it could be 
the result of an intentional fabrication, suggestive process or misremembering). 
 Disclosure of evidence. An additional main research interest on suspect interviewing is 
the disclosure of evidence. Researchers have examined real-life, videotaped, audiotaped and 
transcribed interviews in order to map the disclosure of evidence. In the US, Leo (1996) found 
that interviewers typically started by confronting the suspects with the evidence in order to 
suggest their guilt. In contrast, Moston and Stephenson (1993) found that in the UK most 
interviewers opened the interview by asking offence-related questions and only a minority 
disclosed the evidence at the outset of the interview. Some research suggests that the disclosure 
of evidence may to some extent influence suspects’ decision to shift from denying to confessing 
(Bull & Soukara 2010).  
In line with this, further studies focused on when to disclose evidence in order to 
influence the interview outcome. Sellers and Kebbel (2011) found that asking for a free account 
before disclosing the evidence resulted in fewer incriminating statements, compared to the 
disclosure of the evidence before asking for a free account. An explanation for this finding is 
that the evidence was stronger in the cases where it was disclosed earlier, and this influenced 
the suspects to make an incriminating statement. Furthermore, Walsh and Bull (2015) showed 
that a gradual (stepwise) disclosure of the evidence resulted in more comprehensive accounts, 
compared to an early or late disclosure of the evidence. Examining the gradual disclosure in 
detail, they found that a deferred gradual disclosure, in which an account was fully obtained 
before the interviewers subsequently asked the suspects to explain the inconsistencies, resulted 
in more comprehensive accounts compared to a reactive gradual disclosure, in which the 
inconsistencies were disclosed at the same time as an account was gathered (i.e. the suspects 
were challenged immediately to explain the inconsistencies). Finally, in two recent 
experimental studies Tekin and colleagues (2015, 2016) found that a gradual elicitation and 
disclosure of statement-evidence inconsistencies resulted in more admissions from guilty 
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suspects, compared to an early disclosure of the evidence. Specifically, in these studies the 
inconsistencies were elicited (by asking questions on the evidence without disclosing it) and 
disclosed for two groups of evidence in two subsequent interview phases. Overall, the presented 
studies show that research can provide some suggestions on when to disclose the evidence in 
order to influence suspects’ verbal responses. However, further research is needed in order to 
examine this highly relevant topic for practitioners in more detail (Smith & Bull, 2013). 
Interview outcome. As outlined above there are different measures in order to evaluate 
suspect interviews. In the past, the effectiveness of suspect interviewing was typically captured 
by the extent of true and false confessions. This seems inappropriate as researchers themselves 
recommended that the interviewer should gather information in an open-minded manner instead 
of striving for confessions. The main argument for this is that the interviewer often cannot be 
sure about suspects’ guilt. However, researchers often also cannot be sure about the veracity of 
confessions (e.g. by analysing interview recordings), but they ignore this limitation. Quite 
recently, researchers have started to introduce new measures. For example, Walsh and Bull 
(2015) classified interview outcomes as preferred or undesirable. A preferred outcome was 
defined as a comprehensive account (independent of whether the suspects confessed or not), 
which has been robustly tested by the interviewers for its veracity; an undesirable outcome 
described an account which was accepted without sufficient scrutiny. Furthermore, Tekin and 
colleagues (2015, 2016) captured admissions which referred to potentially incriminating 
information for the suspects but did not involve full confessions. In line with this shift of 
evaluating suspect interviews, this thesis focuses on the elicitation of new information, i.e., 
information that the suspects revealed and that was unknown to the interviewer previously. 
 
Research on HUMINT Interviewing 
While the body of research on suspect interviewing is steadily increasing, there is 
comparatively little research on HUMINT interviewing. Observing current public debates one 
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could argue that HUMINT is of less importance compared to information obtained through 
technical means. However, practitioners stress that there is information that can be gathered 
exclusively in human interactions and that HUMINT is also frequently needed to interpret 
intelligence gathered by technical means (personal communication with police/intelligence 
service members, 2016). 
General HUMINT research. A considerable amount of the HUMINT research was 
initiated by the former US President Barack Obama. Specifically, Obama wanted to develop 
evidence-based alternatives to the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques (e.g. 
waterboarding or deprivation of sleep/food), which US intelligence services used after the 9/11 
attacks in order to obtain information from sources (Hoffman et al., 2015). Critically, enhanced 
interrogations techniques are unethical, inhumane and generally contradict Human Rights 
Article 5 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” The United Nations, 1948). Furthermore, there is no scientific evidence that these 
harsh and coercive interrogation techniques are effective in collecting information (Brandon, 
2011; Costanzo & Redlich, 2010), and in fact rather increase the risk of obtaining unreliable 
information (Alison & Alison, 2017). In 2009, Obama founded the High Value Detainee 
Interrogation Group (HIG). The HIG aims to examine the effectiveness of the interviewing 
techniques specified in the Field Manual 2-22.3 of the US Army (2006) that is standard for US 
interrogators (US Government, 2009), and to develop new ways of lawful interviewing. In the 
following section, some studies of this research program will be outlined. 
The HIG has initiated numerous experimental studies. For example, researchers found 
that truth tellers (vs. liars) reported more details when asked to report activities with closed eyes 
(Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hillman, & Hope, 2014), that truth tellers provided more details than liars 
when a second interviewer exhibited a supportive demeanour (vs. a neutral or suspicious 
demeanour; Mann et al., 2012), that asking anticipated and unanticipated questions can help to 
elicit cues to true and false intentions among small cells of truth tellers and liars (Sooniste, 
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Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2014), and that priming can result in an increased amount of 
information (Dawson, Hartwig, & Brimbal, 2015). This indicates that experimental HUMINT 
research is multifaceted and includes many different research areas. 
Furthermore, researches gathered insights on what happens in real-life HUMINT 
interviews by surveying different persons involved in HUMINT interactions. For example, US 
military and federal-law interrogators (Redlich et al., 2014) and highly experienced US military 
and HUMINT interrogators (Russano, Narchet, Kleinman, & Meissner, 2014) reported that 
rapport and relationship building techniques were most frequently used and perceived as most 
effective for intelligence gathering. This perception is consistent with that of US analysts and 
interpreters (Russano, Narchet, & Kleinman, 2014), and with that of international interrogators 
and high-value detainees (Goodman-Delahunty, Martschuk, & Dhami, 2014). By examining 
recordings of interviews with suspects, later convicted of terroristic activities in the UK and 
Ireland, Alison and colleagues (2014b) found five groups of counter-interrogation strategies: 
verbal (discussing unrelated topics, providing well known information and providing 
unscripted responses), passive-verbal (providing monosyllabic responses and claiming to have 
a lack of memory), passive (refusing to make eye contact with the interviewer and complete 
silence in response to police questions), retraction, and no comment. Furthermore, they found 
that a rapport-based approach reduced the suspects’ use of passive, passive-verbal and no-
comment counter-interrogation strategies (Alison et al., 2014a), and resulted in an increased 
amount of useful information (Alison et al., 2013). These studies illustrate the prominent role 
of building rapport in HUMINT interviews.  
However, researchers and practitioners sometimes neglect the fact that too much rapport 
building can also be risky. For example, research has shown that suspects (and it is likely the 
case also for sources) can perceive situations as aversive due to the social isolation 
(Gudjonsson, 2003). An interviewer who engages in too much rapport building in such an 
aversive situation (e.g. by engaging the interviewee on an emotional level) can make an 
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innocent suspect to confess falsely or a source holding no relevant information to reveal 
unreliable information. The rationale of this is that the suspect/source wants to stop the aversive 
situation, please the interviewer and/or keep a social interaction with the interviewer, and 
therefore reveals information. Apart from the reliability of the information gathered, it is an 
ethical question of to what extent the interviewer should build rapport in order to influence 
interviewees’ basic decisions (e.g. persuade the interviewees to talk with the interviewer). 
Arguably, general rapport building behaviours – such as showing respectful, friendly, 
conversational and non-judgemental behaviour (Alison & Alison, 2017) – should be seen as a 
minimum requirement of human interactions. However, rapport building behaviours should not 
be used to manipulate suspects/sources autonomy (e.g. by persuading the interviewees to 
cooperate).  
HUMINT gathering research. Two lines of HUMINT research aiming to gather 
intelligence are of specific interest for this thesis. First, Evans and colleagues (2013) simulated 
a scenario, in which an interviewer questioned a detained individual who was believed to hold 
knowledge about relevant events but his or her personal involvement was unknown. In the 
experiment, the participants were informed that the study was a national assessment of college 
students’ knowledge, and they answered questions in pairs (together with a confederate). Half 
of the participants were guilty (the confederate cheated by using a cheat sheet and getting help 
via a cell phone) and half were innocent but held guilty knowledge (that the confederate broke 
an experimental rule by using the cell phone in order to chat but did not cheat). When 
interviewing the “guilty and innocent persons”, the information-gathering approach resulted in 
more relevant information compared to the accusatorial approach. Using the same experimental 
paradigm, Evans and colleagues (Evans et al., 2014) compared three interview approaches 
derived from the Field Manual 2-22.3 (US Army, 2006): the positive emotional approach 
(aimed to reduce the detainees’ fear and increase their self-esteem before asking open-ended 
questions), the negative emotional approach (aimed to increase the detainees’ fear and lower 
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their self-esteem before asking open-ended questions) and the direct approach (asking only 
open-ended questions). When interviewing the guilty and innocent persons both emotional 
approaches resulted in more relevant information compared to the direct approach. 
Furthermore, the positive emotional approach reduced interviewees’ perceptions of anxiety and 
increased their perceptions of a fostering atmosphere in comparison with the negative emotional 
approach. That means, these studies showed the effectiveness of the information-gathering 
approach and the positive emotional approach in a rather traditional police interview setting by 
questioning suspicious persons. 
Second, Fisher and colleagues examined in two studies the gathering of intelligence 
about terrorist meetings by interviewing fully cooperative sources (Leins, Fisher, Pludwinski, 
Rivard, & Robertson, 2014; Rivard, Fisher, Robertson, & Mueller, 2014). More specifically, in 
interviewing student participants about family meetings they found that the cognitive interview 
resulted in more information compared to a control condition (free recall and direct questions; 
Leins et al., 2014). Furthermore, the cognitive interview resulted in more event-related 
information when experienced US investigators (trainers at the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center) interviewed other trainers on different business meetings, compared to a 
standard five-step interview protocol trained and used by US investigators (Rivard et al., 2014). 
In sum, these studies show the effectiveness of the cognitive interview in recollecting 
intelligence from cooperative sources. 
 Overall, these two lines of HUMINT research examined the gathering of intelligence by 
interviewing suspicious or fully cooperative sources. This thesis aims to add to this research on 
HUMINT gathering by interviewing sources that are willing to share a limited amount of 
information. 
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Two-Tier Interviewing Framework 
This thesis develops an interviewing framework aiming to elicit new information from suspects 
and sources (see Figure 1). This developed interviewing framework consists of a conceptual 
and a tactical tier, and is motivated by the SUE model (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). The 
conceptual tier is more abstract and contains several assumptions on the interviewees’ cognitive 
and verbal processes that help the interviewer to plan and conduct the interview strategically. 
The tactical tier provides practical ways of how to meet sub-goals in the interview. In this thesis 
the tactical tier includes the Scharff-technique and SUE-technique. Using these techniques in a 
meaningful manner implies understanding and implementing the conceptual notions. Next, the 
two tiers will be described in more detail. 
 
Conceptual Tier 
The conceptual tier includes the interviewees’ cognitive and verbal processes. Broadly 
speaking, it assumes that the suspects’/sources’ interview goal influences their perceptions of 
the interviewer’s knowledge, which in turn affects their choice of counter-interrogation 
strategy, and their verbal behaviour (see Figure 2). Furthermore, the conceptual tier assumes 
that the interviewer can use these assumptions of the interviewees’ cognitive and verbal 
processes by taking the suspects’/sources’ perspective. Below, the interviewees’ cognitive and 
verbal processes will be outlined separately first, and then their relation to each other and to 
perspective-taking will be described. 
 
 
Figure 2. The interviewees’ cognitive and verbal processes. 
 
Interview goals. Humans naturally behave in a goal-directed manner (Aarts, 2012). 
Accordingly, in interviews suspects and sources strive for goals, which can differ in the amount, 
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orientation and specific content. Sources can have a single goal (e.g. “I want money”) or 
multiple goals (e.g. “I want to have money, help the police and prevent the planned activities”; 
personal communication with police/intelligence service members, 2016; Scherp, 1992). Goals 
are “concurring” when they induce the sources to cooperate with the police (e.g. “I want to help 
the police and need the money”). In contrast, goals are “conflicting” when one goal induces the 
sources to cooperate with the police (e.g. “I want money from the police”) while another does 
not (e.g. “I do not want to betray the group”). That means, the conflicting goals can result in 
the sources’ willingness to reveal a limited amount of information. More precisely, conflicting 
goals result in the sources facing an information management dilemma: they need to reveal 
some information in order to pursue the focal goal but cannot reveal too much information in 
order to also pursue the conflicting goal. 
Similar to sources, suspects’ interview goals can differ with respect to the amount, 
orientation and content. Suspects can pursue a single goal (e.g. “I want to get it off my chest”; 
Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, 1994), multiple concurring goals (e.g. “I want to ease my conscience 
and mitigate the sentencing”; Volbert, May, Hausam, & Lau, 2016) or conflicting goals (e.g. “I 
want to get it off the chest but do not want to be viewed as a criminal”; Gudjonsson & Petursson, 
1991). Certainly, interview goals can differ on further dimensions (e.g. their hierarchy). 
However, the three dimensions exemplified are crucial for the developed interviewing 
framework. Simply put, this thesis examines interactions in which the interviewees pursue 
conflicting goals that encourages them to reveal a limited amount of information. 
Perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge. Suspects contemplate the interviewer’s 
knowledge in preparation of the interview (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall, & Doering, 2010) 
and also during the interview (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). Biographical works of HUMINT 
interviewers indicates that this also holds true for sources (e.g. Soufan, 2011). The interviewees’ 
cognitive processes of testing the interviewer’s knowledge can be explained with the concept 
of social hypothesis testing (Trope & Liberman, 1995). First, the interviewee may formulate a 
 	 16 
hypothesis about the interviewer’s knowledge (e.g. “The interviewer holds a lot of 
information”). Subsequently, the interviewee may test this hypothesis. Specifically, the 
interviewee may derive conditional if-then rules (e.g. “If the interviewer knows a lot, then s/he 
holds information A”), search for relevant information in his or her memory (e.g. “Previously, 
the interviewer talked about B”) or in the social environment (e.g. “Currently, the interviewer 
is talking about A”), and interpret and categorize the collected information (e.g. “Talking about 
A and B implies the interviewer holds a lot of information”). Based on this testing the 
interviewee may draw an inference about whether the hypothesis is true or not (e.g. “The 
interviewer actually holds a lot of information”). The interviewee does not have to be aware of 
all these steps, and can return to and skip separate steps until s/he is able to draw an inference. 
For the developed interviewing framework it is vital that suspects/sources test and estimate the 
interviewer’s knowledge concerning what information the interviewer holds about the case.  
Furthermore, it is relevant to relate (a) the information the interviewees perceive the 
interviewer to hold, and (b) the information the interviewer actually holds. As illustrated in 
Figure 3, three broad combinations are possible. First, the interviewees can be approximately 
correct in estimating the interviewer’s knowledge (a ~ b). Second, the interviewees can perceive 
the interviewer to hold less information than s/he actually knows. That means, the interviewees 
underestimate the interviewer’s knowledge (a < b). Finally, the interviewees can overestimate 
the interviewer’s knowledge and perceive the interviewer to know more information than s/he 
in fact holds (a > b). In certain situations, the interviewer aims to make the interviewees 
overestimate his or her knowledge, whereas in other situations it is beneficial if the interviewees 
underestimate it or perceive it approximately correct (described in detail below). Therefore, the 
interviewer needs to have tactics at his or her disposal that can influence the interviewees’ 
perceptions of his or her knowledge in different directions. 
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Figure 3. Relating the interviewees’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge (above the scale) and the 
interviewer’s actual knowledge (below the scale) on a scale ranging from no knowledge to all knowledge.  
 
Counter-interrogation strategies. Based on research on deception detection, Clemens 
(2013) described counter-interrogation strategies as “attempts made by suspects to successfully 
withstand an interrogation or an investigative interview and appear convincing” (p. 5). In line 
with this, in experimental studies guilty lying suspects are reported to have had developed and 
used strategies such as “Avoid incriminating details”, “Include many details”, “Avoid lying” 
and “Try to keep it simple” (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Strömwall, Hartwig, & 
Granhag, 2006). In contrast, in these studies most innocent truth telling suspects reported to 
have had prepared and used no strategy or prepared and used the strategy to “Tell the truth like 
it happened”. Furthermore, as described above, the field study by Alison and colleagues 
(2014b) has shown that suspects use verbal counter-interrogation strategies such as “Discussing 
unrelated topics”, “Providing well known information” and “Providing monosyllabic 
responses”. Similarly, biographical works of interviewers shows also that sources develop and 
employ counter-interrogation strategies such as “Reveal only less information”, “Reveal only 
known information” and “Figure out what the interviewer is after and then withhold this 
information” (Scharff, 1950; Soufan, 2011; Toliver, 1997).  
Overall, the different types of literature show that suspects and sources devise and use 
several counter-interrogation strategies of what to say in the interview. In order to develop such 
verbal strategies, interviewees need to reflect on what information they hold and what 
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information to avoid, deny or admit. The suspects’/sources’ actual choice to use a specific 
counter-interrogation strategy can change during the course of the interview. Simply put, the 
developed interviewing framework assumes that interviewees have a pool of counter-
interrogation strategies from which they can continuously choose between to achieve their 
interview goals. In doing so the counter-interrogation strategies can differ in the extent of 
revealing case-related information, ranging from withholding (e.g. “Discuss unrelated topics”) 
to forthcoming (e.g. “Tell it like it happened”). It is important to note that the developed 
interviewing framework focuses only on the choice of verbal counter-interrogation strategies.  
The interviewees’ counter-interrogation strategies can be linked to the theory on self-
regulation, which describes how humans control and direct their actions, emotions and thoughts 
(Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Specifically, humans set goals, plan their goal-directed behaviours and 
monitor their activities (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). In line with this, the suspects/sources may 
formulate an interview goal (e.g. for a source: “I need money without betraying the group”), 
and choose counter-interrogation strategies accordingly (e.g. “It is meaningless to deny or 
withhold what they already know, hence I will reveal this information”). By employing goal-
directed strategies, the goal presents a reference point and humans continuously compare their 
current state with the formulated goal (Carver & Scheier, 2002). Based on this comparison, they 
make adjustments to diminish the gap between their current state and the goal until they achieve 
their goal or give up. In the interview, the interviewees may compare their current state (e.g. “I 
will not get the money as I have not revealed enough information yet”) with the intended goal 
(e.g. “I need the money without betraying the group”). Consequently, the interviewees may 
change the counter-interrogation strategies (e.g. from “I will reveal already known information” 
to “I will reveal little information that is new to the interviewer”) until they achieve their 
interview goal. These considerations illustrate that counter-interrogation strategies are 
generally goal-oriented and its development and use implies cognitive work. Therefore, in this 
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thesis counter-interrogation strategies are viewed as the suspects’ and sources’ cognitively 
developed behaviours which they use to achieve their interview goal. 
Verbal behaviour. All information suspects or sources reveal during the interview is 
defined as verbal behaviour. For the developed framework the information revealed can be 
classified into a matrix with two dimensions: the interviewer’s actual knowledge, and the 
veracity of the information revealed (see Figure 4). Both dimensions can be divided in two 
broad categories. With respect to the interviewer’s knowledge, the information revealed can be 
already known to the interviewer or new to him or her (i.e. previously unknown). The veracity 
dimension describes whether the information revealed is actually correct or false. Relating the 
two dimensions orthogonally results in a matrix with four quadrants: new correct information, 
new incorrect information, known correct information and known incorrect information. The 
interviewer’s primary objective is to collect new correct information. 
 
 
Figure 4. Simplified illustration of the interviewees’ verbal behaviour considering the interviewer’s knowledge 
and veracity of the information revealed. 
 
Relating interviewees’ cognitive and verbal processes. Surveying convicted suspects 
about their reasons to confess showed a link between their perceptions of the interviewer’s 
knowledge (e.g. “The police will eventually prove I did it”) or their interview goal (e.g. “I want 
to get it off my chest”) with their verbal behaviour (confession; Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, 
1994). However, such simple relationships do not seem to cover all situations properly, such as 
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when the interviewees pursue conflicting goals. As described above, the conflicting goals place 
the interviewees in an information dilemma, and results in a limited willingness to share 
information (i.e. they want to reveal some information but do not want to share all their 
knowledge). This in turn leads them to use subtle counter-interrogation strategies. In order to 
choose productive counter-interrogation strategies the interviewees may attempt to access as 
much information as possible, and hence the perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge play 
a crucial role. This is in line with literature indicating that the suspects and sources typically 
reflect on the interviewer’s knowledge and these perceptions affect their decisions during the 
interview (Moston & Engelberg, 2011; Soufan, 2011). Below, the relation of the interviewees’ 
cognitive and verbal processes are illustrated in two cases. 
First, consider a guilty suspect aiming to convince the interviewer that s/he is innocent. 
This suspect needs to reveal some information to show his or her innocence but cannot reveal 
too much information that would show his or her guilt. This suspect may access the 
interviewer’s knowledge in order to use goal-directed counter-interrogation strategies. If the 
suspect perceives that the interviewer does not hold specific information, s/he will use more 
withholding counter-interrogation strategies (e.g. “I will not tell any information that might be 
incriminating for me”). These withholding strategies will likely result in known incorrect or 
new incorrect information. In contrast, if the suspect perceives the interviewer to hold specific 
information, s/he will use more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies concerning this 
specific information (e.g. “I will reveal the information that is already known to the interviewer 
as it is meaningless to withhold this”). This in turn will likely result in correct known or correct 
new information. 
Second, consider a source aiming to get money from the police while simultaneously 
sharing sympathy for his or her friends in the group. This source needs to reveal some 
information to get the money but cannot reveal too much information to not betray his or her 
friends. As above, the source may consider the interviewer’s knowledge in order to choose 
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goal-directed counter-interrogation strategies. For example, concerning the information that the 
source perceives the interviewer is after, s/he will use a more withholding counter-interrogation 
strategy (e.g. “I will figure out what the interviewer is after, and then make sure not to give him 
or her what s/he wants”). This will likely result in known incorrect information or new incorrect 
information. In contrast, if the source perceives the interviewer to hold specific information, 
s/he will use more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies with respect to this specific 
information (e.g. “I will reveal the information that is already known to the interviewer as it is 
meaningless to withhold this“). Consequently, this will result in known correct information or 
new correct information. These two examples illustrate that the suspects’/sources’ conflicting 
interview goal regulates their perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge, which in turn affects 
their choice of counter-interrogation strategy and verbal behaviour. 
Perspective-taking. Galinsky and colleagues (2008) describe perspective taking as the 
“cognitive capacity to consider the world from other viewpoints and allows an individual to 
anticipate the behaviour and reactions of others” (p. 378). Taking the perspective of the 
opponents has shown to be effective in negotiations (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), and is of 
importance for the interviewer (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008, 2015). By taking the interviewees’ 
perspective the interviewer can use the knowledge about the interviewees’ cognitive and verbal 
processes in three ways (see also Figure 5). First, by considering the interviewees’ perspective 
during the interview planning, the interviewer can cognitively simulate alternative scenarios of 
how the interviewees could behave during the interview. Based on this, the interviewer can 
prepare tactics for how to conduct the interview and how to react depending on the 
interviewees’ statements. Second, by observing the interviewees’ verbal behaviours and taking 
their perspectives during the interview, the interviewer can anticipate the interviewees’ 
interview goals and counter-interrogation strategies. Based on this, the interviewer can employ 
tactics that counteract the interviewees’ choice of counter-interrogation strategies. Third, taking 
the interviewees’ perspective can help the interviewer to analyse the interview outcome. Based 
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on the interviewees’ verbal behaviour the interviewer can seek to anticipate the interviewees’ 
counter-interrogation strategies and interview goals, which in turn can help to assess the 
credibility of the information revealed and whether they revealed their knowledge. For 
example, knowing that a source shares sympathy with some group members but does not have 
sympathy for the group’s interests can explain why the source withholds information on specific 
members (e.g. “I don’t know that”) but the information revealed on the group’s planning of an 
attack is still rather credible. In the following sections, this thesis focuses mainly on the 
planning and implementation of the interview by considering the interviewees’ cognitive and 
verbal processes. 
 
 
Figure 5. Taking the perspective of the interviewees can help the interviewer to plan, conduct and analyse the 
interview. 
 
Tactical Tier 
The tactical tier described in this thesis includes two interview techniques both consisting of a 
collection of interview tactics. The two interview techniques aim to elicit new information by 
considering interviewees’ cognitive and verbal processes. This section starts with the 
presentation of the research on HUMINT interviewing (namely the Scharff-technique) and then 
on suspect interviewing (namely the SUE-technique), as this order matches the chronology in 
which the studies were conducted.  
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Scharff-technique 
Overview of the Scharff tactics. The scientific development of the Scharff-technique was 
inspired by Hanns Scharff (1907-1992; Toliver, 1997). Scharff worked in the textile industry 
in Johannesburg, South Africa, and was drafted into German military service during a home 
leave. During World War II, Scharff worked for the German Luftwaffe at the Intelligence and 
Evaluation Center West at Oberursel, Germany. After the war, Scharff moved to the US, 
advised security agencies and taught his style of interviewing before he moved on to work 
successfully as a mosaic artist in his own company.  
Relevant for this thesis is Scharff’s time during the war when he interviewed hundreds 
of US and British combat pilots (Scharff, 1950; Toliver, 1997). When Scharff came to 
Oberursel he first observed the prisoners of war (POWs) during the interrogations his 
colleagues conducted. By taking the POWs perspectives, Scharff identified the counter-
interrogation strategies they used to resist the conventional interrogations. Based on his 
observations, Scharff developed his own way of interviewing which allowed him to counteract 
the POWs’ counter-interrogation strategies. Broadly speaking, Scharff was known for his 
friendly, respectful and conversational interviews and that he appeared extremely 
knowledgeable. His approach was respected by superiors (e.g. sergeant Bert Nagel: “I read the 
reports each interrogator wrote and in this way knew which ones were best. Scharff was 
unbeatable!” Toliver, 1997, p. 308), by POWs (e.g. US Army Air Corps Colonel Hub Zemke: 
“What did he get out of me? There is no doubt in my mind that he did extract something, but I 
haven’t the slightest idea what. If you talked to him about the weather or anything else, he no 
doubt got some information or confirmation from it. His technique was psychic, not physical. I 
had the feeling that he was truly Germany’s Master Interrogator so my motto was beware.” 
Toliver, 1997, p. 193), and recently also by leading psychological scientists (e.g. Professor Ray 
Bull: Scharff was “one of Germany’s most successful interrogators”, Bull, 2014, p. 178).  
 The empirical examination of the Scharff-technique in this thesis draws on both Hanns 
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Scharff’s approach and the conceptual tier of the interviewing framework outlined above. The 
Scharff-technique consists of several tactics aiming to elicit new information from sources who 
face an information management dilemma (i.e. they want to reveal some information but do not 
want to share all known information). The first tactic is the friendly approach, which stipulates 
the interviewer should establish and maintain a pleasant, respectful and conversational 
atmosphere during the interview. The second tactic is not pressing for information. This tactic 
instructs the interviewer to ask very few (if any) questions, and open-ended questions instead 
of specific questions. The friendly approach tactic and the not pressing for information tactic 
form the foundation and should be implemented throughout the interview. The third tactic is 
the illusion of knowing it all, which directs the interviewer to present the already known 
information. In doing so the interviewer gives the sources the opportunity to add details. The 
fourth tactic is the confirmation/disconfirmation. HUMINT interviewers frequently have 
conflicting information about a topic (e.g. the place of the attack can be a main station or a 
shopping mall) or specific pieces of information for which the reliability is uncertain. In these 
cases, the interviewer can elicit new information by presenting the unreliable piece of 
information within a claim, waiting a second and hence giving the sources the chance to confirm 
or disconfirm the specific information. That means, the illusion of knowing it all tactic aims to 
collect generally new information, whereas the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic aims to 
collect the reliability of specific pieces of information. Finally, the fifth tactic is the ignore new 
information. This tactic encourages the interviewer conceal his or her interest for information 
and treat the information revealed as known or unimportant (e.g. by not repeating claims and 
not commenting on information revealed). These Scharff tactics have been examined in a line 
of experimental studies, which will be described next.  
Previous research on the Scharff-technique. Examining a HUMINT interaction in 
which a source faces an information management dilemma requires a specific set of 
independent measures and experimental set-ups. Therefore, the following dependent measures 
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were proposed to capture information elicitation in such interactions (e.g. Granhag, 2010; 
Granhag, Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015). First, the interviewer must have the primary goal 
of collecting new information. This is undoubtedly the most important objective in HUMINT 
interactions as new information can help to solve and prevent crimes. In the studies on the 
Scharff-technique, persons blind to the experimental hypotheses coded the new information 
revealed while listening to the audio records. Second, the interviewer needs to hide his or her 
information objectives in order to reduce the risk that the source will withhold this particular 
information or fabricate information about the knowledge gap (e.g. “I will try to figure out what 
the interviewer is after, and then make sure not to give him or her what s/he wants”). In the 
experiments, the participants’ perception of the interviewer’s information objectives was 
mapped by a Likert-scale question. Third, concerning the source’s perception of the 
interviewer’s knowledge the interviewer should want the source to overestimate it. The rationale 
of this is that the source should be forthcoming in terms of the information that s/he perceives 
the interviewer to hold (e.g. “It is meaningless to deny or hold back what the interviewer already 
knows, hence I will reveal this information”). The participants’ perception of the interviewer’s 
knowledge was captured using a Likert-scale or presenting a checklist that include all available 
information and where the participants marked the information that they believed was known 
to the interviewer. Finally, the interviewer should want the source to underestimate the amount 
of new information revealed. This is important because, for example, sources believing to have 
not revealed much new information could be motivated to talk to the interviewer again because 
they assume to have achieved their goal by revealing only little information. In order to capture 
this the participants were asked to mark in a further checklist the specific information they 
perceived to have revealed during the interview. By relating this perception of new information 
revealed to the objective amount of new information revealed it was possible to assess the extent 
to which each participant over-/underestimated the amount of new information revealed. 
HUMINT interactions often have three features in common (Granhag, Montecinos, & 
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Oleszkiewicz, 2015). First, the interviewer holds some intelligence about a future crime but has 
knowledge gaps, which s/he wants to fill during the interview with the source. Second, the 
source holds information that can fill some of these information gaps but not necessarily all of 
them. Third, the source is in an information management dilemma (i.e. the source is motivated 
to reveal some information but not all the known information). In order to simulate these 
features Granhag, Montecinos and Oleszkiewicz (2015) introduced an experimental setting in 
which they instructed participants to prepare to play the role of a source in a phone interview. 
For this purpose, the participants received background information on a terrorist group planning 
an attack. Furthermore, they were instructed to strike a balance between not revealing too little 
information as they need assistance from the police with their own problems and not revealing 
too much information as then they may risk retaliation from the group. Then they conducted a 
phone interview with a police contact, and finally filled out questionnaires. The experimental 
conditions differed with respect to the interview protocols the interviewer used during the phone 
call. 
When this thesis research began, the Scharff-technique had been examined in three 
studies, all of which used the experimental set-up described above. In the first study (Granhag, 
Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015), the Scharff-technique was conceptualized by the tactics 
described above and was compared against the open question technique (asking open-ended 
questions only) and the specific question technique (asking specific questions only). The 
Scharff-technique resulted in a similar amount of new information as the other two interview 
conditions. The authors explained this unexpected finding with a rather disorganised/mixed 
implementation of the illusion of knowing it all tactic and the confirmation/disconfirmation 
tactic. However, the sources interviewed with the Scharff-technique found it more difficult to 
understand the interviewer’s information objectives (vs. both control techniques), and they 
perceived themselves to have revealed less information (vs. the specific question technique). 
 	 27 
The second (Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Montecinos, 2014) and third study about the 
Scharff-technique (May, Granhag, & Oleszkiewicz, 2014) advanced the experimental set-up 
and the implementation of the Scharff tactics of the first study on three points. First, for the 
Scharff conditions, the illusion of knowing it all tactic was clearly implemented before 
presenting the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic. Second, the Direct Approach was chosen as 
a point of comparison. The rationale for this was that US intelligence interviewers are instructed 
to open with the Direct Approach (US Army, 2006; US Government, 2009), and in line with 
this most US interviewers typically start with this approach (Redlich, Kelly, & Miller, 2011; 
Semel, 2013). In accordance with the Field Manual 2-22.3 (US Army, 2006) the Direct 
Approach was conceptualized as a combination of open-ended and specific questions. Finally, 
two subjective measures were calibrated. Specifically, the participants marked in checklists the 
information (a) they believed the interviewer held prior to the interview, and (b) they perceived 
to have revealed during the interview (in the first study by Granhag, Montecinos, & 
Oleszkiewicz, 2015 Likert-scale questions were used). 
The main difference between the second (Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Montecinos, 2014) 
and third study (May et al., 2014) was the implementation of the confirmation/disconfirmation 
tactic: While the second study examined only the confirmation tactic, the third study examined 
the confirmation tactic and the disconfirmation tactic separately in two interview conditions. In 
both studies the sources in the Scharff conditions revealed more new information compared to 
the sources questioned with the Direct Approach. The sources in the Scharff conditions 
perceived the interviewer to hold comparatively more information. Furthermore, the sources in 
the Scharff conditions underestimated how much new information they had revealed, whereas 
the sources in the Direct Approach overestimated it. Unexpectedly, in both studies no 
differences were found between the Scharff-technique and the Direct Approach with respect to 
the sources’ difficulty to understand the interviewer’s information objective. Examining the 
confirmation/disconfirmation-tactic more closely in the third study, the use of the confirmation 
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tactic made it more difficult for the sources to understand the interviewer’s information 
objectives and made the sources overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge to a higher extent, 
compared to the disconfirmation tactic. This thesis extends the examination on the Scharff 
tactics with two studies. However, before outlining these studies the SUE tactics must first be 
introduced. 
 
Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE)-technique 
Overview of the SUE tactics. Past research has shown that the SUE-technique can be used to 
obtain verbal cues of deceit about past actions in interviews with single (e.g. Sorochinski et al., 
2013) or small groups of suspects (Granhag, Rangmar, & Strömwall, 2014), and also about 
intended actions in interviews with single suspects (Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2013; for 
a meta-analysis on the SUE-technique see Hartwig et al., 2014). Recently, the objective of the 
SUE-technique has shifted from eliciting cues of deceit to eliciting new information. In the 
following, this thesis focuses solely on this new line of research, which to date has been 
examined in two published studies (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016). 
In general, the SUE-technique consists of questioning and disclosure tactics. An 
interviewer employing the SUE-technique needs to know different types of questions. For 
example, open-ended invitations/questions (e.g. “Tell me everything you did yesterday 
evening”), probing questions (i.e. WH-questions; e.g. “Who did you talk to at the party?”), and 
specific/closed-ended question (i.e. requesting of specific details; e.g. “Have you talked to 
Jane?”). The different types of questions can generate different types of answers. For example, 
open-ended invitations allow for a wider range of responses than specific questions. 
Researchers typically advise to use open-ended invitations (e.g. Milne & Bull, 2000), and 
classify specific questions as rather inappropriate (e.g. Oxburgh, Ost, & Cherryman, 2010). 
However, specific questions can be profitable when used deliberately. For example, a specific 
question may induce stating suspects to comment on a detail asked about in the question. 
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Therefore, specific questions may be suitable in order to elicit statement-evidence 
inconsistencies when asking questions about known information.  
The evidence disclosure tactics concern the timing and framing (or manner) of the 
evidence disclosure. The timing refers to when to disclose the evidence. For example, an 
interviewer can disclose the evidence early, late or in a gradual manner (see Granhag, 
Strömwall, Willén, & Hartwig, 2013 for an incremental disclosure of one piece of evidence). 
In contrast, the framing describes how to disclose the evidence. Depending on the timing of the 
disclosure the framing of the evidence naturally differs. That means, when disclosing the 
evidence before asking questions, it is presented in a rather pure and neutral form (e.g. “We 
have CCTV footage that you were at the station”). In this case the suspects can subsequently 
use the evidence as a “brick to build the statement”. In contrast, when asking questions on the 
evidence before disclosing it, the evidence loses its pure and neutral form in relation to the 
interview. Specifically, when asking question on the evidence without disclosing it, it 
subsequently turns into statement-evidence consistencies (e.g. “What you say fits to CCTV 
footage showing that you were at the station”) or statement-evidence inconsistencies (e.g. 
“Your statement is inconsistent to CCTV footage showing that you were at the station”). The 
evidence then takes on an agreeing (statement-evidence consistency) or disagreeing component 
(statement-evidence inconsistency). Next the examination of the SUE tactics will be described. 
Previous research on the SUE-technique. Examining information elicitation in 
suspect interviews requires a minimum of three dependent measures (e.g. Tekin et al., 2015). 
First, the interviewer’s primary goal is the amount of new information revealed, as this can help 
to solve crimes. For the experimental analysis, persons blind to the experimental hypotheses 
coded the new information revealed about a critical phase of the crime by listening to the 
interview records. Second, statement-evidence inconsistencies give the interviewer the chance 
to estimate and possibly change the suspects’ counter-interrogation strategies. Specifically, a 
statement-evidence inconsistency indicates that the suspect is using a more withholding 
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counter-interrogation strategy, whereas a statement-evidence consistency suggests that the 
suspect is using a more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategy. As outlined below, by 
disclosing the inconsistencies the interviewer can attempt to change the suspects’ choice of 
counter-interrogation strategy from more to less withholding. The statement-evidence 
inconsistencies refer to known incorrect information, whereas statement-evidence consistencies 
describe known correct information (described above). In the studies, the inconsistencies were 
captured by coding contradictions and omissions while listening to the interview recordings 
(i.e. by comparing the suspects’ statement with the available pieces of evidence). Finally, the 
suspects’ perception of the interviewer’s knowledge is expected to be crucial in influencing the 
suspects’ choice of counter-interrogation strategy. Broadly speaking, the suspects are expected 
to use more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies for specific information that they 
perceive is known to the interviewer (e.g. “I will reveal the information that is already known 
to the interviewer as it is meaningless to withhold this”), and withholding counter-interrogation 
strategies for specific information that they perceive is unknown to the interviewer (e.g. “I will 
not tell any information that might be incriminating for me”). The perception of the 
interviewer’s knowledge was captured by Likert-scale ratings or by completing a checklist.  
Tekin and colleagues (2015) also introduced an experimental design that mirrors a crime 
scenario in which a person committed a crime consisting of several phases. The interviewer 
held information about some of the crime phases indicating the suspects’ involvement in the 
crime but which did not prove their guilt. That means, the interviewer lacked information on 
the critical phase of the crime and aimed to collect this information during the interview. In the 
experiment, the participants committed a mock crime consisting of three phases (referred to 
here as phases A, B and C). The interviewer held information about two of the crime phases 
(Phase A and B) indicating the suspects’ involvement in the crime but lacked information on 
the critical phase of the crime (Phase C). Then, the participants prepared for the interviews, and 
were instructed that it was their goal to convince the interviewer of their innocence. That is, all 
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suspects were guilty and denying. The interviewer questioned the suspects by using the 
evidence s/he held in different ways (depending on the interview condition). After the interview 
was finished the participants filled out a questionnaire. 
When this thesis research on the SUE-technique started, two studies about the SUE 
tactics aiming to elicit new information had been conducted. In the first study a version of the 
SUE-technique was compared against early disclosure of the evidence (Tekin et al., 2015). The 
interview conditions were divided into three phases (referred to here as Phases 1, 2 and 3). For 
the Early disclosure condition, the interviewer disclosed all the evidence at the outset of the 
interview before asking questions about it in Phase 1 and 2. The Early disclosure mode was 
seen as a reasonable point of comparison because of its widespread real-world implementation 
(e.g. Leo, 1996). For the SUE confrontation condition, the interviewer started Phase 1 by asking 
specific and open-ended questions about crime Phase A without disclosing the evidence on it. 
The interviewer’s objective of this step was to elicit statement-evidence inconsistencies. In a 
next step the interviewer then confronted the suspects with the in/consistencies without giving 
them the chance to comment on these (still Phase 1). In Phase 2, the interviewer repeated these 
two steps for the evidence on Phase B. The final questioning in Phase 3 was the same for both 
conditions; the interviewer asked open-ended questions about crime Phase C, for which s/he 
lacks information. The SUE confrontation condition resulted in more statement-evidence 
inconsistencies, more new information about the critical phase of the crime, and the suspects 
overestimated the interviewer’s knowledge to a higher degree (vs. Early disclosure condition).  
In the second study, two SUE versions were compared against the Early disclosure 
condition (Tekin et al., 2016). The two SUE conditions were implemented in three phases as 
described above, and differed only in the way the interviewer disclosed the statement-evidence 
inconsistencies (in Phase 1 and 2). For the SUE confrontation condition, the interviewer 
confronted the suspects with their inconsistencies without giving them the chance to comment 
on them. In contrast, for the SUE confrontation/explain condition the interviewer confronted 
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the suspects with their inconsistencies and asked them explicitly to explain them. The two SUE 
conditions generated more statement-evidence inconsistencies than the Early disclosure 
condition. However, only the SUE confrontation condition resulted in more new information 
compared to the Early disclosure condition. This was unexpected as the suspects in both SUE 
conditions overestimated the interviewer’s knowledge about the critical phase of the crime 
(Phase C) to a higher degree than the suspects in the Early disclosure condition. Further analyses 
showed that for the SUE confrontation/explain condition a small group of suspects were 
reluctant to explain their inconsistencies and these suspects revealed less new information about 
the critical phase of the crime compared to the suspects who explained their inconsistencies 
previously. This shows that in order to elicit new information at a later stage in the interview, 
the suspects need to use more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies early on in the 
interview. Simply put, the interviewer needs to keep the suspect in the game in order to obtain 
new information. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
General and Specific Aims 
The overall objective of the empirical studies was to examine the developed interviewing 
framework aiming to elicit information from sources and suspects. As described above, the 
framework consists of the conceptual tier and the tactical tier. Within this thesis, two studies on 
the Scharff-technique and one study on the SUE-technique were conducted. The findings of 
these studies support the tactical and the conceptual tier. From the tactical tier, the studies can 
identify how to use the tactics in order to reach sub-goals and finally obtain new information. 
On the conceptual tier, the studies can map the mechanisms behind the tactics, which is valuable 
for training and research purposes. Derived from this rationale, the three studies focused on the 
following specific aims: Study I examined how to combine the illusion of knowing it all tactic 
and the confirmation tactic in order to influence the sources’ perceptions of the interviewer’s 
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knowledge and collect new information; Study II examined how to implement the illusion of 
knowing it all tactic in such a manner that encourages the sources to focus on the interviewer’s 
knowledge and steer away from his or her knowledge gaps; and Study III examined how to 
disclose statement-evidence inconsistencies in order to make the suspects overestimate the 
interviewer’s knowledge, to use more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies and to 
collect new information. Below, these three studies are described briefly (see Appendix A for 
the complete publications). 
 
Study I 
This study was primarily about the combination of the illusion of knowing it all tactic and the 
confirmation tactic. Two variations of the Scharff-technique were compared with the Direct 
Approach (see Table 1 of Publication I in the Appendix for the processes of the three 
conditions). The Scharff conditions differed with respect to the order of an initial open-ended 
question and the confirmation tactic (used within three claims). Specifically, after employing 
the illusion of knowing it all tactic it differed in if the interviewer first asked the initial open-
ended question and then employed the confirmation tactic (Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition), or 
first implemented the confirmation tactic and then asked the initial open-ended question 
(Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition). In both Scharff conditions the interviewer finished with a 
second open-ended question, and used both the friendly approach tactic and the not pressing 
for information tactic during the full interview. For the Direct Approach the interviewer started 
with an open-ended question, asked three specific questions (which s/he repeated if the sources 
failed to answer them), and finished with a final open-ended question. 
Based on previous research it was predicted that the Scharff conditions (vs. the Direct 
Approach) would result in more new information in response to the initial open-ended question, 
to the claims and during the full interview. Comparing the Scharff conditions, it was predicted 
that the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition would result in more new information in response to 
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the initial open-ended question, the claims and during the full interview. The rationale of this 
was that for the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition the claims were the sources first opportunity to 
contribute to the interview, and this was expected to result in an increased willingness to 
comment on them. Furthermore, it was expected that for the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition the 
use of the confirmation tactic would reinforce the illusion of knowing it all tactic before asking 
the initial open-ended question, what should increase the outcome of this question.  
Moreover, it was predicted that the sources in the Scharff conditions would perceive the 
interviewer to hold comparatively more information prior to the interview, and they would find 
it more difficult to understand his or her information objective. Finally, it was predicted that 
the sources in the Scharff conditions would underestimate the amount of new information 
revealed, whereas the sources in the Direct Approach would overestimate it. 
Method. The participants (N = 93) took the role of a source in a phone interview with 
a police contact and were instructed to strike a balance between not revealing too little 
information (in order to get help from the police) or too much information (as they had 
sympathy for the group members and interests). That is, they pursued conflicting goals and 
faced an information management dilemma. In comparison to previous studies, the participants 
received less case-related information which they had available during the phone call (24 pieces 
of information compared to, for example, 35 pieces of information in the study by May et al., 
2014). That is, they had to use the information in a more sophisticated manner. The interviewer 
held 12 pieces of the information, and for the Scharff conditions used them all to implement 
the illusion of knowing it all tactic. After the interview which used one of the three interview 
protocols described above, the participants were asked to fill out questionnaires. Specifically, 
they were asked to rate how easy/difficult it was to understand the interviewer’s information 
objective. Also, they were presented with two checklists, and marked the information they 
perceived they had revealed during the interview (Checklist 1), and the information they 
perceived the interviewer already held prior to the interview (Checklist 2). Two persons who 
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were blind to the experimental hypotheses coded the interview recordings with respect to what 
pieces of new information were revealed by the sources and at what times they were revealed 
during the interview.  
Results. In line with the predictions, the two Scharff conditions resulted in more new 
information after the first open-ended question and during the full interview, compared to the 
Direct Approach. However, only for the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition did the confirmation 
tactic result in more new information compared to the specific questions in the Direct Approach. 
Contrary to the predictions, no differences were found between the two Scharff conditions with 
respect to the new information revealed in response to the specific interview components or 
during the full interview.  
As predicted, the sources in the Scharff conditions found it comparatively more difficult 
to understand the interviewer’s information objectives, and perceived the interviewer to hold 
more information (vs. the Direct Approach). Further analyses showed that the sources in the 
Scharff conditions overestimated the interviewer’s knowledge to a comparatively higher extent 
and this overestimation was mainly assigned to the pieces of information used for the 
confirmation tactic. Finally, in support of the prediction, the sources in the Scharff conditions 
underestimated the amount of new information revealed, whereas the sources in the Direct 
Approach overestimated it. 
Discussion. Both combinations of the Scharff tactics outperformed the Direct Approach 
with respect to all important measures. That means, both combinations of the illusion of 
knowing it all tactic and confirmation tactic were fruitful in influencing the sources’ perception 
of the interviewer’s knowledge and in gathering new information. However, comparing the two 
Scharff versions no clear order effects of the tactics were found. Nevertheless, a closer review 
on the results proved to be worthwhile. 
The confirmation tactic resulted in more new information than the specific questions 
only when it was presented before the initial open-ended question. This finding suggests that 
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the sources were more ambitious to take the first chance to comment on the claims and 
contribute with information. However, employing the confirmation tactic before (vs. after) the 
initial open-ended question did not reinforce the sources’ perceptions of the interviewer’s 
knowledge to such an extent that they revealed more new information in response to this initial 
question. Possibly, the confirmation tactic needs to be used for more pieces of information in 
order to reinforce the illusion of knowing it all to a considerable extent. 
Furthermore, the sources in both Scharff conditions perceived the interviewer to hold 
more information and revealed more new information in response to the initial open-ended 
question, compared to the sources in the Direct Approach. This indicates that the illusion of 
knowing it all tactic was successful in prompting sources to reveal new information. Differently 
put, the illusion of knowing it all tactic made the sources reveal new information that went 
beyond the information presented to implement the tactic. However, the sources overestimated 
the interviewer’s knowledge mainly due to the pieces of information used in the confirmation 
tactic. That means, the illusion of knowing it all tactic as such failed to make the sources 
overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge. This finding was the starting point for Study II. 
 
Study II 
This study focused on how to introduce the illusion of knowing it all tactic. For this purpose, 
Study II examined how two ways of introducing the illusion of knowing it all tactic affect the 
sources’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge (Experiment 1) and the sources’ 
perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge gaps (Experiment 2). In the traditional condition 
the interviewer introduced the presentation of the known information by stating: “I already 
possess most of the most important information, so let me just share that information first”; this 
introduction was similar to that used by Hanns Scharff (Toliver, 1997) and to that implemented 
in previous studies (e.g. May et al., 2014). In contrast, in the just start condition the interviewer 
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just started to present the known information without an explicit statement on the amount and 
relevance of the information that s/he held.  
As outlined previously, the sources’ perception of the interviewer’s knowledge can be 
linked to research on social hypothesis testing. In general, humans prefer a diagnostic strategy 
to test social hypotheses, which includes the comprehensive analysis of the hypothesis and its 
alternatives (Bassok & Trope, 1984). However, humans also prefer a more positive test strategy 
when instructed to test an extreme (radical) hypothesis, in comparison to a more moderate 
hypothesis (Trope & Bassok, 1983). The positive test strategy refers to the preference of 
searching for hypothesis-consistent information and this testing can – but do not necessarily 
have to – confirm the hypothesis (Hodgins & Zuckerman, 1993; Klayman & Ha, 1987). In 
contrast, a confirmatory test strategy describes that the hypothesis biases the search and 
interpretation of information in such a hypothesis-consistent way that inevitably results in a 
confirmation of the hypothesis (Skov & Sherman, 1986). It was expected that the extreme 
statement in the traditional condition may trigger alertness and the sources would test a more 
extreme (radical) hypothesis (e.g. “It is impossible that the interviewer holds all important 
information”). Thereby they were expected to use a positive test strategy to uncover information 
gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge (in terms of “The interviewer said s/he holds all important 
information so I need to find information gaps”). In contrast, the sources in the just start 
condition were expected to be surprised by the known information and consequently test a more 
moderate hypothesis (e.g. “The interviewer already holds some important information”) and 
focus more on the known information possessed by the interviewer (in terms of “It is possible 
the interviewer holds further information”). 
The sources’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge (Experiment 1) and knowledge 
gaps (Experiment 2) were examined separately in order to avoid order effects and confounds. 
For Experiment 1, it was predicted that the sources in the just start condition would test the 
interviewer’s knowledge more for known information, and would infer the interviewer to hold 
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more knowledge, compared to the sources in the traditional condition. For Experiment 2, it was 
expected that the sources in the just start condition would test the interviewer’s knowledge less 
for unknown information, and would infer the interviewer had fewer knowledge gaps, 
compared to the sources in the traditional condition. 
General Method. The procedure of the two experiments differed only with respect to 
the post-interview questionnaire that measured the sources perception of the knowledge or 
knowledge gaps. In both experiments, the participants (N = 60 in each experiment) prepared 
for the role of a source calling a police contact. Therefore, they had to memorize case-related 
information about 14 themes concerning a terrorist group planning an attack, and were 
instructed to strike a balance between not revealing too much or too little information. Then 
they called the police contact. Both interview conditions started with the friendly approach 
tactic, and then they differed with respect to the way of introducing the illusion of knowing it 
all tactic (described above). Next, for both conditions the interviewer presented the information 
on seven themes and interrupted the phone call. The rationale of this interruption was to avoid 
possible confounds which might arise when the sources would be allowed to reveal information. 
Finally, the participants filled out the questionnaire that differed between the two experiments.  
Experiment 1. This experiment captured the sources’ perceptions of the interviewer’s 
knowledge. Therefore, the participants were asked to rate the extent to which they perceived 
the interviewer already held information on the group and their activities. This question aimed 
to map the sources global perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge. In addition, they were 
asked to write down the information they believed the interviewer held, and rate the extent to 
which they thought during the phone call about which further information the interviewer could 
hold. These two questions aimed to measure the extent to which the sources tested the 
interviewer’s knowledge for known information. For the written answers, the information was 
coded for predetermined themes.  
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The results gave mixed support for the predictions. The sources in the just start condition 
globally perceived the interviewer to hold more information, compared to the sources in the 
traditional condition. However, no differences were found between the two conditions with 
respect to the extent to which they tested the interviewer’s knowledge for known information.  
Experiment 2. This experiment measured sources’ perceptions of the interviewer’s 
knowledge gaps. The participants were asked to rate the extent to which they perceived the 
interviewer had knowledge gaps in terms of the group and their activities. This question was 
asked in order to capture the source’s global perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge gaps. 
Furthermore, participants were asked to write down the information that they perceived the 
interviewer did not know, and rated the extent to which they searched for gaps in the 
interviewer’s knowledge. These questions aimed to map the extent to which the sources tested 
the interviewer’s knowledge for unknown information. Again for the written answers, the 
information was coded for predetermined themes. 
Unexpectedly, no difference was found between the two conditions with respect to the 
sources’ global perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge gaps. However, as predicted, the 
sources in the just start condition tested the interviewer’s knowledge less actively for unknown 
information than the sources in the traditional condition.  
Discussion. Based on the research on social hypothesis testing, a link was expected 
between the extent the sources tested the interviewer’s knowledge for known/unknown 
information and their global perception of the interviewer’s knowledge/knowledge gaps. 
Unexpectedly, this link was not found. However, these experiments showed that the sources in 
the just start condition searched less actively for gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge, and 
inferred that the interviewer held more knowledge, compared to the sources in the traditional 
condition. This suggests that in the just start condition the hypothesis could have been 
confirmed without searching comparatively more for known information. Furthermore, the 
sources in the traditional condition might have used a positive test strategy as they tested the 
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interviewer’s knowledge relatively more for unknown information without drawing an 
inference in favour of the hypothesis. Overall, the present findings speak in favour of just 
starting the presentation of the known information when aiming to keep the sources’ interests 
away from the interviewer’s knowledge gaps, and to focus them on the interviewer’s knowledge 
instead.  
  
Study III  
This study examined how to use evidence in order to elicit new information in suspect 
interviews. Two modes of evidence disclosure derived from the SUE-technique were compared 
against an early disclosure mode. All suspects were guilty and in denial (described in the 
method section below). The three interviews protocols consisted of four Phases (1, 2, 3 and 4; 
see Figure 1 of Publication III in the Appendix A for the processes of the three conditions). In 
the SUE conditions the interviewer elicited statement-evidence inconsistencies about the two 
crime phases s/he held evidence for (A and B) by asking specific and open-ended questions 
about it in two phases of the interview (2 and 3). The SUE conditions differed with respect to 
the way the interviewer introduced the interview (Phase 1), and disclosed the elicited 
in/consistencies (Phase 2 and 3). For the SUE-Confrontation (SUE-C) condition, the 
interviewer started off in a business-like manner (Phase 1), and confronted the suspects with 
their in/consistencies without giving them the chance to comment on them (Phase 2 and 3). In 
contrast, for the SUE-Introduce-Present-Respond (IPR) condition, the interviewer introduced 
the interview in a non-guilt-presumptive manner (Phase 1), presented the inconsistencies in a 
way that allowed the suspects to comment on these, and then responded to their comments 
(Phase 2 and 3); at all times in a non-judgemental manner. For the Early disclosure condition, 
the interviewer disclosed all the evidence at the outset of the interview (Phase 1) before asking 
open-ended questions on it (Phase 2 and 3). The final questioning (Phase 4) concerned the 
critical phase of the crime the interviewer lacked information on (Phase C) and was the same 
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for all three interview conditions. Here the interviewer made open-ended invitations and asked 
follow-up questions. 
Based on previous research it was predicted that the SUE conditions (vs. the Early 
disclosure condition) would result in more statement-evidence inconsistencies, and more new 
information about the critical phase of the crime. Comparing the SUE conditions, it was 
predicted that the SUE-IPR condition would result in more new information. The rationale for 
this was that the non-judgemental approach used in SUE-IPR condition should increase the 
suspects’ willingness to discuss the inconsistencies with the interviewer in Phase 3. Based on 
previous studies (Tekin et al., 2016), this in turn was expected to increase the amount of new 
information revealed during Phase 4. Furthermore, it was predicted that the suspects in the SUE 
conditions would overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge about the critical phase of the crime 
during the interview Phase 3 and 4 to a higher degree than the suspects in the Early disclosure 
condition. The rationale behind this was the way the interviewer used the evidence in order to 
elicit and disclose statement-evidence inconsistencies. Finally, it was predicted that the non-
judgemental approach in the SUE-IPR condition would make the suspects perceive the 
interviewer’s behaviour as being more respectful and friendlier than what the suspects in the 
SUE-C condition and the Early disclosure condition perceived.  
Method. The participants (N = 88) conducted a mock crime – “preparing an attack” – 
that consisted of three phases (A, B and C). Simply put, they had to perform several tasks on a 
campus. After returning the participants were instructed that the police would interview them 
as a suspect, and they should imagine that they have consulted with their lawyer, who informed 
the police that his or her client was innocent and willing to make a statement. The interviewer 
held evidence on the suspects’ crime Phase A and B which cast suspicion against the suspects 
but did not prove any criminal activity. This evidence was used differently in the three interview 
conditions (described above). When the interviews were finished the participants filled out a 
post-interview questionnaire. They were asked to rate how respectful the interviewer was 
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towards them and how friendly the interviewer was. Furthermore, the experimenter played back 
for each participant his or her audio recordings of the interview and paused it four times (after 
Phase 1, 2, 3 and 4). At each pause the participants used a checklist to report what information 
they perceived the interviewer held that they had not told him or her. This process provided 
insights about the influence of specific interview components on the suspects’ overestimations 
of the interviewer’s knowledge in the course of the interview. The audio records were coded 
with respect to the new information revealed about the critical phase of the crime, and the 
statement-evidence inconsistencies. 
Result. As predicted, both SUE conditions resulted in more statement-evidence 
inconsistencies in Phase 2 and 3, compared to the Early disclosure condition. Unexpectedly, in 
Phase 4 only the SUE-IPR condition resulted in more new information compared to the Early 
disclosure condition.  
With respect to the suspects’ overestimations of the interviewer’s knowledge about the 
critical phase of the crime, a significant increase during the interview was found for the SUE 
conditions but not for the Early disclosure condition (the suspects in the SUE conditions 
overestimated the interviewer’s knowledge to a higher extent in Phase 3 compared to Phase 1, 
and in Phase 4 compared to Phase 1, 2 and 3). Furthermore, in Phase 4 the suspects in the SUE 
conditions overestimated the interviewer’s knowledge to a higher extent, compared to the 
suspects in the Early disclosure condition. Hence, the predictions were partially supported.  
The results concerning the perception of the interview atmosphere were partially in line 
with the predictions. The suspects in the SUE-IPR condition felt that they were treated with 
more respect and perceived the interviewer as friendlier compared to the suspects in the SUE-
C condition. No differences were found between the Early disclosure condition and any of the 
two SUE conditions with respect to these two questions.  
Finally, exploratory analyses examined the effects of the two ways of disclosing 
statement-evidence inconsistencies (SUE conditions) on the suspects’ forthcomingness in 
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Phase 3. Here the SUE-IPR condition resulted in a larger proportion of forthcoming suspects2 
in Phase 3 compared to the SUE-C condition. Furthermore, it was found that across both SUE 
conditions the suspects who were forthcoming in Phase 3 revealed significantly more new 
information compared to the suspects who were withholding in Phase 3. This indicated that it 
was crucial that the suspects were forthcoming in Phase 3 in order to reveal new information 
subsequently.  
Discussion. This study found that in both SUE conditions the interviewer elicited more 
statement-evidence inconsistencies (vs. the Early disclosure condition) and made the suspects 
overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge about the critical phase of the crime in the course of 
the interview. However, only the non-judgemental implementation of the SUE-technique 
resulted in more new information than the Early disclosure condition. A likely explanation for 
this was that the SUE-IPR condition resulted in a more positive interview atmosphere and more 
forthcoming suspects in Phase 3 compared to the SUE-C condition. Therefore, it seems that the 
SUE-IPR condition resulted in an interview atmosphere which fostered suspects changing from 
a less to a more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategy in Phase 3 (i.e. before entering 
Phase 4). Explanatory analyses showed that this forthcomingness in Phase 3 was crucial in 
order to collect new information in Phase 4. Overall, these findings suggest that the non-
judgemental way of disclosing the elicited inconsistencies was beneficial.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The principal goal of this thesis was to develop an interviewing framework for information 
elicitation, consisting of the conceptual and tactical tiers. Therefore, two sets of tactics were 
derived from the conceptual tier and examined in three studies. In the HUMINT context, the 
                                                
2 Forthcoming suspects were defined as participants who generated no inconsistency or explained a minimum of 
one inconsistency in Phase 3. In contrast, withholding suspects were described as participants who generated a 
minimum of one inconsistency without explaining at least one inconsistency in Phase 3. 
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Scharff-technique has been shown to be fruitful in eliciting new information. In the criminal 
context, the non-judgemental version of the SUE-technique has been shown to be promising in 
eliciting new information. Below, the outcome of the studies are discussed with respect to the 
Scharff and SUE tactics and explained by using the conceptual tier. Then, the conceptual tier 
will be extended for research and training purposes. 
 
Scharff Tactics 
In this thesis two studies examined how to use available information in order to influence 
sources’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge and the amount of new information elicited 
in a HUMINT interaction. For the Scharff-technique, the interviewer primarily used the 
available information in two tactics: employing the illusion of knowing it all tactic, where the 
interviewer is instructed to present the known information at the outset of the interview, and 
the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic, which instructs the interviewer to present claims that 
include specific pieces of information which s/he wants to have affirmed or negated. In the 
following the effects of these two tactics are discussed. 
Illusion of knowing it all tactic. A goal of the illusion of knowing it all tactic is to 
collect new information by making the sources’ overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge 
(Granhag, 2010). In Study I, for the Scharff conditions the interviewer asked an initial open-
ended question either (a) after using the illusion of knowing it all tactic and before the 
confirmation tactic, or (b) after using both the illusion of knowing it all tactic and the 
confirmation tactic. For both Scharff conditions the initial open-ended question resulted in more 
new information than the initial open-ended question in the Direct Approach (a combination of 
open-ended and specific questions). This finding is in line with several previous studies (e.g. 
Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Montecinos, 2014). It shows that employing the illusion of knowing 
it all tactic with an open-ended question is fruitful in collecting new information.  
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In line with previous studies (e.g. May et al., 2014), Study I found that the sources for 
the Scharff conditions perceived the interviewer to hold more information compared to the 
sources for the Direct Approach. However, Study I was the first to show that the sources 
overestimated the interviewer’s knowledge mainly due to the confirmation tactic and not the 
illusion of knowing it all tactic. This finding suggests also that the illusion of knowing it all 
tactic made the sources “only” remember and perceive most of the actually presented 
information as known (instead of perceiving not presented information as known). Simply put, 
the illusion of knowing it all tactic resulted in an approximately correct perception of the 
interviewer’s knowledge. However, the objective of the illusion of knowing it all tactic to make 
the sources overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge was not accomplished.  
To address this shortcoming, Study II focused on how to start the illusion of knowing it 
all tactic in order to make the sources focus on the interviewer’s knowledge and steer away 
from the interviewer’s knowledge gaps. Therefore, two ways of introducing the presentation of 
known information were compared: a way where the interviewer just started to present the 
known information without an introductory statement, and a more traditional way where the 
interviewer used an extreme introductory statement on the amount and importance of the known 
information. This study found that when the interviewer just started to present the known 
information without such an introductory statement the sources tested the interviewer’s 
knowledge comparatively less for information gaps and generally perceived him or her to hold 
more information. That means, Study II offered a promising way for introducing the illusion of 
knowing it all tactic (i.e. just start the information presentation) in order to hide the 
interviewer’s information objectives and make the sources focus on the interviewer’s 
knowledge. 
Confirmation/disconfirmation tactic. An interviewer holding information with 
uncertain reliability can use the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic in order to elicit new 
information (Granhag, 2010; May et al., 2014). Previous research has shown that the 
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confirmation tactic hides the interviewer’s information objectives to a higher extent and makes 
the sources perceive the interviewer to hold more information compared to the disconfirmation 
tactic (May et al., 2014). Meanwhile, Oleszkiewicz, Granhag and Kleinman (2014) have found 
that using solely the confirmation tactic resulted in more new information compared to mixing 
the confirmation and disconfirmation tactic. Overall, these findings indicate an advantage of 
the confirmation tactic over the disconfirmation tactic. 
Focusing in on the confirmation tactic, Study I found that the confirmation tactic 
resulted in more new information compared to the specific questions only when it was presented 
before the initial open-ended questions. A possible explanation for this finding is that the 
sources were more motivated to comment on the claims when they were presented before (vs. 
after) the initial open-ended question, as this was their first chance to contribute with 
information. This finding suggests that it is advisable to use the confirmation tactic before 
asking an open-ended question when it is crucial to obtain knowledge about the reliability of a 
specific piece of information.  
As described above, Study I found that for the Scharff conditions the sources 
overestimated the interviewer’s knowledge mainly due to the confirmation tactic. This indicates 
that sources confirming a claim were unaware that the interviewer was actually unsure of the 
reliability of the specific information. This implies also that the confirmation tactic hides the 
interviewer’s information objective. Furthermore, it suggests that the confirmation tactic can 
contribute to reinforce the illusion of knowing it all tactic. However, in Study I the Scharff 
conditions resulted in a similar amount of new information revealed in response to the initial 
open-ended question when it was asked (a) after using the illusion of knowing it all tactic and 
before the confirmation tactic, or (b) after using the illusion of knowing it all tactic and the 
confirmation tactic. This suggests that the confirmation tactic did not reinforce the illusion of 
knowing it all tactic in a meaningful manner when it was used before the initial open-ended 
question. Possibly, in this study the illusion of knowing it all tactic was insufficiently reinforced 
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as the confirmation tactic was used only for three pieces of information. Future studies need to 
address this matter by presenting more claims. In general, the research on the confirmation 
tactic has shown its value in making the sources’ overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge, 
hiding the interviewer’s information objectives and collecting new information. 
Combining the Scharff tactics. Previously, the effects of two individual Scharff tactics 
were discussed. However, some findings cannot be viewed in such an isolated manner. For 
example, in line with previous studies (e.g. May et al., 2014), the combination of the Scharff 
tactics in Study I (i.e. the friendly approach-, the illusion of knowing it all-, the confirmation- 
and the not pressing for information tactics) made the sources underestimate the amount of new 
information revealed, whereas the sources in the Direct Approach overestimated it. It seems 
likely that this was the result of all Scharff tactics used, but particularly the confirmation tactic 
and the illusion of knowing it all tactic. However, further studies should examine the 
combination of the Scharff tactics in more detail in order to map the influence of specific tactics 
on the sources’ estimations of the new information revealed. In general, the underestimation of 
the interviewer’s knowledge is of particular importance when sources are about to be 
interviewed more than once. Specifically, sources who underestimates the amount of new 
information revealed may infer that they have achieved their interview goal (e.g. “I need the 
assistance of the police”) without violating the conflicting goal (e.g. “I do not want to betray 
the terrorist group”). Therefore, the sources who underestimate the amount of new information 
revealed should be comparatively more motivated to talk to the interviewer again.  
Furthermore, in several previous studies the combination of the Scharff tactics 
outperformed the Direct Approach with respect to the most important measure: the new 
information revealed during the full interview (e.g. May et al., 2014). While in some of these 
studies this was the case, the separate Scharff tactics however did not outperform the relevant 
interview components for the Direct Approach. For example, in the study by Oleszkiewicz, 
Granhag and Kleinman (2014) the confirmation tactic did not result in more new information 
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compared to the specific questions in the Direct Approach. However, in this study, the 
combination of the Scharff tactics still resulted in more new information during the full 
interview than the Direct Approach. This indicates that in order to collect new information it is 
advisable to use a combination of Scharff tactics. 
Value of the Scharff-technique. So far, the presented studies on the Scharff-technique 
provide knowledge on the specific tactics. The Scharff-technique was examined in three further 
studies showing its applicability as a HUMINT interview technique. First, with varying 
sources’ levels of cooperation and knowledge, Granhag, Oleszkiewicz, Strömwall and 
Kleinman (2015) found that the Scharff-technique generally outperformed the Direct Approach 
on all important measures and for all types of sources, especially for the less cooperative 
sources. Second, the Scharff-technique also outperformed the Direct Approach on most of the 
important measures when interviewing sources repeatedly (Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & 
Kleinman, 2017b). Third, handlers who were trained in the Scharff tactics elicited more new 
information and were perceived by sources as less eager to gather information, compared to 
handlers who used the tactics they felt appropriate (Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Kleinman, 
2017a). These studies show that the Scharff-technique can be trained and used successfully in 
different HUMINT scenarios.  
Overall, the presented research has shown the value of the Scharff tactics in eliciting 
new information. The Scharf-technique extends the existing more traditional interviewing 
techniques which focus on questioning suspicious sources (e.g. the emotional approach; Evans 
et al., 2014) or fully cooperative sources (e.g. the cognitive interview; Leins et al., 2014). The 
Scharff-technique is of relevance for police or intelligence interviewers who interact with 
different types of sources who are willing to share a limited amount of information (e.g. persons 
with a link to terrorist/extremist organisations, organised crime, drug-related crimes, burglary 
gangs, counterfeit crime).  
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Explaining the Scharff Tactics with the Conceptual Tier 
The general objective of the framework’s conceptual tier is to explain the mechanisms of the 
tactics. In doing so, it helps to understand how to use the tactics effectively, which is crucial 
for training and research purposes. Therefore, in the following section the findings on the 
Scharff tactics are discussed in the context of the conceptual tier. 
In Study I the sources pursued the conflicting goal of “I need help from the police” and 
“I do not want to betray the group, as I have sympathy for them and their interests”. Thus, 
facing an information management dilemma they might have prepared moderately forthcoming 
counter-interrogation strategies such as “I will not say very much during the interview”. Study 
I showed that the illusion of knowing it all tactic can be productive in such a situation.  
The illusion of knowing it all tactic led the sources to perceive the interviewer’s 
knowledge approximately correct (instead of underestimating it). This approximately correct 
estimation then led the sources to use their more moderately forthcoming counter-interrogation 
strategy (e.g. “I will not say very much during the interview”) after the interviewer presented 
the already known information. That means, the illusion of knowing it all tactic prompted the 
sources to use their rather moderately forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies concerning 
the information the interviewer has not mentioned yet and hence the information unknown to 
the interviewer. Consequently, the open-ended question that was asked after outlining the 
illusion of knowing it all tactic resulted in new information. Differently put, if the interviewer 
starts with presenting the already known information, the sources cannot reveal this presented 
information as new afterwards. Instead the sources need to reveal unmentioned information that 
is actually new to the interviewer in order to show cooperativeness/willingness. In contrast, for 
the Direct Approach the interviewer kept the sources in the dark with respect to his or her 
knowledge, and the sources could decide freely which information to reveal (i.e. “sell as new 
to the interviewer”). Consequently, these sources revealed comparatively less new information 
(and more already known information) in order to show cooperativeness/willingness.  
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 Facing the information management dilemma, the sources might have also developed 
counter-interrogation strategies like “It is meaningless to deny or withhold what they already 
know, hence I will reveal this information”. Derived from this, it is important for the interviewer 
to make the sources overestimate his or her knowledge.  
Study I found that the confirmation tactic made the sources overestimate the 
interviewer’s knowledge concerning the unreliable pieces of information used within the 
claims. Accordingly, the sources used more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies with 
respect to this specific information and the confirmation tactic resulted in new information. In 
contrast, the specific questions did not make the sources overestimate the interviewer’s 
knowledge to a considerable extent (instead they rather pointed towards the knowledge gaps). 
Therefore, the sources chose more withholding counter-interrogation strategies and revealed 
comparatively little new information in response to the specific questions. 
Overall, Study I showed that the interviewer can elicit new information from sources 
who are pursuing conflicting goals in two ways: (a) by making the sources estimate the 
interviewer’s knowledge approximately correct, and (b) by making the sources overestimate 
the interviewer’s knowledge. The Scharff-technique provides tactics that help the interviewer 
influence the sources’ perception of his or her knowledge in these directions. 
Study II found that by just starting the presentation of the known information without 
an introductory statement hid the interviewer’s information gaps more effectively, compared to 
when using an explicitly convinced introductory statement on the amount and relevance of the 
known information. Hiding information gaps can be crucial when sources prepare counter-
interrogation strategies such as “I will figure out what they are after, and then make sure not to 
give them what they want”. Furthermore, Study II showed that just starting the presentation of 
the known information led the sources to focus more on the interviewer’s knowledge, compared 
to when using the introductory statement. Although focusing on knowledge is not equivalent to 
overestimating knowledge, this could exploit sources’ counter-interrogation strategies such as 
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“It is meaningless to deny or withhold what they already know, hence I will reveal this 
information”. However, this study did not allow for a conclusion on how the sources’ 
perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge and knowledge gaps affect their verbal behaviours. 
Future studies are needed to examine this.  
Overall, based on the presented studies it is fair to assume that, in support of Figure 2, 
sources’ conflicting interview goals affect their perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge, 
which in turn influences their choice of counter-interrogation strategies and verbal behaviours. 
The studies also showed that the interviewer can exploit these theoretical notions by 
interviewing the sources strategically.  
 
SUE Tactics 
In suspect interviews, evidence can be used in different ways aiming for different things. Study 
III examined three ways of using evidence by interviewing guilty suspects in denial in order to 
gather new information. This section discusses the findings in the context of the timing of the 
evidence disclosure and then the mode of disclosing statement-evidence inconsistencies.  
Timing of the evidence disclosure. Study III compared two periods of evidence 
disclosure: before or after asking questions on the evidence. Specifically, for the SUE 
conditions the interviewer split the evidence in two groups and used them in two interview 
phases; in both phases the interviewer asked specific and open-ended questions about the 
evidence before disclosing it. For the SUE conditions, the interviewer aimed to elicit statement-
evidence inconsistencies which can be used to affect the suspects’ choice of counter-
interrogation strategies (described below). In contrast, for the early disclosure mode all 
evidence was disclosed at the outset of the interview before asking open-ended questions on it. 
A goal of the early disclosure is to demonstrate the strength of the evidence against the suspects 
already at the outset of the interview and that “It is meaningless to deny any wrongdoing” (Leo, 
1996). Study III provided knowledge about how the two approaches achieved these goals. 
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First, in line with previous research (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016), the SUE conditions 
resulted in more statement-evidence inconsistencies than the Early disclosure condition. That 
means, asking specific and open-ended questions without disclosing the evidence was useful 
when aiming for statement-evidence inconsistencies. In general, some research describes 
specific questions as inappropriate and which should be avoided when interviewing witnesses 
and suspects (e.g. Oxburgh et al., 2010). However, this study showed that using different types 
of questions (i.e. specific and open-ended) is valuable when aiming for statement-evidence 
inconsistencies. 
Second, the novel way of mapping suspects’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge 
in the course of the interview resulted in a more detailed examination of the different interview 
phases. This has shown that in Phase 1 the suspects’ overestimations of the interviewer’s 
knowledge did not differ between the Early disclosure condition and the SUE conditions. That 
means, Study III found no support that the early disclosure of all the evidence is more effective 
in demonstrating the strength of the evidence and that it is meaningless to deny at the outset 
(vs. withholding the evidence). 
Mode of disclosing inconsistencies. For the SUE-technique the interviewer attempts to 
use the elicited statement-evidence inconsistencies in order to change the suspects’ counter-
interrogation strategies from less to more forthcoming. In doing so the elicited statement-
evidence inconsistencies can be disclosed in different ways. For example, Tekin and colleagues 
(2016) showed that the confrontational mode of disclosing inconsistencies (where the suspects 
were confronted with their inconsistencies without having chance to comment on them) was 
generally beneficial, compared to the confrontational/demand mode of disclosing 
inconsistencies (where the suspects were confronted with the inconsistencies and explicitly 
asked to explain them). Study III compared the confrontational mode of disclosing 
inconsistencies against a non-judgemental mode of disclosing inconsistencies (where the 
suspects could decide whether they comment the inconsistencies or not and the interview was 
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generally conducted in a non-judgemental manner). In this study, four findings on the mode of 
disclosing inconsistencies are noteworthy here. 
First, the suspects’ overestimations of the interviewer’s knowledge increased only to a 
rather small extent when the interviewer elicited and disclosed inconsistencies. However, when 
subsequently asking questions without holding evidence (final interview phase), for the SUE 
conditions the suspects’ overestimations of the interviewer’s knowledge increased 
significantly. A possible explanation for this finding is that for the SUE conditions the suspects 
were believed to have read the interviewer’s tactic of eliciting and disclosing inconsistencies 
(i.e. asking questions about the evidence before disclosing it), and expected him or her to also 
use the same tactic in the final interview phase. This finding shows that the elicitation and 
disclosure of inconsistencies made the suspects overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge over 
the course of the interview.  
Second, the suspects interviewed with the non-judgemental SUE protocol felt that they 
were treated with more respect, and perceived the interviewer as friendlier, compared to when 
they were interviewed with the confrontational SUE protocol. That is, the non-judgemental 
disclosure mode resulted in a fostering interview atmosphere, which Evans and colleagues 
(2014) say “facilitates kindness, cooperation, and respect” (p. 871).  
Third, the non-judgemental SUE protocol resulted in a higher proportion of forthcoming 
suspects before entering the critical interview phase, compared to the confrontational SUE 
protocol. This is crucial as previous studies have shown (Tekin et al., 2016) that the suspects 
needed to be willing to discuss the inconsistencies with the interviewer in order to subsequently 
collect new information.  
Fourth, in the final and critical interview phase only the non-judgemental SUE protocol 
resulted in more new information, compared to the early disclosure mode. Contrary to previous 
studies (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016), the confrontational SUE protocol did not result in more new 
information than the early disclosure mode. Taken together, both SUE versions made the 
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suspects overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge. However, only the non-judgemental SUE 
protocol resulted in a comparatively more fostering interview atmosphere, in more forthcoming 
suspects before entering the critical interview phase and in more new information. 
Value of the SUE-technique. Study III advanced the research on the SUE-technique 
by showing in detail the mechanisms and benefits of the non-judgemental presentation of the 
elicited in/consistencies when aiming for new information. This finding is of importance for 
several reasons. First, it provides a manageable way on how to use evidence in order to gather 
new information, which is generally required by practitioners (Smith & Bull, 2013). 
Specifically, the SUE-technique is designed for police suspect interviews, and can be integrated 
in more extensive information-gathering approaches such as for example the PEACE model 
(Clarke & Milne, 2001) or the Norwegian KREATIV model (e.g. Fahsing & Rachlew, 2009). 
Furthermore, the SUE-technique could also be feasible for investigative interviews outside the 
police context (e.g. judges, prosecutors or internal investigators). Second, it confirms field 
studies showing that a non-judgemental approach is associated with reduced suspect resistance 
and an increase in the amount of information gathered (Alison et al., 2013). Third, it shows that 
a non-judgemental approach that is explicitly in line with Human Rights Article 11 (1) 
(“Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his 
defence.” The United Nations, 1948) can help to gather new information even from guilty 
suspects in denial. In general, the present research on the SUE-technique examining the 
disclosure of in/consistencies advances the general research on the use of evidence which 
focuses, if at all, on the timing of the evidence disclosure and not on its framing (e.g. Walsh & 
Bull, 2015). 
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Explaining the SUE Tactics with the Conceptual Tier 
Next, we set off to discuss the present findings of the SUE tactics in terms of the conceptual 
tier of the developed interviewing framework. In Study III the guilty suspects pursued the 
conflicting interview goal of “I want to show my innocence”. Therefore, they faced an 
information management dilemma of needing to reveal some information in order to show their 
innocence but not too much information that would show their actual guilt. The suspects 
interviewed with the SUE protocols produced more statement-evidence inconsistencies, 
compared to the suspects interviewed with the early disclosure protocol. A likely explanation 
of this is that the suspects in the SUE conditions were unaware of the available evidence when 
asked questions on it, and consequently used more withholding counter-interrogation strategies 
during these phases (e.g. “I will not tell any information that might be incriminating”). In 
contrast, the suspects in the Early disclosure condition were aware of the available evidence 
when asked questions on it and used more forthcoming strategies (e.g. “I will reveal the 
information that is already known to the interviewer as it is meaningless to withhold this”).  
A practical benefit of asking questions before disclosing the evidence is that by 
observing suspects’ verbal responses to these questions, the interviewer can estimate the 
suspects’ counter-interrogation strategy. Specifically, a statement-evidence inconsistency 
indicates that the suspect uses a more withholding counter-interrogation strategy, and a 
statement-evidence consistency indicates that s/he uses a more forthcoming strategy. If the 
suspect uses a less forthcoming counter-interrogation strategy the interviewer can attempt to 
use the elicited inconsistencies in order to make the suspect overestimate the interviewer’s 
knowledge and change his or her counter-interrogation strategy to be more forthcoming. 
For the SUE conditions in Study III the interviewer disclosed the elicited inconsistencies 
in a confrontational or non-judgemental manner. Both modes of disclosing the inconsistencies 
made the suspects overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge. However, only the non-
judgemental presentation of the in/consistencies resulted in more new information, compared 
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to the Early disclosure condition. In order to explain this finding it is worthwhile to dig deeper 
into the theory of self-regulation.  
Carver and Scheier (2011) considered behaviour as reflecting processes of feedback 
loops. When pursuing a goal, the process of comparing the current position with the intended 
goal (as a reference value) follows a feedback loop pattern. If this comparison results in a 
discrepancy between the current position and the intended goal, humans implement 
counteractions in order to change the current position and approach the intended goal. 
Contrarily, if this comparison results in an overlap, no further actions will be initiated. That 
means, after the interviewer disclosed the elicited inconsistencies, the suspects in the SUE 
conditions might have compared their current position with their intended goal. In doing so they 
realized a discrepancy between their current position (e.g. “I just made an inconsistent and 
incriminating statement”) and the intended goal (e.g. “I want to make an exonerating statement 
to show my innocence”). However, when discovering this discrepancy, the suspects in the two 
SUE conditions differed in their counteractions. The suspects interviewed in a confrontational 
manner gave up as they saw no chance in convincing the interviewer of their innocence 
anymore. In contrast, the suspects interviewed in the non-judgemental manner still saw a chance 
to approach their intended goal by adjusting their counter-interrogation strategy to be more 
forthcoming. 
A possible explanation for the different reactions when determining the discrepancy is 
the perceived interview atmosphere. The non-judgemental SUE protocol created a more 
fostering interview atmosphere, in which the suspects might have felt more free to change their 
counter-interrogation strategy (vs. the confrontational SUE protocol). In line with this the non-
judgemental implementation of the SUE-technique resulted in more forthcoming suspects 
before entering the final interview phase, compared to the confrontational implementation of 
the SUE-technique. This was crucial, as Study III and the study by Tekin and colleagues (2016) 
have both found that in order to have suspects reveal new information at a later stage in an 
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interview, they have to be willing to explain the inconsistencies that occur early on in the 
interview. Overall, this explains why the non-judgemental implementation of the SUE-
technique resulted in comparatively more new information elicited. 
In general, this reasoning is in accordance with other research findings. For example, 
Evans and colleagues (2014) found that a fostering interview atmosphere resulted in an 
increasing amount of information elicited. Furthermore, Alison and colleagues (2013) found 
that adaptive interpersonal behaviour reduced the suspects’ resistance and increased the amount 
of information gathered. 
Based on these findings, the illustration of the conceptual tier in the developed 
framework was modified by adding the interview atmosphere and the feedback aspect (see 
Figure 6). These modifications help to explain why comparatively more suspects interviewed 
with the non-judgemental SUE protocol changed their counter-interrogation strategies (whereas 
the suspects in both SUE conditions overestimated the interviewer’s knowledge). Simply put, 
the interviewer’s disclosure of the inconsistencies initiated a feedback loop, which in turn 
changed the suspects’ choice of counter-interrogation strategy when the interview atmosphere 
was fostering.  
 
 
Figure 6. The modified illustration of the conceptual tier. 
 
 Finally, the findings for the early disclosure mode should be explained. In the initial 
phases of the interview, the suspects were aware of the evidence when asked questions on it. 
Consequently, they used more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies with respect to this 
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evidence (e.g. “I need to explain the evidence they hold in an exonerating manner”) and 
generated comparatively less statement-evidence inconsistencies. However, this discussion of 
the evidence did not make the suspects overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge meaningfully. 
Furthermore, after discussing the evidence with the interviewer they did not determine a 
discrepancy between their current position (e.g. “I explained all the disclosed evidence in an 
exonerating manner”) and their intended goal (e.g. “I want to show my innocence”), as the 
interviewer did not give them challenging feedback. Consequently, these suspects saw no need 
to hold to the more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies, and changed to less 
forthcoming strategies. Entering the critical interview phase with a less forthcoming counter-
interrogation strategy, the suspects interviewed with the early disclosure mode revealed 
comparatively less new information.  
Considering the findings of the Scharff and SUE tactics, the two interview techniques 
resulted in a different course of the interviewees’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge 
and use of counter-interrogation strategies. The Scharff-technique aimed to make the sources 
overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge already before the sources made their first case-
related statement (i.e. after outlining the illusion of knowing it all tactic) in order to counteract 
their counter-interrogation strategies. In contrast, the SUE-technique aimed to make the 
suspects underestimate the interviewer’s knowledge first (by withholding evidence), and then 
making them overestimate it (by presenting the elicited statement-evidence inconsistencies) in 
order to change their counter-interrogation strategies. The presented modifications of the 
conceptual tier facilitated the illustration of the dynamic process of both interview techniques.  
 
Extending the Conceptual Tier for Training and Research Purposes 
The conceptual tier can help to train practitioners on how to elicit new information from 
sources/suspects who show a limited willingness to reveal information. However, for training 
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and research purposes it is useful to illustrate different interview interactions. Therefore, the 
conceptual tier of the interviewing framework needs to be extended regarding some notions. 
In some situations, the interviewees’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge might 
be less relevant. Then the interview goal may primarily influence the interviewees’ choice of 
counter-interrogation strategy. For example, imagine an informed source who has the exclusive 
interview goal “I need money from the police” (personal communication with 
police/intelligence service members, 2016; Scherp, 1992). This source should be willing to 
reveal all known information. Therefore, the interview goal directs the source to use a 
forthcoming counter-interrogation strategy, and share his or her complete knowledge.3 
Similarly, a guilty suspect who has the sole goal “I want to get it off my chest” will likely use 
forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies and share his or her information (Sigurdsson & 
Gudjonsson, 1994). Finally, an innocent suspect aiming to convince the interviewer of his or 
her innocence is also expected to use forthcoming strategies and reveal all available 
information. The rationale of this assumption is twofold (Kassin, 2005). First, innocent suspects 
are expected to be influenced by the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980). That is, they trust in 
the fairness of the world and that they will be believed to be innocent when they “just tell it like 
it happened”. Second, innocent suspects are expected to display an illusion of transparency 
(Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998). Based on this assumption, innocent suspects simply 
believe that the interviewer reads their thoughts and emotions and “sees their innocence”. The 
previous examples provided justification to modify the illustration of the conceptual tier further 
(see Figure 7). Simply put, in some situations the sources’/suspects’ interview goal 
predominantly determines their choice of counter-interrogation (and the perception of the 
interviewer’s knowledge seems less important). 
 
                                                
3 Also, fully forthcoming sources/suspects can generate omissions and contradictions due to normal memory 
processes of forgetting and misremembering. However, discussing these processes would be beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
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Figure 7. The modified illustration of the conceptual tier aiming to help for training and research purposes. 
 
To date, the gathering of new information with the Scharff and SUE tactics have not 
been examined by interviewing sources/suspects who are willing to share all their knowledge 
(i.e. fully forthcoming). However, it seems likely that no extensive strategic use of the available 
information is necessary in order to collect new information from fully forthcoming 
interviewees. Instead, when interviewing fully forthcoming interviewees it seems beneficial to 
use retrieval mnemonics (e.g. the cognitive interview). Nevertheless, future studies are needed 
to examine the effects of interviewing fully forthcoming sources/suspects when using the 
Scharff/SUE tactics. 
 An important aspect of interview training is also the demonstration of possible risks. 
Hence, a possible risk when interviewing suspects is exemplified next. Specifically, it will be 
described how the conceptual tier can be used to explain the formation of a coerced-compliant 
false confession (for a taxonomy on false confessions4 see Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985). For 
this purpose, imagine an innocent suspect who enters an interview with the goal to show his or 
her innocence. In line with previous research, the suspect waives his or her right to silence and 
trusts that s/he will be believed if s/he “just tells it like it happened” (Kassin, 2005). 
Accordingly, the suspect is likely to employ forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies and 
reveal information. Now, consider an interviewer who is convinced of the suspect’s guilt and 
hence not pleased with the suspect’s verbal response. This interviewer might confront the 
                                                
4 The conceptual tier should be also useful to explain coerced-internalized and voluntary false confessions. 
However, as it is not the main focus of this thesis it is not described here. 
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suspect with an accusation of guilt together with the available evidence in order to show that it 
is meaningless to deny. For the suspect, the interviewer’s verbal response can initiate two 
processes. First, as the innocent suspect has not experienced the crime, the disclosed evidence 
is the (only) information s/he now holds about the case (presented as the suspect’s perception 
of the interviewer’s knowledge in Figure 7). Second, the suspect uses the interviewer’s verbal 
feedback in order to compare his or her current position (e.g. “The interviewer believes me to 
be guilty”) with his or her interview goal (e.g. “I want to show my actual innocence”). Based 
on this perception the suspect then attempts to reduce the discrepancy by continuing to deny 
the accusation and explain the evidence in an exonerating manner.  
In the course of the interview, the interviewer still does not believe the suspect and 
continues to confront him or her with the accusation of guilt. For the suspect, this triggers 
further comparisons between the current position and the interview goal resulting in a perceived 
discrepancy, and that s/he continues to counteract his or her current position by denying. Carver 
and Scheier (2011) proposed that this behaviour loop (describing the comparison between the 
current position and intended goal) is assessed by an affect loop, which can result in an 
acceptable or unacceptable perception. That means, as the innocent suspect cannot achieve a 
reduction of the discrepancy between his or her current position (e.g. “The interviewer believes 
me to be guilty”) and his or her interview goal (e.g. “I want to show my innocence”), with an 
increasing interview duration the suspect perceives the interview atmosphere as 
unacceptable/aversive. According to Carver and Scheier (2011) such negative feelings can 
affect action. Specifically, when the actions aiming to reduce the discrepancy between the 
current position and the focal goal seem futile, negative feelings can decrease the effort to 
reduce the discrepancy and lead to a shift in priority of the goals (i.e. one goal diminishes in 
priority, and another goal obtains priority). That means, based on the perceived aversive 
interview atmosphere and the perceived futileness of denying, the suspect reduces his or her 
effort to approach the current interview goal (e.g. “I want to show my innocence”). 
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Furthermore, the suspect diminishes the priority of this goal, and give priority to the goal “I 
want to stop this aversive situation as soon as possible”. In order to reach this focal goal, the 
suspect employs other counter-interrogation strategies such as “I will just tell the interviewer 
what s/he wants to hear”. Critically, in order to employ this strategy, the suspect uses his or her 
perception of the interviewer’s knowledge and finally makes a false confession. In doing so 
s/he approaches the new intended goal. This example shows how the conceptual tier of the 
interviewing framework can help to illustrate risks of suspect interviewing (i.e. gathering 
unreliable information). 
In general, it is possible that the SUE-technique can decrease the risk of generating such 
coerced-compliant false confessions. Simply put, an interviewer disclosing the evidence 
already at the outset of the interview increases the risk of a false confession, as the innocent 
suspect could then integrate this evidence in his or her statement (e.g. Gudjonsson, 2003). In 
contrast, an interviewer using the SUE-technique discloses the evidence after asking questions 
on it. Hence, the innocent suspect cannot include this evidence in his or her initial answers, and 
the interviewer can compare the suspect’s statement with the available evidence. Therefore, it 
seems that the SUE-technique could decrease the risk of creating undetected false confessions. 
Future studies need to address these theoretical assumptions. Overall, the presented 
modifications of the conceptual tier prove useful for training purposes and initiating further 
research. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
In general, the Scharff and SUE tactics aim to influence the interviewees’ perceptions and 
verbal behaviours by using the available information strategically. Mainly due to this aspired 
influence, these interview techniques are part of a debate of whether it is fair to employ strategic 
interviewing or not (e.g. Hartwig, Luke, & Skerker, 2017; Sukumar, Wade, & Hodgson, 2016). 
Although this is more of a legal-philosophical question, three aspects will be commented here. 
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First, the Scharff and SUE tactics are for information-gathering but do not aim to influence the 
interviewees’ basic decision of whether they should talk with the interviewer or not. In fact, the 
interviewer needs to consider the sources/suspects as conversational partners making their 
decisions autonomously, and accept if they are not willing to talk with him or her. Of note, 
Study III stipulated that all suspects waived their right to silence, as this was crucial for the sake 
of the experiment. However, in most European countries suspects can decide to use their right 
to silence (Walsh, Oxburgh, Redlich, & Mykleburst, 2016), and the interviewer needs to accept 
this without any further request of making the suspects talk. Second, both interview techniques 
are not designed to elicit the interviewees’ entire knowledge. Instead the interviewer is directed 
to accept the interviewees’ willingness to share only a limited amount of information. This 
includes that the interviewer should also accept if the sources/suspects want to stop talking 
about a specific topic or not participate in the full interview. Third, the interviewing framework 
developed in this thesis should clearly not be used with psychologically or physically coercive 
manipulation tactics (e.g. social influence, emotional persuasion). Even minimal coercive 
tactics are unethical, and increase the likelihood of obtaining unreliable information (e.g. Alison 
& Alison, 2017; Costanzo & Redlich, 2010). It is critical that the interviewer understands why 
it is important to refuse such coercive tactics. For example, they need to understand that 
misperception about sources’ ground knowledge and suspects’ ground truth can occur and have 
disastrous consequences. By illustrating potential risks of interviewing, the developed 
interviewing framework can help to give answers to these questions.  
Overall, researchers’ responsibility in the field of interviewing is twofold. First, they 
need to identify interview tactics that should be avoided because they are unethical and/or 
increase the risk of unreliable information. Second, they need to develop interview tactics that 
help the interviewer to collect new information in a conversational, human and respectful 
manner. This thesis aimed to contribute to the second area by examining strategic interview 
techniques in two different interview situations.  
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Limitations and Further Reflections 
The present studies examined information elicitation by simulating important features of 
HUMINT and suspect interviews. Therefore, participants without a criminal background 
interacted shortly with an interviewer in rather low-stake situations. For this reason, one could 
criticise the studies due to a lack of generalizability. However, theoretically one can counter 
this in arguing that real-life sources/suspects facing an information management dilemma might 
be much more motivated to prepare and employ counter-interrogation strategies than in the 
studies discussed in this thesis. As the Scharff and SUE tactics are tailored to counteract these 
strategies, one can hypothesize that they are even more effective in real-life settings than in the 
lab environment. Certainly, these are theoretical considerations and in the future it is important 
to reflect on how to examine these tactics in the field. 
All three studies focused on specific manipulations and controlled specific factors in 
order to draw clear conclusions. This comes along with some limitations within the individual 
studies. For example, in Study I and II the interviews were conducted via phone; Study II 
prohibited the participants from revealing case-related knowledge; Study III included only 
guilty suspects. The experimental studies must be seen as starting points and future studies 
should address these limitations. As a basis for this line of research, the present studies provided 
valuable insights on the mechanisms of the specific interview tactics by considering 
interviewees’ perceptions. Study III, especially, blazed a novel path by analysing the interview 
records together with the participants afterwards. This procedure shows enormous potential for 
future studies. Finally, for the future it is also crucial to experimentally examine potential risks 
and limitations of the interview techniques (e.g. by interviewing unknowing sources or innocent 
suspects). 
Finally, some reflections on the two interview techniques as such are needed. First, 
naming the Scharff-technique after a person who fought with National Socialists during World 
War II is problematic in Germany. This holds true even though Hanns Scharff behaved in a 
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friendly, respectful and conversational manner, and was respected by the POWs (Toliver, 
1997). I share that view. However, the term Scharff-technique had been already defined at the 
start of this research, and this is in general considered less controversial abroad (e.g. in Sweden 
or England). Concerning the use of the Scharff tactics, in some situations it is a risk to present 
information to sources (e.g. the source could forward it to group members). Therefore, the 
interviewer needs to consider this risk especially when interviewing sources that are not in 
custody. A further risk could be that an interviewer employs the illusion of knowing it all tactic 
although s/he is unsure about the sources’ interview goal and counter-interrogation strategies. 
After presenting the known information the interviewer would have no additional information 
to estimate the sources’ counter-interrogation strategy. Here a possibility could be that the 
interviewer combines the Scharff and SUE tactics. The interviewer could implement the illusion 
of knowing it all tactic with some known information, and withhold some information in order 
to test the sources’ counter-interrogation strategy. Future studies need to address this practically 
important aspect.  
A limitation concerning the SUE-technique could be that the suspects receive 
knowledge on the evidence prior to the interview. This is for example the case when suspects 
receive inspection of files. However, the legal discussion about the right of inspection of files 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Critically, in the past the SUE-technique has also been shown 
to be effective in eliciting other cues of deceits (e.g. within-statement-inconsistencies). Future 
studies need to examine how different types of inconsistencies could be used to elicit new 
information. 
Finally, a note on the terminology of the developed interviewing framework. During the 
time these studies were conducted, it became clear that it is advisable to change the term 
counter-interrogation strategy to interview strategy. As outlined, sources and suspects do not 
necessarily work against the interviewer. Hence, it is reasonable to move away from the 
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“concept of the enemy” (who counteracts) and consider sources and suspects as conversation 
partners. 
 
Conclusions 
The collection of information from sources and suspects is critical in preventing future crimes 
and solving criminal case. By developing the interviewing framework for eliciting information 
from sources and suspects, this thesis contributes to the research and practice of information-
gathering in two broad ways. First, on the tactical tier it describes how to use available 
information in order to influence interviewees’ perceptions and collect new information. 
Simply put, it has shown that the Scharff and SUE tactics are fruitful in eliciting new 
information from sources and suspects who are willing to share a limited amount of 
information. Second, the conceptual tier of the interviewing framework was useful in 
explaining the mechanisms of the tactics and illustrating other interview interactions. This is 
helpful for training practitioners and initiating further research. Overall, this thesis speaks in 
favour of the interviewing framework’s tactical and conceptual tier for the examination and 
training of information elicitation. 
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The present study examines non-coercive interview techniques aimed for eliciting
intelligence from human sources. Two versions of the Scharff technique were compared
against the direct approach (a combination of open-ended and specific questions). The
Scharff conditions were conceptualised into four tactics and differed with respect to when
the confirmation tactic was implemented: before or after an initial open-ended question.
Participants (n D 93) took the role of a source in a phone interview and were instructed to
strike a balance between not revealing too little or too much information. In general, the
Scharff technique outperformed the direct approach on all important measures. The sources
in the Scharff conditions revealed more new information, and found it more difficult to
understand the interviewer’s information objectives. Importantly, the sources interviewed by
the Scharff technique underestimated how much new information they revealed, whereas the
sources interviewed by the direct approach overestimated the amount of new information
revealed. Although no clear order effects of the Scharff tactics were found, we introduce an
alternative method for implementing the confirmation tactic.
Key words: human intelligence gathering; information elicitation; interview technique;
Scharff technique; direct approach.
Human intelligence refers to the gathering
of information through an interaction between
two or more individuals (Justice, Bhatt,
Brandon, & Kleinman, 2010), typically an inter-
viewer and a source. The gathered information
may concern the past, the present or the future
and is collected with the aim of contributing to
national security (Evans, Meissner, Brandon,
Russano, & Kleinman, 2010). Information elici-
tation is a specific form of human intelligence
gathering where the interviewer aims to obtain
information without the source fully realising
the true purpose of the interaction (Justice et al.,
2010). More precisely, the goal is to gather
information in such a manner that the source
underestimates how much new information she
or he contributes and remains unaware of the
interviewer’s information objectives.
The scientific research on intelligence
interview techniques is relatively meagre.
However, in the last years researchers have
begun to remedy this gap. Some have, for
example, linked findings from social and
forensic science to intelligence gathering
(Borum, 2006; Loftus, 2011). Other research-
ers have surveyed experienced human intelli-
gence interviewers on their techniques (e.g.,
Redlich, Kelly, & Miller, 2014) or examined
the recollection of intelligence by cooperative
sources (e.g., Leins, Fisher, Pludwinski,
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Rivard, & Robertson, 2014) or the gathering
of intelligence in a traditional police interro-
gation setting (Evans, Meissner, Ross, Hous-
ton, Russano, & Horgan, 2013). The overall
aim of the present study was to compare two
intelligence gathering techniques: the Scharff
technique and the direct approach.
The Scharff Technique
Granhag (2010) suggested a scientific elabo-
ration of the Scharff technique; named after
the German interrogator Hanns Joachim
Scharff (1907!1992). Observing prisoners of
war, Scharff took their perspective and identi-
fied the counter-interrogation strategies that
they used to resist conventional interview
techniques (Scharff, 1950; Toliver, 1997). On
the basis of these observations Scharff devel-
oped his own interview tactics, which aimed
to counteract the prisoners’ strategies.
The Scharff technique rests upon the inter-
viewer’s ability to take the source’s perspec-
tive. Perspective-taking relates to the
‘cognitive capacity to consider the world from
other viewpoints and allows an individual to
anticipate the behavior and reactions of others’
(Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008, p.
378). Furthermore, the technique draws on the-
oretical notions from social cognition. Specifi-
cally, humans behave in a goal-directed
manner (Aarts, 2012), which also holds true for
sources in an intelligence interaction who may
pursue specific goals (e.g., to obtain a privi-
lege). In order to strive towards a goal, people
develop strategies and plans (Fiske & Taylor,
2008), and by controlling their thoughts, emo-
tions and actions they attempt to steer away
from undesired outcomes and towards desired
goals (Carver & Scheier, 2012; Fiske & Taylor,
1991). To give an example, a source aiming for
the goal ‘privilege’ may develop and employ
the counter-interrogation strategies ‘I will not
tell very much during the interrogation’, ‘I will
try to figure out what they are after, and then
make sure not to give them what they want’,
and ‘it is meaningless to deny or hold back
what they already know’ (Toliver, 1997; for a
field analysis on counter-interrogation strate-
gies, see Alison, Alison, Noone, Elntib,
Waring, & Christiansen, 2014). In order to
employ such strategies the source may have to
contemplate the interviewer’s knowledge and
information objectives (Granhag & Hartwig,
2015; Soufan, 2011). By taking the source’s
perspective, the interviewer may become aware
of the source’s goal and counter-interrogation
strategies, and implement interview tactics in
order to exploit these strategies. The Scharff
technique is a collection of such tactics, four of
which are used in the present study.
Scharff was known for his friendly and
conversational approach (Toliver, 1997). He
established a pleasant, conversational atmo-
sphere, and rarely asked any specific questions.
Hence, the friendly approach and the not press-
ing for information tactics are implemented
throughout the interview and form the founda-
tion of the Scharff technique. The third tactic is
the illusion of knowing it all. Scharff typically
opened the interview by telling a detailed story,
based on already known information. In doing
so he gave the source the opportunity to add
details. Finally, by using the confirmation/dis-
confirmation tactic, Scharff was able to elicit
specific pieces of information. In brief, he pre-
sented claims which included specific pieces of
information that he sought to have affirmed
(confirmation tactic) or negated (disconfirma-
tion tactic; for a more detailed description on
the Scharff tactics, see Granhag, Montecinos,
& Oleszkiewicz, 2015; May, Granhag, &
Oleszkiewicz, 2014).
The Direct Approach
The U.S. Army Field Manual (FM 2-22.3,
2006) is, according to President Obama’s
Executive Order 13491 (2009), the govern-
ment-wide standard for intelligence interrog-
ations. The manual advises the interrogator to
open with the direct approach, which is a
combination of open-ended and specific ques-
tions. For example, the interviewer should
start with initial questions (‘who’, ‘what’,
‘where’, ‘when’, ‘how’, and ‘why’), and later
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ask follow-up or repeated questions (U.S.
Army Field Manual 2-22.3, 2006). In line
with these recommendations, 45% of civil-
ians and 81% of military interrogators typi-
cally start an interrogation with the direct
approach (Redlich, Kelly, & Miller, 2011).
Military interrogators also believe that the
direct approach is an effective interviewing
technique (Semel, 2013). Based on its practi-
cal significance, the direct approach was con-
sidered to be a relevant point of comparison.
Previous Research on the Scharff
Technique
To date there are five empirical studies on the
Scharff technique. Granhag, Montecinos and
Oleszkiewicz (2015) found that the Scharff
technique, an open-question technique and a
specific-question technique resulted in a simi-
lar amount of new information revealed. This
result was attributed to a rather disorganised
implementation of the illusion of knowing it
all tactic and the confirmation/disconfirma-
tion tactic. Therefore, all later studies started
by establishing the illusion of knowing it all,
asking an open-ended question and subse-
quently employing the confirmation/discon-
firmation tactic. This step-wise presentation
of the Scharff tactics has resulted in promis-
ing outcomes. Importantly, the Scharff tech-
nique has proven to result in more new
information compared to the direct approach
(e.g., May et al., 2014; Oleszkiewicz, Gran-
hag, & Cancino Montecinos, 2014). Further-
more, sources interviewed by the Scharff
technique tend to underestimate the amount
of new information revealed, whereas the
sources interviewed by the direct approach
tend to overestimate the amount of new
information revealed (e.g., Oleszkiewicz,
Granhag, & Cancino Montecinos, 2014;
Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Kleinman, 2014).
In addition, sources find it more difficult to
read the interviewer’s information objective
when interviewed by the Scharff technique
compared to the direct approach (e.g., May
et al., 2014; Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, &
Kleinman, 2014). Finally, May et al. (2014)
showed that when implementing the confir-
mation tactic, the sources in the Scharff con-
dition perceived that the interviewer knew
more information prior to the interview, and
found it more difficult to understand the inter-
viewer’s information objectives compared to
a version of the Scharff technique employing
the disconfirmation tactic.
Granhag, Oleszkiewicz, Str€omwall, and
Kleinman (2015) compared the two interview
techniques by using four different types of
sources varying in both their level of coopera-
tion and their extent of knowledge. The
Scharff technique resulted in more new infor-
mation than the direct approach for sources
who were less cooperative (with more and
less knowledge), and for sources who were
more cooperative and had more knowledge
(but not for sources who were more coopera-
tive and had less knowledge). Furthermore,
all sources interviewed by the Scharff tech-
nique found it more difficult to read the
interviewer’s information objectives and
underestimated the amount of new informa-
tion revealed. That is, the Scharff technique
outperformed the direct approach on the most
important measures and this was particularly
pronounced for less cooperative sources.
The Present Study
The current study extends previous work on
the Scharff technique on several accounts. In
the first study on the Scharff technique the
confirmation/disconfirmation tactic was
embedded into the illusion of knowing it all
tactic, resulting in the Scharff technique did
not lead to more new information in compari-
son to the open- and specific-question techni-
ques (Granhag, Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz,
2015). Hanns Scharff, however, elicited infor-
mation effectively by combining the illusion
of knowing it all tactic and the confirmation/
disconfirmation tactic (Tolliver, 1997). The
present study set out to examine when to
implement the confirmation tactic. Specifi-
cally, we compared two versions of the
Techniques for Eliciting Human Intelligence 277
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Scharff technique, which differed with respect
to the order of an initial open-ended question
and the use of the confirmation tactic. For one
version the interviewer implemented the illu-
sion of knowing it all tactic, asked the initial
open-ended question then presented the confir-
mation tactic and finally asked a second open-
ended question (the Scharff OpenQ/Conf con-
dition). For the second version the interviewer
established the illusion of knowing it all, pre-
sented the confirmation tactic and then asked
the first and second open-ended questions (the
Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition). We compared
the two Scharff conditions against the direct
approach. For the direct approach, the inter-
viewer asked an open-ended question followed
by three specific questions, which were
repeated if the source failed to answer, and
finished the interview with yet another open-
ended question. Table 1 displays the structure
of the different interview protocols.
Broadly speaking, we used the same
experimental set-up as in similar previous
studies (e.g., Granhag, Montecinos, & Olesz-
kiewicz, 2015). Participants took the role of a
source holding information about an upcom-
ing terrorist attack, and were instructed to try
to strike a balance between not revealing too
little or too much information in an interview
with a police contact. However, the partici-
pants in the current study received less infor-
mation about the upcoming attack in
comparison to the previous studies (e.g., May
et al., 2014), and thus needed to use this
information in a very careful manner. In line
with previous research on the Scharff tactics
we formulated the following hypotheses.
New Information Revealed during
the Interview
We predict that both Scharff conditions
will result in more new information during
the full interview than the direct approach
(Hypothesis 1a), and that the Scharff Conf/
OpenQ condition will result in more new
information compared to the Scharff OpenQ/
Conf condition (Hypothesis 1b). We predict
that the participants in both Scharff condi-
tions will reveal more new information in
response to the initial open-ended question
compared to the direct approach (Hypothesis
2a). The rationale behind this prediction is
that the participants will aim to be perceived
as cooperative and hence the participants for
the Scharff conditions will need to provide
information beyond the information stated
when employing the illusion of knowing it all
tactic. We also predict that the Scharff Conf/
OpenQ condition will outperform the Scharff
OpenQ/Conf condition with respect to the
outcome of the first open-ended question
(Hypothesis 2b). The reason for this is that
for the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition the
interviewer will reinforce the illusion of
knowing it all by implementing the confirma-
tion tactic before posing the open-ended
question (May et al., 2014). This might result
in the participants revealing relatively more
new information in response to the initial
open-ended question. With respect to the con-
firmation tactic versus specific questions, we
predict that the confirmation tactic (in both
Scharff conditions) will result in relatively
more new information (Hypothesis 2c), as we
expect that the participants will respond to
Table 1. Structure of the three interview conditions.
Scharff OpenQ/Conf Scharff Conf/OpenQ Direct Approach
Illusion of knowing it all tactic Illusion of knowing it all tactic
Open-ended question Confirmation tactic Open-ended question
Confirmation tactic Open-ended question Specific questions
Open-ended question Open-ended question Open-ended question
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more claims (versus specific questions) in
order to reach an adequate level of coopera-
tion. Furthermore, we predict that when the
confirmation tactic is implemented before the
first open-ended question (Scharff Conf/
OpenQ condition) this will result in more
new information compared to when it is
implemented after the initial open-ended
question (Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition,
Hypothesis 2d). The rationale for this is that
for the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition the
posed claims will be the participants’ first
chance to show their willingness to cooper-
ate. In contrast, when the participants in
the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition are facing
the claims, they have already responded to
the first open-ended question.
The Sources’ Perception of the Interview
We predict that the participants in both
Scharff conditions will perceive the inter-
viewer to hold relatively more information
prior to the interview (Hypothesis 3a). The
basis for this prediction is that for the Scharff
conditions the interviewer presents already
known information when employing the illu-
sion of knowing it all tactic. Furthermore, we
expect that the participants in both Scharff
conditions will have a less clear understand-
ing of the interviewer’s information objec-
tives compared to the participants in the
direct approach (Hypothesis 3b). The reason
for this is that we expect that the participants
presented with the confirmation tactic will
find it more difficult to read the interviewer’s
information objectives compared with those
who are asked specific questions. As we mea-
sure the participants’ perceptions of the inter-
view only after the full interview, we do not
expect any difference between the Scharff
conditions.
Relating Objective and Subjective Measures
We predict that the participants in the Scharff
conditions will perceive that they revealed
less new information than they objectively
did, whereas the participants in the direct
approach will perceive that they revealed
more new information than they actually did
(Hypothesis 4). The rationale behind this pre-
diction is that the Scharff tactics may result
in the participants unknowingly revealing
new information. In contrast, the participants
in the direct approach are expected to reveal
new and old information in response to the
open and specific questions, and may esti-
mate that the majority of the reported infor-
mation will be new to the interviewer, as they
are kept blind to his or her prior knowledge.
Method
Participants
Ninety-three undergraduate psychology stu-
dents (76 females and 17 males) from the uni-
versity in Kiel participated in exchange for
partial course credit. The mean age was
22.60 years (SD D 5.42), with a range of 19
to 48. The participants were randomly
assigned to one of the three interview condi-
tions (32 for the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condi-
tion, 30 for the Scharff Conf/OpenQ
condition, and 31 for the direct approach).
Procedure
Background and Planning
All students received background information
to prepare for playing the role of a source in an
upcoming phone conversation with a police
contact. They were presented with 24 pieces of
information about a radical political group
planning a bombing in a shopping mall. This
amount of information is smaller compared to
the 33 to 36 pieces of information in previous
studies (e.g., Granhag, Montecinos, & Olesz-
kiewicz, 2015; May et al., 2014). The inter-
viewer already knew 12 of these 24 pieces of
information. The participants did not know if
the interviewer already held information. Criti-
cally, the participants were instructed to strike
a balance between not revealing too little infor-
mation in order to get help from the police, and
not revealing too much information as they had
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sympathy for the group’s members and inter-
ests. The students were informed that they
would receive cinema tickets depending on
their performance in striking this balance, but
in fact all tickets were raffled. Moreover, the
participants were instructed not to fabricate any
information during the interview, as this
allowed for a cleaner analysis. However, they
were allowed to withhold information, which is
a form of lying (Vrij, 2008). All participants
took 15 to 20 minutes to prepare for the
interview.
The Interview
During the phone conversation the participant
was alone in a room and had all background
information available. The interviews lasted
between 2.06 and 9.26 minutes (M D 4.88,
SD D 1.87). The Scharff OpenQ/Conf (M D
5.76, SD D 1.32, p < .001) and Scharff Conf/
OpenQ condition (M D 6.00, SD D 1.34, p <
.001) were significantly longer than the direct
approach (M D 2.90, SD D 1.87), F(2, 90) D
60.207, p < .001, h2 D .572. The main reason
for this difference was that it took around 3
minutes to establish the illusion of knowing it
all. No difference was found between the two
Scharff conditions.
The Scharff OpenQ/Conf Condition
For the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition the
interviewer answered the phone, asked about
the source’s well-being, and showed under-
standing of the source’s situation (friendly
approach tactic). Then the interviewer said
that she or he wanted to make the outcome of
the interview more effective by reporting
known information (illusion of knowing it all
tactic). She or he closed the presentation of
the 12 already known pieces of information
by again expressing sympathy for the
source’s situation (friendly approach tactic),
and asked an initial open-ended question (‘So
how can you help us with additional
information?’). When the source finished
talking, the interviewer presented three
claims and noted whether the source con-
firmed them (confirmation tactic). The claims
concerned the date of the attack (‘They chose
a date when they can attract a lot of attention,
I am sure you also know that the date of the
attack is the 27th of December…’), the edu-
cation of a bomb expert, and the triggering of
the bomb. All claims were made even if the
source had already revealed the information
during the interview. After the third claim the
interviewer asked a second open-ended ques-
tion (‘Would you like to add something
before we end this?’), and then finished the
conversation. The interviewer never asked
any specific question or pressed for any infor-
mation (not pressing for information tactic).
The Scharff Conf/OpenQ Condition
For the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition the
interviewer implemented the friendly
approach, illusion of knowing it all and not
pressing for information tactics in the same
manner as in the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condi-
tion. She or he used the same claims and
asked the same open-ended questions, but
implemented the tactics in a different order.
Directly after presenting the illusion of know-
ing it all tactic, the interviewer posed the three
claims (confirmation tactic). Thereafter, she or
he asked the two open-ended questions.
The Direct Approach
For the direct approach the interviewer opened
the conversation by asking the source about his
or her well-being, followed by the request, ‘just
tell me what you know about the situation!’.
When the source finished responding, the inter-
viewer asked three specific questions concern-
ing the same information as in the Scharff
conditions (e.g., ‘At what date will the attack
take place?’). If a source did not answer a spe-
cific question, the interviewer repeated the
question once (‘Just give me the exact date for
when they are exploding the bomb’). Thus, the
interviewer asked a maximum of six specific
questions. All specific questions were asked
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even if the source had revealed this information
previously during the interview. Finally, the
interviewer asked the same open-ended ques-
tion as in the Scharff conditions and finished
the conversation.
Interviewers
Four interviewers (two females and two
males) were trained in conducting the inter-
views. They were instructed to follow the
interview protocols and to use a few standard
phrases to handle unanticipated situations.
Each interviewer performed between 15 and
30 interviews, and conducted interviews in
all three conditions.
Post-interview Questionnaires
After the interview the participants were given
three sequential questionnaires. The first ques-
tionnaire concerned demographic information
and a rating of how easy/difficult it was to
understand the interviewer’s information
objectives (7-point scale: 1: very easy to
understand to 7: very difficult to understand).
The participants were also asked to rate their
motivation to carry out ‘their task as a source’
(7-point scale: 1: not at all motivated to 7:
very motivated). The second questionnaire
consisted of a checklist with all 24 pieces of
information, and the participants marked the
information that they perceived they revealed
during the interview. The third questionnaire
contained the same checklist and the partici-
pants marked the information that they per-
ceived the interviewer already held prior to
the interview.
Coding of the Interviews
The interviews were coded in terms of the
information the participant revealed during
the full interview (range: 0 to 24 units). The
new information revealed was identified and
examined (range: 0 to 12 units). A piece of
information was scored as ‘new’ if the inter-
viewer did not hold it prior to the interview.
Next, we examined how much new informa-
tion the participants revealed in response to
the first open-ended question, the claims/spe-
cific questions, and the final open-ended
question. A piece of information was counted
only for the question/claim where it was men-
tioned first. Information was only scored if
the participants clearly affirmed a claim (e.g.,
‘right’) or clearly answered a specific ques-
tion correctly (e.g., ‘27th of December’).
Inter-rater Reliability
Two coders independently rated all 93 inter-
views. The inter-rater agreement was 98.97%
(Cohen’s k D 0.94). Differences were resolved
in a discussion between the two coders and the
final agreed-upon scores were used for the
analysis.
Results
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) concern-
ing the participants’ motivation did not result
in any significant difference between the
three conditions, F(2, 90) D 1.311, p D .275,
h2 D .028. The mean score of all participants
was above the midpoint of the scale (M D
5.46, SD D 0.94).
Furthermore, we found no differences
between the interviewers in terms of the
objective or subjective measures. Finally, we
counterbalanced the order in which the partic-
ipants were presented the three claims/spe-
cific questions; the subsequent analysis did
not show any order effects with respect to the
new information revealed.
New Information Revealed During the
Interview
A one-way ANOVA showed a significant
effect of the new information revealed during
the full interview, F(2, 90)D 16.229, p< .001,
h2 D .265. Pairwise Bonferroni tests showed
that both the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition
(M D 4.00, SD D 2.00, p < .001) and the
Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition (M D 4.50,
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SD D 2.30, p < .001) resulted in significantly
more new information than the direct approach
(M D 1.84, SD D 1.46). This confirmed
Hypothesis 1a. As we found no significant dif-
ference between the two Scharff conditions,
Hypothesis 1b was not supported. Table 2
presents the mean scores and standard devia-
tions regarding the new information revealed.
We conducted three one-way ANOVAs in
order to examine the outcome of the two
open-ended questions and the claims/specific
questions. First, we found a significant effect
of the new information revealed in response to
the initial open-ended question, F(2, 90) D
17.853, p < .001, h2 D .284. Pairwise Bonfer-
roni tests showed that the Scharff OpenQ/Conf
condition (M D 2.28, SD D 1.51, p < .001)
and the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition (M D
2.73, SD D 1.78, p < .001) generated more
new information than the direct approach (M
D 0.58, SD D 1.12). This was in line with
Hypothesis 2a. The two Scharff conditions did
not differ significantly. Thus, we failed to find
support for Hypothesis 2b. Second, we found a
significant effect of the new information
revealed for presenting claims/asking specific
questions, F(2, 90) D 6.120, p D .003, h2 D
.120. Here, the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition
(M D 1.43, SD D 1.04) resulted in signifi-
cantly more new information than the direct
approach (M D 0.65, SD D 0.66, p D .003).
The Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition (M D
1.19, SD D 0.97) and the direct approach did
not differ significantly. Thus, Hypothesis 2c
was partially supported. There was no signifi-
cant difference between the two Scharff condi-
tions. This was not in line with Hypothesis 2d.
Finally, we found no significant effect in terms
of the new information revealed for asking the
second (and final) open-ended question, F(2,
90) D 0.884, p D .417, h2 D .019.
The Sources’ Perception of the Interview
A one-way ANOVA concerning the partic-
ipants’ perception of the interviewer’s knowl-
edge prior to the interview showed a
significant effect, F(2, 90) D 83.534, p <Ta
b
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.001, h2 D .650. Pairwise Bonferroni tests
revealed that the participants in the Scharff
OpenQ/Conf condition (M D 11.56, SD D
2.94, p < .001) and in the Scharff Conf/
OpenQ condition (M D 11.13, SD D 2.37,
p < .001) perceived that the interviewer held
more information before the interview
than the participants in the direct approach
(M D 4.13, SD D 2.25). No difference
was found between the two Scharff condi-
tions. This confirmed Hypothesis 3a. Examin-
ing this further, a one-way ANOVA showed
a significant effect of the information which
the participants incorrectly believed the inter-
viewer to have held prior to the interview,
F(2, 90) D 13.791, p < .001, h2 D .235. The
participants in the Scharff OpenQ/Conf con-
dition (M D 3.16, SD D 2.08, p < .001) and
in the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition (M D
3.03, SD D 1.71, p < .001) misperceived the
interviewer’s prior knowledge to a greater
extent than the participants in the direct
approach (M D 1.16, SD D 1.07). No signif-
icant difference was found between the two
Scharff conditions. Finally, we examined
whether the participants incorrectly believed
that the interviewer knew the three pieces
of information, which the interviewer aimed
to collect with the claims/specific question.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant
effect, F(2, 90) D 103.706, p < .001, h2 D
.697. Bonferroni tests showed that the partici-
pants in the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition
(M D 2.09, SD D 0.73, p < .001) and in the
Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition (M D 2.07,
SD D 0.78, p < .001) perceived that the
interviewer held significantly more of
these particular pieces of information than
participants in the direct approach (M D 0.06,
SD D 0.25). No significant difference was
found between the Scharff conditions.
A one-way ANOVA of the participants’
perception of the interviewer’s information
objectives showed a significant effect, F(2, 90)
D 5.481, p D .006, h2 D .109. Pairwise Bon-
ferroni tests revealed that the participants in
the Scharff OpenQ/Conf (M D 4.50, SD D
1.46, p D .013) and in the Scharff Conf/OpenQ
condition (M D 4.47, SD D 1.70, p D .019)
found it significantly more difficult to under-
stand the interviewer’s information objectives
than the participants in the direct approach (M
D 3.29, SD D 1.76, p < .001). No significant
difference was found between the Scharff con-
ditions. Thus, Hypothesis 3b was supported.
Relating Objective and Subjective Measures
A mixed ANOVA with the three interview
conditions as the between-subjects factor and
the scores for the new information revealed
during the interview and the perception of
how much information they revealed as
1
2
3
4
5
Scharff OpenQ/Conf Scharff Conf/OpenQ Direct Approach
Subjective Objective
Interview condition
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Figure 1. The interaction effect for the subjective and objective scores of the new information revealed.
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the within-subjects factor showed that the
difference between the objective and subjec-
tive amount of new information revealed
depended on the interview condition,
F(2, 90) D 34.266, p < .001, h2 D .432
(see Figure 1). Simple effect tests showed
that the participants in the Scharff OpenQ/
Conf condition perceived that they had
revealed significantly less new information
(M D 3.22, SD D 2.09) than they objectively
did (M D 4.00, SD D 2.00), F(1, 31) D 4.973,
p D .028, h2 D .052. Similarly, the partici-
pants in the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition
believed that they had revealed less new
information (M D 3.20, SD D 1.88) than they
objectively did (M D 4.50, SD D 2.30), F(1,
29) D 12.910, p D .001, h2 D .125. In con-
trast, the participants in the direct approach
condition perceived that they revealed signifi-
cantly more new information (M D 4.39, SD
D 2.22) than they objectively did (M D 1.84,
SD D 1.46), F(1, 31) D 51.264, p < .001,
h2 D .363. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported.
For the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition
(68.75%) and the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condi-
tion (66.67%) the majority of the participants
underestimated the amount of new informa-
tion revealed during the interview. In sharp
contrast, for the direct approach the vast
majority (87.10%) of the participants overes-
timated the amount of new information
revealed during the interview.
Discussion
The present study examined the Scharff tech-
nique; a technique aimed for eliciting human
intelligence. Specifically, we mapped possible
order effects of the Scharff tactics. Hence, two
different versions of the Scharff tactics were
compared against the direct approach. The
results allow for two general conclusions.
First, both versions of the Scharff technique
outperformed the direct approach on all the
important measures of efficacy. Second,
although we did not find any clear order
effects, we introduced an alternative how to
combine the illusion of knowing it all-tactic
and the confirmation-tactic.
Intelligence Gathering using the
Scharff Technique
In line with our expectation and the outcome
of previous work (e.g., May et al., 2014;
Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Cancino Monteci-
nos, 2014), the Scharff technique resulted in
more new information compared to the direct
approach. Both versions of the Scharff tech-
nique resulted in double the amount of new
information compared to the direct approach.
With respect to the response to the initial
open-ended question, both versions of the
Scharff technique resulted in comparatively
more new information. For the Scharff condi-
tions this held true independent of whether
the first open-ended question was asked
before or after implementing the confirmation
tactic. We assume that this result is due to the
illusion of knowing it all tactic. For the sour-
ces to reach their goal of getting assistance
from the police, they had to be somewhat
cooperative and reveal information that went
beyond the information presented by the
interviewer. Furthermore, the confirmation
tactic resulted in more new information than
the specific questions. Specifically, the
Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition led to signifi-
cantly more new information than the direct
approach, and comparing the Scharff OpenQ/
Conf condition and the direct approach, the
difference was bordering on significance.
Importantly, for the direct approach the inter-
viewer repeated a specific question if it was
not answered, and could thus ask specific
questions up to six times (three questions
asked two times). Our findings show the
rather unobtrusive implementation of the con-
firmation-tactic outperformed the more obtru-
sive way of asking specific questions.
The sources interviewed by the Scharff
technique perceived that the interviewer knew
more information prior to the interview com-
pared to sources in the direct approach. This
finding replicates the outcome of previous
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work (e.g., Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Klein-
man, 2014), indicates a successful implementa-
tion of the illusion of knowing it all tactic, and
supports the idea that the sources interviewed
by the Scharff technique felt prompted to
reveal information beyond the already pre-
sented information. The illusion of the knowing
it all tactic also aims to give the source the
impression that the interviewer holds more
information than she or he actually does. By
employing the strategy that ‘it is meaningless
to deny or hold back what they already know’
(Granhag, 2010), the source may strive to show
his or her willingness to cooperate through pro-
viding the information that she or he believes is
already known, but which is in fact new to the
interviewer. For the present study this specific
aim was not reached. The results showed that
the information that the sources incorrectly
believed the interviewer to have held was
mainly attributed to the confirmation tactic and
not the illusion of knowing it all tactic.
In line with previous studies (e.g., Granhag,
Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015), the
sources in the Scharff conditions found it com-
paratively more difficult to understand the
interviewer’s information objectives. This find-
ing highlights an important advantage of the
Scharff technique. Our explanation for this is
that when sources were presented with claims
it was more difficult to read the interviewer’s
information objectives compared to specific
questions (especially if the specific questions
are repeated).
One of the most relevant measures for
examining human intelligence interviewing
techniques is the extent to which a source
underestimates the amount of new information
revealed (Justice et al., 2010). This is impor-
tant since a source who perceives that they
have revealed very little might be more will-
ing to talk to the interviewer again. The pres-
ent study showed that sources who faced the
Scharff technique underestimated the amount
of new information revealed. We believe that
this was a result of all the Scharff tactics com-
bined, but particularly the confirmation and
illusion of knowing it all tactics. In contrast,
the sources interviewed by the direct approach
overestimated the amount of new information
revealed. That is, the sources who answered
direct questions and who were in the dark with
respect to the interviewer’s prior knowledge
perceived that almost all of the information
they revealed was new to the interviewer. In
general, this result is in accordance with previ-
ous findings (e.g., Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, &
Kleinman, 2014), and we interpret this as fur-
ther support for the Scharff technique.
For the present study, we compared the
Scharff technique against the direct approach
by interviewing sources who held less infor-
mation about an upcoming attack compared
to sources in previous studies (e.g., May
et al., 2014). That is, because the sources
were less informed, they had to carefully
decide what information to reveal during the
interaction. Hence, we were able to show that
previous positive outcomes for the Scharff
technique also hold for sources that have
access to comparably less information.
The present study is the first to examine
possible order effects in the implementation
of the Scharff tactics. Specifically, for one
version the open-ended question was posed
before the confirmation tactic, and for the
other version the confirmation tactic was
implemented before posing an open-ended
question. Overall, we found no clear order
effects. Nevertheless, we believe that our
results are worthy of reflection.
First, the confirmation tactic resulted in
significantly more new information than the
specific questions, but only when the confir-
mation tactic was presented before the initial
open-ended question. A possible interpretation
of this is that the sources were more willing to
confirm information during their first opportu-
nity to contribute with any information.
Second, the sources revealed a low
amount and not significantly more new infor-
mation in response to the first open-ended
question when this was asked after (vs
before) the confirmation tactic. We believe
that the interviewer failed to reinforce the
illusion of knowing it all sufficiently by
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presenting the confirmation tactic before ask-
ing the first open-ended question.
In brief, we found no clear advantage of
one of the Scharff tactics over the other, but
we found that both versions of the Scharff
technique outperformed the direct approach
on all the important measures. Importantly,
we introduced a valuable alternative with
respect to how an interviewer can combine the
illusion of knowing it all tactic with the confir-
mation tactic. Based on these findings, future
research could examine how to elicit informa-
tion without asking any open-ended questions.
Limitations
The current study is based on a sample of
students. Most real-life sources will be
much more motivated to, for example,
employ counter-interrogation strategies dur-
ing the interaction, as they have a greater
investment in the outcome of the interview.
However, as the Scharff technique is tailored
to counteract these strategies, we think it is
possible that the technique might be even
more effective in real-life settings than in the
lab environment. Furthermore, the sources
were interviewed over the phone, had all the
background information in front of them, and
were instructed not to fabricate information.
Future research should remedy these restric-
tions by the sources meet the interviewer face
to face, need to memorise the background
information, and are allowed to fabricate
information.
Conclusions
Research on intelligence interview techniques
is still in its initial stage. The present study
can be viewed as a further step in examining
the Scharff technique as a non-coercive inter-
view technique that draws on several differ-
ent tactics. Two versions of the Scharff
technique, which differed with respect to
when the confirmation tactic was imple-
mented, outperformed the direct approach on
all critical measures. That is, sources
interviewed by the Scharff technique revealed
more new information and found it more dif-
ficult to understand the interviewer’s infor-
mation objectives compared to the sources
faced with the direct approach. Furthermore,
the sources interviewed by the Scharff tech-
nique underestimated the amount of new
information revealed, whereas the sources
interviewed by the direct approach overesti-
mated the amount of new information
revealed. Although we found no clear order
effect with respect to when the confirmation
tactic was implemented (before or after an
initial open-ended question), we illustrated a
promising alternative how to directly com-
bine the illusion of knowing it all tactic and
the confirmation tactic. In sum, we believe
that the combined evidence speaks in favour
of the Scharff technique as a promising tool
for eliciting human intelligence.
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a  b s t  r a c  t
The Scharff-technique  is  used  for  eliciting  information  from human  sources.  At  the  very  core  of the  tech-
nique is the  “illusion  of knowing  it all” tactic,  which  aims to  inflate  a source’s perception of  how  much
knowledge  an interviewer holds about  the  event  to be  discussed.  For the  current  study,  we mapped  the
effects  following  two  different  ways  of introducing  this  particular tactic; a traditional  way  of implemen-
tation  where  the  interviewer explicitly  states  that s/he already  knows most  of the important information
(the  traditional  condition),  and  a  new way  of implementation  where  the  interviewer  just starts  to present
the  information  that  s/he holds (the  just  start condition).  The two  versions  were  compared  in  two  separate
experiments. In Experiment  1 (N =  60),  we measured  the  participants’  perceptions  of the  interviewer’s
knowledge,  and in Experiment  2  (N =  60),  the  participants’ perceptions  of the  interviewer’s  knowledge
gaps. We  found that  participants  in the  just  start  condition  (a)  believed  the  interviewer  had  more  know-
ledge (Experiment 1),  and (b)  searched  less actively  for  gaps  in  the  interviewer’s  knowledge  (Experiment
2),  compared  to the  traditional  condition. We  will discuss  the  current  findings  and  how  sources test and
perceive the  knowledge his or  her  interviewer possesses within  a framework of social  hypothesis testing.
©  2016 Colegio  Oficial  de  Psico´logos  de  Madrid. Published by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U. This  is  an  open
access  article under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
La utilización  de  la  técnica  de  Scharff  para  extraer  información:  cómo  crear  la
“ilusión  de saberlo  todo”  de  un  modo  eficaz?
Palabras clave:
Técnica de entrevista
Prueba de la hipótesis social
Técnica de Scharff
Recogida de información humana
HUMINT
Extracción de información
r e  s  u m  e  n
La técnica  de  Scharff  se utiliza  para  extraer información  de  fuentes  humanas. En el  meollo  de  la técnica
está la táctica de  la  “ilusión  de  saberlo  todo”,  que apunta  a  engordar  la percepción  de una  fuente  sobre
cuánto  conocimiento  posee  un entrevistador  sobre el  hecho que se aborda. Para  realizar  este  estudio
cartografiamos los  efectos derivados de  la  introducción  de  esta  táctica particular,  un  método tradicional
de  aplicación,  en  el  que el entrevistador  afirma de  modo explícito que ya conoce  casi  toda  la información
importante  (la  condición  tradicional)  y  una manera  nueva  de  implementación,  en  la que  el  entrevista-
dor empieza a presentar  la  información  que posee  (la condición  de  simplemente  iniciar  la condición).  Se
comparó ambas versiones  en dos experimentos  distintos.  En el experimento  1  (N =  60)  medimos  la per-
cepción  que  tenían los participantes de  los conocimientos  del  entrevistador  y en el experimento  2  (N  =  60)
la percepción  que tenían  los participantes  de  las  lagunas  de  conocimiento  del  entrevistador.  Se halló que
los  participantes  de  la  condición  de  “simplemente  iniciar” (a) creían  que el  entrevistador  poseía  más
conocimientos  (experimento 1)  y  (b)  buscaban  de  un modo menos activo  las  lagunas  de  conocimiento
del  entrevistador  (experimento  2),  en  comparación  con la  condición  “tradicional”. Comentaremos  estos
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resultados  y  cómo  perciben  y  ponen  a prueba  las  fuentes  los conocimientos  de  su  entrevistador,  en  el
marco de la prueba  de  hipótesis social.
©  2016  Colegio  Oficial  de  Psico´logos de  Madrid.  Publicado  por Elsevier Espan˜a,  S.L.U. Este  es un artı´culo
Open  Access  bajo  la  CC BY-NC-ND licencia  (http://creativecommons.org/licencias/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Human intelligence (HUMINT) is “a category of intelligence
derived from information collected and provided by human
sources” (NATO, 2014, p. 115). Typically, in a  HUMINT interaction
an interviewer aims to collect information about past or future
criminal activities (Evans, Meissner, Brandon, Russano, & Kleinman,
2010; Vrij & Granhag, 2014). A specific form of HUMINT gathering is
information elicitation, for which the goal is to collect information
in such a manner that the sources remain unaware of the true pur-
pose of the interaction (Justice, Bhatt, Brandon, & Kleinman, 2010).
The main aims are here that the sources underestimate how much
new information they have revealed and remain unaware of the
interviewer’s information objectives.
Humans who strive toward goals develop strategies and plans
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991, 2008). In the HUMINT context, sources often
aim for a specific goal (e.g., money or protection from prosecution)
and what they offer in  return is information. Additionally, sources
are often cooperative to some extent; they are willing to  share
some but not all information they hold. In order to  pursue their
goal, sources often use so-called counter-interrogation strategies;
for example, “I will not say very much during the interrogation,”
“I will try to figure out what they are after, and then make sure I
do not give them what they want,” and “It is  meaningless to deny
or withhold what they already know” (Scharff, 1950; Soufan, 2011;
Toliver, 1997). Recently, Alison et al. (2014) presented a  field study
in which they showed the relevance of such counter-interrogation
strategies.
The Scharff-technique
The Scharff-technique aims to collect information from sources
that are motivated to  reveal some but not all information (Granhag,
2010). An interviewer taking the perspective of the source lies at
the very core of the Scharff-technique. Perspective taking refers to
the  “cognitive capacity to consider the world from other viewpoints
and allows an individual to  anticipate the behavior and reactions
of others” (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008,  p. 378). Taking
the perspective of others is  effective in negotiations (Galinsky &
Mussweiler, 2001), and of importance for criminal and HUMINT
interviewers (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Soufan, 2011).
The Scharff-technique is  a  collection of tactics that draws on
the interviewer’s insights about the source’s goals and counter-
interrogation strategies (Granhag, 2010). The friendly approach
tactic stipulates that the interviewer establishes and maintains a
pleasant, conversational atmosphere during the interview. When
employing the illusion of knowing it all tactic, the interviewer
presents already known information, makes clear that s/he is  well-
informed regarding the topic to  be discussed, and gives the source
the opportunity to  add details. The confirmation/disconfirmation tac-
tic aims to elicit specific pieces of information as the interviewer
presents claims that s/he seeks to  have affirmed or negated. The
not pressing for information tactic requires the interviewer to  col-
lect information by asking very few, if any,  questions. Finally, using
the ignore new information tactic means the interviewer conceals
his or her interest for information and treats the information that
the source reveals as known or  unimportant (for more detailed
descriptions on the Scharff tactics, see Granhag, Montecinos, &
Oleszkiewicz, 2015; May, Granhag, & Oleszkiewicz, 2014).
In  a  series of studies, the Scharff-technique has been compared
to the Direct Approach, which is  a combination of open-ended
and specific questions (US Army, 2006). In accordance with the
Field Manual 2–22.3 (US Army, 2006) and the Executive Order No.
13941 (US Government, 2009), the Direct Approach is the most
commonly used intelligence interviewing technique in the field
(Redlich, Kelly, & Miller, 2011; Semel, 2013). All previous studies
have used an experimental paradigm mirroring important features
of a  typical HUMINT interaction (Granhag et al., 2015a). Simply
put, participants received incomplete information on a  planned
attack and were instructed to  strike a balance between not revea-
ling too much or too little information in  a subsequent interview.
In past studies, the Scharff-technique has outperformed the Direct
Approach by all important measures. First, the Scharff-technique
resulted in relatively more new information (e.g., May  & Granhag,
2015; see Granhag, Oleszkiewicz, Strömwall, & Kleinman, 2015 for
sources who  varied in their levels of cooperation and knowledge).
Second, the sources interviewed with the Scharff-technique under-
estimated how much new information they revealed, whereas
the sources interviewed with the Direct Approach overestimated
how much new information they revealed (e.g., May  et al., 2014;
Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Cancino Montecinos, 2014). Finally, the
sources interviewed by the Scharff-technique found it relatively
more difficult to read the interviewer’s information objective (e.g.,
May  et al., 2014; Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Kleinman, 2014).
In previous studies, the illusion of knowing it all tactic played
an important role in terms of collecting new information. The pre-
sentation of known information (i.e., the illusion of knowing it all
tactic) followed by an open-ended question resulted in more new
information compared to simply asking an open-ended question
(e.g., May  et al., 2014; Oleszkiewicz et al., 2014a).  That is, by pre-
senting known information, the interviewer made the source to
reveal information beyond what was  disclosed by the interviewer.
Another aim of the illusion of knowing it all tactic is to inflate the
source’s perception of how much knowledge the interviewer holds
about the event. Specifically, the interviewer steers the source’s
focus towards his or her knowledge of the event and steers it away
from his or her knowledge gaps. The current study is about the effi-
cacy of different ways of introducing the illusion of knowing it all
tactic aiming to inflate the source’s perception of the interviewer’s
knowledge.
Sources Exploring the Interviewer’s Knowledge
Humans are naturally goal-oriented (Aarts, 2012), and in  order
to decide if and how to pursue a  goal, they form and test hypothe-
ses. Trope and Liberman (1996) presented a  framework for social
hypothesis testing that consists of five steps and can be applied to
a  source that tests the amount and relevance of an interviewer’s
knowledge. At  first, the source may  formulate a  hypothesis (e.g.,
“The interviewer holds some important information”). S/he may
then derive if-then rules from stored knowledge in order to  test
the hypothesis (e.g., “If the interviewer holds important informa-
tion, then s/he knows who  founded the group”). In  the third step
the source searches for relevant information in his  or  her memory
from past interviews or actively during an ongoing interaction with
the interviewer in  order to  test these if-then rules (e.g., “The inter-
viewer knows that a  woman  founded the group”). In accordance
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with these if-then rules, the source may  then interpret and catego-
rize the collected information (e.g., “A woman founded the group” is
categorized as important knowledge), and finally draw an inference
by assessing the likelihood that the hypothesis is true or  not  (e.g.,
“The interviewer actually holds some important knowledge”).
Trope and Liberman (1996) distinguished between two  broad
hypothesis-testing methods. The diagnostic testing refers to  a  com-
prehensive analysis of the hypothesis and its alternatives. In
contrast, the pseudodiagnostic testing refers to the neglect of the
alternative hypothesis; persons search for hypothesis-consistent
information, interpret information and/or draw inferences in  favor
of the hypothesis. Since the latter processes often lead to a con-
firmation of the focal hypothesis, it is also considered a  hypothesis
confirmation strategy (Skov & Sherman, 1986), or is  referred to as
a positive test strategy,  as it can, but does not have to, confirm
the focal hypothesis (Hodgins & Zuckerman, 1993; Klayman & Ha,
1987). Studies show that humans generally prefer the diagnostic
strategy to test social hypotheses (Bassok & Trope, 1984; Trope &
Bassok, 1983), and this independent of whether or not they are
instructed to test a  specific hypothesis (Trope, Bassok, & Alon 1984).
However, persons prefer the positive test strategy when presented
with equally diagnostic hypothesis-consistent and alternative-
consistent features (Devine, Hirt, & Gehrke, 1990; Skov & Sherman,
1986), especially when instructed to test an extreme (radical)
hypothesis (e.g., “The interviewer holds all important information”)
in comparison to a more moderate hypothesis (e.g., “The inter-
viewer holds some important information”; Trope & Bassok, 1983).
In brief, many interview situations (including HUMINT interac-
tions) are characterized by the interviewer aiming at influencing a)
the hypothesis that  the source formulates about the interviewer’s
knowledge, and how the source tests this hypothesis, and b)  what
inference the source draws from this testing (Granhag & Hartwig,
2015; Soufan, 2011).
The Present Research
The current paper examines two ways of introducing the illusion
of knowing it all tactic. For the traditional condition the interviewer
began presenting information in  a fashion similar to that found
in previous studies (e.g., May  &  Granhag, 2015), stating explicitly:
“I already posses most of the most important information and let
me just share that  information first.” In contrast, for the just start
condition the interviewer simply presented the known information
without an explicit statement regarding the amount or  relevance
of known information.
The present research examines these two conditions in two
separate experiments. In Experiment 1 we measured how sources
perceived and tested the interviewer’s knowledge in  terms of
known information, and in Experiment 2 in  terms of unknown
information. We  examined the different dependent variables in
two studies in order to  avoid order effects and confounds. In both
studies the participants called an interviewer who then employed
the  illusion of knowing it all tactic and eventually interrupted the
conversation. Participants were then asked to record their percep-
tions of the interview by  filling out a questionnaire which differed
between the two experiments.
Drawing on research on social hypothesis testing, we  predicted
that compared to sources in the traditional condition, sources in
the just start condition would test the interviewer’s knowledge (a)
more actively for known information (Experiment 1), and (b) less
for unknown information (Experiment 2). The reason for this was
that the sources in the traditional condition were presented with
the interviewer’s statement to “possess most of the most important
information.” In short, this statement may  trigger alertness and
we therefore expected the sources to  test a comparatively more
extreme (radical) hypothesis, thereby using a  positive test strat-
egy to  uncover information gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge.
In contrast, the sources in  the just start condition were not pre-
sented with a  statement on the amount and relevance of the known
information. Hence, we expected them to be surprised by all of
the known information, and, accordingly, to test a comparatively
more moderate hypothesis and focus more on the known infor-
mation possessed by the interviewer. Consequently, we predicted
that the sources in the just start condition would infer that the
interviewer (a) held more knowledge (Experiment 1), and (b) had
fewer knowledge gaps (Experiment 2), compared to the sources
in  the traditional condition. The rationale behind this was that
in the traditional condition the interviewer gave the sources a
point of reference for the amount of known information (“I already
possess most of the most important information, so let me just
share that  information first”), and that they would focus more on
the gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge. In contrast, we expected
that the sources in the just start condition would be unsuspect-
ing regarding the amount of known information, and that they
would search more actively for information that the interviewer
possessed.
Experiment 1
For this experiment we measured the participants’ perceptions
of the interviewer’s knowledge. We  predicted that the participants
in  the just start condition would write down comparatively more
information that was  known to the interviewer (Hypothesis 1),
and would think comparatively more about further information
that the interviewer could have (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, we
hypothesized that the participants in the just start condition would
perceive that the interviewer held comparatively more information
(Hypothesis 3).
Method
Participants
The study included 60 participants (49 female and 11 male;
42 psychology students, 16 other students, and two  employees).
The mean age was  23.55 years (SD = 6.29, ages ranging from 18 to
59), and they were randomly assigned to  one of the two interview
conditions (30 participants for  each condition). The psychology stu-
dents participated in  exchange for partial course credit and the
other participants received 10 Euros as compensation for their par-
ticipation. Originally, 62 persons were recruited for this study, but
two had to be excluded (one misunderstood the instructions, and
one reported technical problems).
Materials
We produced a list containing of 14 themes on a terrorist group
in order to prepare instructions for participants and protocols for
the interviewers. Each theme consisted of two pieces of informa-
tion with varying levels of specificity. For example, for the theme
“date of the attack,” the general piece of information was  “around
Christmas,” and the specific piece of information was “the 27th of
December.”
Procedure
Background and planning. Participants received basic instruc-
tions and information concerning the group and their activities
in order to prepare the role of a source calling a  police contact.
Specifically, they had to memorize the specific information on all
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14 themes, as they were not allowed to have notes available dur-
ing the phone call. The participants were instructed to strike a
balance between not revealing too much information (because they
sympathized with the group), and not revealing too little informa-
tion (because they needed help from the police). Furthermore, they
were allowed to provide false information to the interviewer, and
were not informed if the police contact already possessed any infor-
mation. After 20 minutes of preparation time the participants were
asked to fill out a  memory test about  the 14 pieces of background
information (e.g., “On what exact date will the bomb attack take
place?”). An identical memory test was filled out immediately after
the interview. These two tests were scored and participants were
only included in the analysis if they achieved a  score of 11 or higher
on both the pre and post-interview tests. In Experiment 1, all parti-
cipants fulfilled the criteria. After checking the correctness of this
test, the experimenter left the room and the participants called the
interviewer via phone.
The interview. Three interviewers conducted the interviews (two
female and one male), and all of them held approximately the same
amount of interviews in  each condition. They were trained in  con-
ducting the interviews and instructed to closely follow the two
interview protocols.
(a) Just start condition. For the just start condition the interviewer
made the phone call and started the interview by asking the
source if everything was  okay with the phone connection. Then
the interviewer explained kindly that s/he might have to  inter-
rupt the conversation as s/he was expecting an important call
from his or her boss. The interviewer continued by inquiring
about the source’s well-being. After the source finished answer-
ing,  the interviewer showed understanding for the source’s
situation and explained that s/he knew about different options
that could be used to help the source (friendly approach tac-
tic). Then the interviewer employed the illusion of knowing
it  all tactic by  stating the following: “I think it’s really good
that you are just contacting me now, so that  I  had a  chance
to familiarize myself with your situation, and also had time
to think about MDA  and their current planning” (MDA was
the name of the terrorist group). The interviewer then pre-
sented information on seven themes with a general level of
specificity (the name of the group, the number of members in
general, their origins, the number of members planning the cur-
rent attack, the extent of their knowledge on building bombs,
how well the bomb could be concealed, and the location of the
bomb’s production). The interviewer ended his  or her presen-
tation by stating, “But I’m sorry, I think I should stop talking so
much, so let’s get back to the conditions of our deal and how
you can contribute.” Next, the interviewer’s phone rang loud
enough for the source to hear and the interviewer explained
that s/he had to take the phone call and would call the source
back in 5 to 10 minutes. In reality, the interviewer did not call
back.
(b) Traditional condition. The interview protocols in the just start
condition and the traditional condition differed solely with
respect to the introduction of the illusion of knowing it all tac-
tic. For the traditional condition the interviewer stated: “I think
it’s really good that you are just contacting me now, so that I
had time to familiarize myself with your situation. After think-
ing through the whole thing on MDA  again, I’m convinced that
I already hold most of the important information on the group
and their planning, and I wonder if there is really additional
information that we still need. Well, I  mean, I already possess
most of the most important information, so let me just share
that information first.” The friendly approach tactic, the pre-
sentation of the known information, and the interruption of
the phone call were implemented in  the exact same manner as
in the just start condition.
Post-interview questionnaire. Five minutes after the phone
call was  interrupted the experimenter came into the room and
explained that the role-playing part was  over. The participants
were then asked to fill out a  questionnaire concerning their per-
ceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge. The first relevant question
sought to obtain a  global perception of the interviewer’s knowledge
(“To what extent did you perceive that your police contact already
had information on the group and their activities?”), with a  scale
ranging from 1 (to a  very low extent) to  7 (to a  very high extent).  The
next two  questions regarded how actively the participants searched
for information that was  known to  the interviewer. The participants
were asked to write down all the information that the interviewer
already knew (“What information on the group and their activi-
ties did your police contact already hold?”), and the final critical
question was, “To what extent did you think during the phone call
about what further information your police contact could have?”
The scale ranged from 1 (to a  very low extent) to  7 (to a very high
extent). In addition, the participants were asked how motivated
they felt to carry out their “task” as a  source (1 = not at all moti-
vated to 7 =  very motivated), how difficult it was  to  understand the
instructions of the study (1 = not at all difficult to  7 = very difficult),
and how difficult it was  to play the role of an informant (1 = not at
all difficult to 7 =  very difficult). The participants were then debriefed
and discharged.
Coding.  The participants’ written answers about what informa-
tion they perceived the interviewer already knew were coded. Since
some participants listed information on a  high level of specificity
(e.g., “S/he knew that the attack would take place on 27th of  Decem-
ber”), whereas others only mentioned the theme (e.g., “S/he knew
the date of the attack”), we coded for a theme being mentioned or
not. That is, the total amount of listed information ranged from 0
to 14.
Inter-rater reliability. Two  persons coded 30% of the written
answers from the open-ended question (nine for each condition),
and the inter-rater reliability was calculated on the basis of these
30% (Cohen’s ! = .95). The two  coders discussed the results and
resolved discrepancies and the final agreed-upon scores were used
in the analysis. Then, one person coded the remaining 70% of the
answers.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Overall, the participants were motivated to carry out their task
as a  source (M =  5.30, SD =  1.45), did not  find it difficult to under-
stand the received instructions (M =  1.82, SD =  1.07), and found it
moderately difficult to take the role of a source (M = 4.40, SD =  1.68).
No differences were found between the two conditions with respect
to  the participants’ motivation, t(58) = -0.708, p =  .482, d  =  0.18, how
difficult it was to understand the instructions, t(58) =  0.846, p = .401,
d  =  0.22, or  how difficult it was to  take the role of an informant,
t(58) = -0.612, p  =  .543, d =  0.15.
Perception of the Interviewer’s Knowledge
Known information. No difference was  found between the just
start condition (M =  5.33, SD =  1.67) and the traditional condition
(M =  5.60, SD =  1.13) with respect to the written answers to the
open-ended question regarding which information the participants
believed the interviewer already knew, t(58) =  -0.724, p  =  .236, one-
tailed, d = 0.19. Thus, no support was  found for Hypothesis 1.
Knowledge search. We  found no difference between the just
start condition (M =  4.87, SD =  1.72) and the traditional condition
(M =  4.30, SD =  1.97) with respect to the extent to  which participants
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thought about further information that the interviewer could have,
t(58) = 1.189, p =  .120, one-tailed, d = 0.31. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was
not supported.
Global perception.  As predicted in Hypothesis 3, the parti-
cipants in the just start condition (M =  5.47, SD =  0.94) perceived
the interviewer to  hold significantly more information compared
to  the participants in  the traditional condition (M =  4.77, SD = 1.07),
t(58) = 2.692, p  =  .005, one-tailed, d =  0.70.
Discussion
The results offered mixed support for our expectations. As  pre-
dicted, the participants in the just start condition perceived the
interviewer globally to have had more information compared to the
participants in the traditional condition. However, no differences
were found with respect to  how actively the sources searched
the interviewer’s knowledge for known information (i.e., the listed
information that was believed to be possessed by the interviewer,
and the extent to  which they thought about which further infor-
mation the interviewer could hold). Before discussing the results in
detail we examine how sources perceive and test an interviewer’s
knowledge in terms of unknown information.
Experiment 2
In this experiment we  explored the participants’ perception of
the interviewer’s knowledge gaps. We  predicted that the parti-
cipants in the just start condition would list comparatively less
information that was unknown to  the interviewer (Hypothesis 1),
and that they, to a comparatively lesser extent, would search for
gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore,
we expected that the participants in  the just start condition would
globally believe the interviewer to have had comparatively fewer
knowledge gaps (Hypothesis 3).
Method
Participants
The study included 60 participants (45 female and 15 male; 45
psychology students, 14 other students, and one employee) with
a mean age of 21.73 (SD  = 3.98, ranging from 17 to  37). They were
randomly assigned to one of the two interview conditions (30 parti-
cipants for each condition), and received course credit or 10 Euros
as compensation for their participation. Originally, 62 participants
were recruited, but two persons were excluded from the study (one
did not fulfill the memory test criteria, and one misunderstood the
instructions).
Materials and Procedure
The materials and the general procedure (background and plan-
ning, and conducting of the interviews) for Experiment 2 were
exactly the same as those in  Experiment 1. The two experiments
differed only with respect to  the post-interview questionnaire.
Post-interview Questionnaire
After the phone call was interrupted for 5 minutes, the experi-
menter asked the participants to  fill out a questionnaire concerning
their perception of the interviewer’s knowledge gaps. The first cri-
tical question was about the participants’ global perception of the
interviewer’s knowledge gaps (“To what extent did you perceive
that your police contact had knowledge gaps in terms of the group
and their activities?”); the scale ranged from 1 (to a very low  extent)
to 7 (to a very high extent).  The next two  questions related to  how
actively the participants searched for unknown information in  the
interviewer’s knowledge. They were asked to write down the infor-
mation that they perceived the interviewer did not know (“Where
did your police contact have knowledge gaps in  terms of the group
and their activities?”), and they rated the extent to  which they
searched for gaps in  the interviewer’s knowledge (“To what extent
did you search for gaps in the knowledge of your police contact dur-
ing the phone call?”) on a  response scale ranging from 1  (to  a very
low extent)  to 7 (to a very high extent). As in Experiment 1, parti-
cipants were then asked how motivated they felt to carry out their
“task” as a source (1 =  not at all motivated to 7 =  very motivated),  how
difficult it was to understand the study’s instructions (1 =  not at  all
difficult to 7 = very difficult), and how difficult it was  to  play the role
of an informant (1 =  not at all difficult to 7 =  very difficult).
Coding. The coding of the written answers was  very similar to
that in Experiment 1.  The only difference was that the participants
wrote down information that was  unknown to the interviewer (i.e.,
listed knowledge gaps). As in Experiment 1,  we coded answers if a
theme was mentioned with no indication of its level of  specificity
(total range: 0 to 14 themes).
Inter-rater reliability. Two persons coded 30% of the written
answers (9 for each condition), and these 30% were assessed for
inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s ! =  .92). After discussing and resol-
ving discrepancies, the final agreed-upon scores were used in the
analysis, and one person coded the remaining 70% of the answers.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
The participants were motivated to perform their role as a
source (M = 5.60, SD = 1.41), did not find it difficult to  understand
the instructions of the study (M  =  1.70, SD =  .79), and found it
moderately difficult to  take the role of a  source (M =  3.82, SD =  1.90).
No differences were found between the two  conditions with respect
to the participants’ motivation, t(58) =  0.548, p = .586, d  =  0.14, how
difficult it was to understand the study’s instructions, t(58) = 0.652,
p  =  .517, d = 0.18, or how difficult it was to  take the role of a  source,
t(58) = -0.745, p =  .460, d =  0.19.
Perception of the Interviewer’s Knowledge Gaps
Unknown information. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, the parti-
cipants in the just start condition (M =  6.13, SD =  3.00) wrote down
significantly less information that they perceived as unknown to
the interviewer compared to the participants in  the traditional
condition (M =  7.70, SD = 3.06), t(58) =  -2.000, p =  .025, one-tailed,
d =  0.52.
Knowledge gaps search. In support of Hypothesis 2, the parti-
cipants in the just start condition (M = 4.70, SD =  1.75) searched to a
significantly lesser extent for gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge
compared to the participants in the traditional condition (M =  5.63,
SD =  1.59), t(58) = -2.168, p  =  .017, one-tailed, d = 0.56.
Global perception.  No difference was  found between the just
start condition (M =  3.20, SD = 1.42) and the traditional condition
(M = 3.20, SD =  1.38) with respect to  the participants’ global percep-
tion of gaps in  the interviewer’s knowledge, t(58) =  0.000, p =  1.00,
one-tailed, d  =  0.00. This did not align with Hypothesis 3.
Discussion
The results confirmed two of our  three predictions. As expected,
we found that the participants in the just start condition listed com-
paratively less information that  was  unknown to  the interviewer,
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and searched to a  comparatively lesser extent for gaps in the
interviewer’s knowledge. That means, the sources in  the just start
condition searched comparatively less actively for gaps in  the
interviewer’s knowledge information. However, no difference was
found between the two conditions with respect to  the sources’
global perception of gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge. Below we
discuss the results of Experiment 1 and 2 in  an integrated manner.
General Discussion
The present research examined two ways of introducing
the Scharff-technique’s illusion of knowing it all tactic. For the
traditional condition, the interviewer began presenting known
information with a  statement on the amount and relevance of
known information. In contrast, for the just start condition, the
interviewer started presenting information without such a state-
ment. In two separate experiments we compared these two
conditions and mapped how sources tested and perceived the
interviewer’s knowledge in terms of known (Experiment 1) and
unknown information (Experiment 2).
In Experiment 1, no difference was found between the two
conditions with respect to how actively the sources tested the
interviewer’s knowledge. However, the sources in the just start
condition perceived that the interviewer possessed a  larger amount
of knowledge compared to the sources in  the traditional condition.
In Experiment 2,  we found that the sources in the just start condi-
tion tested the interviewer’s knowledge less actively for unknown
information compared to the traditional condition. However, the
two conditions did not differ in terms of the sources’ global per-
ception of gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge. In sum, the sources
in the just start condition tested comparatively less actively for gaps
in the interviewer’s knowledge, and inferred that  the interviewer
held comparatively more knowledge.
The results confirmed some but not  all of our  predictions. Based
on the framework for social hypothesis (Trope & Liberman, 1996),
we expected to find a  link between (a) how actively the sources
tested the interviewer’s knowledge in terms of known/unknown
information and (b) how they–on a  global level–perceived the
interviewer’s knowledge/knowledge gaps. Unexpectedly, we did
not find this link. However, we found that in  Experiment 1, the
sources in the just start condition perceived the interviewer to
have had a greater extent of knowledge without searching more
actively for known information (vs. the traditional condition). This
suggests that the hypothesis could have been confirmed without
searching more actively for known information and a  hypothesis
confirmation strategy could have therefore been used accordingly.
In Experiment 2, the sources in  the traditional condition might
have used a positive test strategy as they searched more actively
for unknown information, but did not perceive the interviewer to
have more knowledge gaps (vs. the just start condition). How-
ever, further research is needed to examine these hypothesis
test strategies. Overall, in the present experiments, the just start
condition outperformed the traditional condition in  terms of maxi-
mizing the sources’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge
and minimizing their focus on information that was unknown to
the interviewer. The relevance of this becomes particular obvious
when linking these findings to the sources’ counter-interrogation
strategies (a) to reveal only information that is already known to
the interviewer, and (b) to refrain from filling in crucial gaps in  the
interviewer’s knowledge (Soufan, 2011; Toliver, 1997).
The present study came with a number of limitations as well as
some fruitful input with respect to directions for future research.
A rather general limitation of the illusion of knowing it all tactic
is that in order to implement it, prior information is  required. Fur-
thermore, in certain situations presenting information to  a source
poses a  risk (e.g., if a  source is  not credible). That is, the illusion of
knowing it all tactic should only be  implemented in certain situ-
ations. A limitation concerning the current study was  that it was
a  role-play based on a student sample. However, we believe that
real-life sources, who  are  in an information management dilemma
similar to  the one examined in the present study, would be com-
paratively more motivated to explore the interviewer’s knowledge.
This could mean that the just start condition may  be even more
effective in real-life situations. Furthermore, we decided to  con-
duct the interviews via phone, to prohibit the participants from
revealing any case-specific information, and to  give them no chance
to ask any questions, as this could have influenced our manipu-
lations. However, we  view the current research as a first step in
examining sources’ perceptions of the illusion of knowing it all tac-
tic and future studies should address these issues. For future studies
it might be also worthwhile to vary the introductory statement
(e.g., “to have some important information”) and the specificity
and amount of presented information. Also, we believe that  there is
room for future research on how to elaborate the presented infor-
mation presentation. For example, the interviewer could add in
ambiguous information, as several studies have shown that such
information is likely to be interpreted in favor of the hypothesis
(Darley & Gross, 1983; Regan, Straus, & Fazio, 1974; Schulz-Hardt
& Köhnken, 2000). Finally, it might also be worthwhile to examine
how to  introduce evidence in police interviews.
Conclusions
The present study examined two  versions of how to  introduce
the illusion of knowing it all tactic. This tactic specifies that an
interviewer presents already known information and is  at the very
core of the Scharff-technique. In conclusion, we have demonstrated
that sources who were not  presented with an explicit introductory
statement on the presented information (a) searched less actively
for information unknown to the interviewer, and (b) perceived
the interviewer to  have held a larger amount of prior  knowledge,
compared to sources who were presented with an interviewer’s
statement implying that s/he already had most of the important
information. Further research is needed to examine more closely
how to introduce and present known information in order to inflate
sources’ perceptions of how much knowledge the interviewer holds
about an event to be discussed.
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This study examines how different evidence disclosure modes affect the elicitation of
new critical information. Two modes derived from the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE)
framework were compared against an early disclosure mode (i.e., the evidence was
disclosed at the outset of the interview). Participants (N = 88) performed a mock crime
consisting of several actions before they were interviewed as suspects. In both SUE
conditions the interviewer elicited and disclosed statement-evidence inconsistencies in
two phases after an introductory phase. For the SUE-Confrontation (SUE-C) condition,
the interview was introduced in a business-like manner, and the interviewer confronted
the suspects with the in/consistencies without giving them a chance to comment on
these. For the SUE-Introduce-Present-Respond (SUE-IPR) condition, the interviewer
introduced the interview in a non-guilt-presumptive way, presented the in/consistencies
and allowed the suspects to comment on these, and then responded to their comments;
at all times in a non-judgmental manner. Both SUE conditions generated comparatively
more statement-evidence inconsistencies. The SUE-IPR condition resulted in more
new critical information about the phase of the crime for which the interviewer lacked
information, compared to the Early disclosure condition. A likely explanation for this was
that (for the SUE-IPR condition) the interviewer used the inconsistencies to create a
fostering interview atmosphere and made the suspects overestimate the interviewer’s
knowledge about the critical phase of the crime. In essence, this study shows that in
order to win the game (i.e., obtaining new critical information), the interviewer needs to
keep the suspect in the game (i.e., by not being too confrontational and judgmental).
Keywords: suspect interview, information elicitation, information gathering, counter-interrogation strategies,
strategic use of evidence
INTRODUCTION
One important aim of a suspect interview is to collect new case-related information (Memon et al.,
2003). Ethical interviewing approaches suggest gathering this information in an open minded-
manner (e.g., the PEACEmodel; Bull, 2014). Furthermore, the research literature shows that ethical
and humane interviewing approaches are associated with forthcoming suspects (Holmberg and
Christianson, 2002; Kebbell et al., 2010; Snook et al., 2015). In suspect interviews, the use of
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evidence is often at the core. Unfortunately, to date only few
studies have provided knowledge on the link between evidence
disclosure and information elicitation (e.g., Tekin et al., 2015;
Walsh and Bull, 2015). Therefore, this study was designed to
examine how diﬀerent evidence disclosure modes aﬀect the
elicitation of new critical information.
The Strategic Use of Evidence Framework
The Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) framework consists of
general principles that can be used to obtain diagnostic cues to
deceit (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2014), and to elicit new information
(e.g., Tekin et al., 2016). At the core of the SUE framework
is the suspects’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge, and
how these perceptions aﬀect the suspects’ counter-interrogation
strategies, and in turn their verbal responses (Granhag, 2010;
Granhag and Hartwig, 2015).
Research has shown that innocent and guilty suspects
aiming to convince the interviewer of their innocence diﬀer
with respect to their counter-interrogation strategies. Broadly
speaking, innocent suspects have seldom something to conceal,
they trust that they will be believed if they “just tell it like
it happened” (Kassin, 2005), and hence employ forthcoming
counter-interrogation strategies (Hartwig et al., 2010). In
contrast, guilty suspects are typically motivated to conceal
crime-relevant information. Therefore, they commonly prepare
for the interview (Hartwig et al., 2007), and reflect on the
interviewer’s possible knowledge (e.g., Moston and Engelberg,
2011). If they estimate that the interviewer does not hold specific
information, they will likely use withholding strategies with
respect to this information (“I will not tell any information that
might be incriminating”). However, if a guilty suspect believes
the interviewer holds specific information, s/he will likely employ
forthcoming strategies with respect to this particular information
(“It is meaningless to withhold what the interviewer already
knows”). Therefore, an interviewer might profit from having the
suspect overestimate how much information s/he holds.
An interviewer who aims to elicit new information on a
phase of a crime for which s/he lacks information can exploit
the knowledge about suspects’ counter-interrogation strategies
by using the available evidence strategically. For example,
the interviewer may elicit statement-evidence inconsistencies
by asking questions about the available evidence without
disclosing it. Guilty suspects will likely produce statements
that are inconsistent with the evidence, as they are unaware
of the interviewer’s knowledge and therefore tend to use
withholding strategies. Next, the interviewer may disclose
these inconsistencies to the suspect. This may result in the
suspects realizing that the interviewer held more knowledge
than first thought. Furthermore, the suspect may rethink his
or her perception of the interviewer’s knowledge concerning
the information that have not yet been discussed (“S/he
may hold information also on other aspects”). Basically, the
interviewer wants to achieve two things by eliciting and
disclosing inconsistencies: (1) to reveal his or her interview tactic
to the suspect (i.e., asking questions about the evidence before
disclosing it), and (2) to make the suspect overestimate his or
her knowledge. Critically, this in turn may result in the suspects
changing from less to more forthcoming counter-interrogation
strategies. Finally, the interviewer asks questions about the part of
the crime for which s/he lacks information. If a guilty suspect now
uses more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies, s/he will
reveal new information.
In contrast, innocent suspects are expected to typically use
forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies throughout the
interview. Therefore, the innocent suspects will likely provide
statements that are consistent with the evidence (when asked
questions about the evidence) and reveal new information (when
asked questions about the part for which the interviewer lacks
information).
Research on the SUE Framework
In the first study examining how the SUE framework could
be used to elicit new information from guilty suspects, a
SUE confrontation condition was compared against an Early
disclosure condition (Tekin et al., 2015). To illustrate the
implementation of the SUE protocol, consider a crime that can be
divided into three diﬀerent phases (A, B, and C). The interviewer
holds evidence about Phase A and B indicating the suspect’s
possible involvement in the crime. However, the interviewer lacks
information about the critical phase (Phase C). The interviewer
starts by asking questions about Phase A without disclosing
the evidence on this phase (in order to generate statement-
evidence inconsistencies), and confronts the suspect with these
statement-evidence inconsistencies. The interviewer then repeats
this procedure for Phase B. Finally, the interviewer asks about
Phase C, for which s/he lacks information. Importantly, in the
study by Tekin et al. (2015), for the SUE confrontation condition,
the suspects were not given any opportunity to comment on
their in/consistencies. For the Early disclosure condition, the
interviewer disclosed the evidence about Phase A and Phase
B before asking questions about it. The SUE confrontation
condition resulted in more statement-evidence inconsistencies,
more new information, and that the suspects perceived the
interviewer to have held more information about the critical
phase of the crime compared to the Early disclosure condition.
In a second study, two SUE conditions were compared against
the Early disclosure condition (Tekin et al., 2016). The two SUE
protocols were implemented as described above and diﬀered
only with respect to the way in which the statement-evidence
in/consistencies were handled. For the SUE confrontation
condition the suspects were not given any opportunity to
comment on the in/consistencies. In contrast, for the SUE
confrontation/explain condition, the interviewer explicitly asked
the suspects to explain their inconsistencies. Both SUE conditions
generated more statement-evidence inconsistencies compared
to the Early disclosure condition. However, only the SUE
confrontation condition resulted in more new information
compared to the Early disclosure condition. This was unexpected
as the suspects in both SUE conditions perceived the interviewer
to hold comparatively more information about the critical phase.
Further analysis showed that a small group of suspects in the SUE
confrontation/explain condition were reluctant to explain their
inconsistencies, and these suspects revealed less new information
compared to the suspects who did explain their inconsistencies.
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Diﬀerently put, some suspects seemed to have given up trying
to explain their inconsistencies, and therefore continued to use
a withholding strategy also when questioned about the critical
phase. This shows that in order to have suspects reveal new
information at a later stage in an interview, they have to be willing
to explain the inconsistencies that occur early on in the interview.
The Present Study
The present study advances research on the SUE framework
by examining the eﬀects of three diﬀerent modes of evidence
disclosure. Two modes derived from the SUE framework were
compared against a mode for which the evidence was disclosed
early in the interview. All interview protocols were divided
into an introductory phase (Phase 1) and three questioning
phases (Phases 2, 3, and 4). For the Early disclosure condition,
the interviewer disclosed all the evidence at the outset (Phase
1), and then continued with open-ended invitations asking
the suspect to explain the disclosed evidence (Phases 2 and
3). In both SUE conditions the interviewer attempted to elicit
statement-evidence in/consistencies for Phases 2 and 3 (by asking
questions about the evidence without disclosing it). The SUE
conditions diﬀered with respect to the way the interviewer
(a) introduced the interview (Phase 1) and (b) disclosed the
in/consistencies to the suspects (Phase 2 and 3). For the SUE-
Confrontation (SUE-C) condition, the interviewer introduced the
interview in a business-like manner (Phase 1), and confronted
the suspects with their in/consistencies without giving them any
chance to comment on them (Phases 2 and 3). In contrast,
for the SUE-Introduce-Present-Respond (SUE-IPR) condition the
interviewer introduced the interview in a non-guilt-presumptive
way (Phase 1), presented the statement-evidence in/consistencies
in a manner that allowed the suspects to comment on these,
and then responded to their comments (Phases 2 and 3); all
these steps were implemented in a non-judgmental manner (see
detailed descriptions below). Phase 4 of the interview concerned
the actions for which the interviewer lacked information. This
phase was approached in the same manner for all three
interview conditions: The interviewer began with an open-
ended invitation, and if the suspects revealed information the
interviewer asked follow-up questions. Compared to previous
studies (Tekin et al., 2016) the SUE-IPR condition is novel,
whereas similar versions of the SUE-C condition and Early
disclosure condition were also used before.
As in previous studies using the SUE framework to elicit
new information (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016), all mock suspects
in this study were guilty. The rationale behind this was that
previous studies using a similar design have shown innocent
suspects to be forthcoming to a very high extent (Luke et al.,
2014; Tekin et al., 2014), and we had no reason to assume that
innocent suspects would be less forthcoming in the present study.
Furthermore, we mapped only the incriminating information
that the suspects revealed during the interview and which was
new to the interviewer. We used the term “new information”
(instead of “admissions” as used in previous studies; e.g., Tekin
et al., 2016) as in some countries admissions refer to suspects’
statements in court.
In the present study, we introduced a new way to capture
the course of the suspects’ perceptions of the interviewer’s
knowledge. That is, the participants listened to the audio
recordings of their interviews once the interview was over, and
used a checklist to report their perceptions of the interviewer’s
knowledge at four diﬀerent points of the interview (after Phase 1,
2, 3 and 4). This procedure enabled us to examine—in a more
detailed manner—how specific interview phases aﬀected the
suspects’ overestimations of the interviewer’s knowledge about
the critical phase of the crime.
On the basis of previous research and the arguments outlined
above, we predicted that both SUE conditions would result in
more statement-evidence inconsistencies compared to the Early
disclosure condition (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we predicted
that the SUE conditions would elicit more new information
about the phase for which the interviewer lacked information,
compared to the Early disclosure condition (Hypothesis 2a).
Moreover, we predicted that the SUE-IPR condition would result
in more new information compared to the SUE-C condition
(Hypothesis 2b). The rationale for this was that we expected the
non-judgmental approach (used for the SUE-IPR condition) to
increase the suspects’ willingness to explain the inconsistencies
to the interviewer in Phase 3. In turn, this forthcomingness
during Phase 3 was expected to be associated with the suspects’
forthcomingness during the critical Phase 4, and consequently
the amount of new information elicited.
Furthermore, we predicted that during interview Phase 3
(Hypothesis 3a) and Phase 4 (Hypothesis 3b) the suspects in the
SUE conditions would overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge
about the critical phase of the crime to a higher degree than the
suspects in the Early disclosure condition. Finally, we predicted
that the suspects in the SUE-IPR condition would perceive
that the interviewer had behaved more respectful (Hypothesis
4a), and friendlier compared to the suspects in the SUE-C
condition and the Early disclosure condition (Hypothesis 4b).
These expectations were based on the non-judgmental approach
used for the SUE-IPR condition.
METHODS
Participants
The study included 88 participants (50 females and 38 males;
69 students, 13 employees and six unemployed persons). The
participants’ mean age was 27.91 years (SD = 9.45; ranging
from 18 to 66), and the participants were randomly assigned
to one of the three interview conditions (30 for the SUE-C,
29 for the SUE-IPR, and 29 for the Early disclosure). The
participants’ age, gender and occupation did not diﬀer across
the three interview conditions. Originally, 92 participants were
recruited, but four had to be excluded as they misunderstood
the instructions of the study (three did not follow through with
the mock-crime and one used the first possibility to make a
full confession). The participants received compensation in the
form of course credit or e10. Ethical approval was not required
for this study in accordance with the national and institutional
guidelines.
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Procedure
The Mock Crime
Participants received information that the study was about
security measures and detection of criminal activities. They were
instructed to imagine themselves being a member of a criminal
group, which had to perform a mission consisting of three phases
(A, B, and C) in order to prepare an attack. First, the participants
left the building at the forecourt Habelschwerdter Allee, had a
brief dialog with an accomplice, and received a paper from her
with a code for a locker (Phase A). Second, after returning to the
building they entered the library, opened a locker with the code,
and took out a cloth bag. The bag contained a book (which they
could use to disguise him or her as a student) and a key for a
lockbox that had been stolen by an accomplice (Phase B). Third,
they walked further inside the building to Street-29, opened a
lockbox with the key, and collected a mobile phone and a small
box. They were told that an accomplice had prepared the mobile
phone for the attack and had stolen the vials inside the box from a
chemical lab. Next, the participants walked via a ramp to a notice
board on the first floor from which they took a booklet with the
label “do not remove.” The booklet included building plans of
the target location. Finally, they left the building at the forecourt
Fabeckstraße, followed a path next to the building, and deposited
all the materials under a ventilation machine (Phase C). During
the full mock crime, the participants had the written instructions
and a map of the premises with them.
After returning to the lab, the participants were asked to sketch
their route on a map in order to check if they performed and
remembered the actions correctly. They then received written
instructions that a suspicious bag has been found and break-ins
and thefts have been reported, that the police were investigating
this case and that they had been invited to an interview as a
suspect. Furthermore, they were instructed to imagine that they
had consulted with their lawyer, who informed the police prior to
the interview that the client was innocent and willing to make a
statement. In order to increase their motivation, the participants
were informed that they would receive their compensation only
if they convinced the interviewer of their innocence, but in fact
all participants received the compensation. The participants took
10 to 15min to prepare for the interview.
The Interviews
One male and one female interviewer were trained in conducting
the pre-scripted interviews. They were blind to the hypotheses,
and conducted approximately the same number of interviews
in each condition. All interviews were audio-recorded and their
mean duration was 6.93min (SD= 1.56); no diﬀerence was found
between the interview conditions with respect to the duration of
the interviews, F(2, 85) = 1.68, p= 0.19, ηp
2 = 0.04.
The interviewer held evidence on the crime Phases A and
B; that information casted suspicion on the suspect, but did
not prove any criminal activity. Specifically, the police had
eyewitness evidence regarding Phase A stating that the suspect
had (1) been at the forecourt Habelschwerdter Allee, (2) talked
to a woman there, and (3) received something from her. The
interviewer also had a video from a witness’ smartphone about
Phase B showing that the suspect had (4) been at the library,
(5) opened a locker, and (6) taken out a cloth bag. All interview
protocols were divided into four phases: an introductory
phase (Phase 1) and three phases of questioning (Phases 2,
3, and 4). See Figure 1 for an illustration of the interview
protocols.
SUE-Confrontation (SUE-C) Condition
In this condition, the interviewer started the interview by
outlining the suspicion against the suspect, and explained the
format of the interview in a business-like manner (Phase 1):
“Your lawyer informed us that you are willing to make a
statement and that you say you are innocent. I want to ask you
a couple of questions about this matter, and it is very important
that you answer my questions in as much detail as possible.”
The structures of Phases 2 and 3 were identical: The interviewer
first asked a specific question about the suspect’s whereabouts
(e.g., “Have you been outside the building at the forecourt next
to the Habelschwerdter Allee?”). If the suspect confirmed being
there, the interviewer continued with an open-ended invitation
(“Please tell me everything you have done there outside; start with
your arrival at the forecourt.”), followed by a follow-up question.
Then, depending on the suspect’s response, the interviewer
disclosed the evidence. Specifically, if the suspect’s statement
was consistent with the evidence, the interviewer disclosed this
statement-evidence consistency in a neutral manner (e.g., “What
you say fits well with the statement of a female witness who
said that you have talked to a woman outside the building and
that she has given something to you. Moving on to my next
question now.”) If the suspect’s statement was inconsistent with
the evidence, the interviewer confronted him or her with this
inconsistency by emphasizing the seriousness of this (e.g., “Well,
but we have a female witness, who said that you talked to a
woman outside the building and that she has given something
to you. It is obvious that you are withholding information from
me. This is serious and we will return to this later. But now I will
move on tomy next question.”) Importantly, the interviewer gave
the suspect no chance to comment on the in/consistency, instead
she continued immediately with posing questions. If the suspect
disconfirmed the initially asked specific question about his or
her whereabouts, the interviewer directly confronted him or her
with the statement-evidence inconsistency. The interviewer used
the evidence pertaining to Phase A in Phase 2, and the evidence
about crime Phase B in Phase 3. For Phase 4, the interviewer
began with an open-ended invitation about the suspect’s further
actions (“Tell me everything you have done after leaving the
philological library and before arriving to the laboratory.”) If the
suspect volunteered a clue, the interviewer then invited him or
her to explain this in more detail (“You mentioned that you have
been on the first floor; tell me everything you have done there.”)
Finally, the interviewer asked a follow-up question and closed the
interview.
SUE-Introduce-Present-Respond (SUE-IPR)
Condition
The SUE-IPR condition diﬀered from the SUE-C condition
with respect to the introduction (Phase 1) and the disclosure
of the statement-evidence in/consistencies (Phases 2 and 3).
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FIGURE 1 | Process of the three interview conditions.
Specifically, the interviewer introduced the interview in a non-
guilt-presumptive and non-judgmental manner (Phase 1): “Your
lawyer informed us that you are willing to make a statement and
that you say you are innocent, and if this is true, you should of
course not be here. I am really interested in your point of view
in this matter as it is my task to solve this case, and if you are
innocent then it is certainly my duty to show this, but then I need
your assistance; it is important that you present your account
and explanations, and answer and comment on everything as
detailed as possible, and that you dispel the existent suspicion and
uncertainty, OK?” In Phases 2 and 3, the interviewer presented
the in/consistencies in a non-judgmental manner: if the suspect’s
statement was consistent (e.g., “What you say fits well with the
statement of a female witness, who said that you have talked to
a woman outside the building and that she has given something
to you.”) or inconsistent with the evidence (e.g., “Well, but we
have a female witness who said that you have talked to a woman
outside the building and she has given something to you.”) Then
the interviewer paused for a few seconds to give the suspect the
chance to comment without putting pressure on him or her.
The interviewer noted the suspect’s comment and responded still
in a non-judgmental manner if the suspect’s explanation was
consistent with the evidence (e.g., “OK, nowwhat you say fits well
with the witness statement.”) or if it was still inconsistent (e.g.,
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“OK, we might have to look at this more thoroughly then.”). The
questioning procedure of Phase 4 was identical to that used for
the SUE-C condition.
Early Disclosure Condition
In this condition, the interviewer started the interview exactly
as in the SUE-C condition in a business-like manner. However,
before posing any questions, the interviewer disclosed all the
available evidence (Phase 1): “Ok, we have a female witness, who
said that you have been outside the building at the forecourt
next to the Habelschwerdter Allee, and she said also that you
talked to a woman and she has given something to you. Also, we
have a male witness, who said that you were at the philological
building and that you opened a locker there and gathered a cloth
bag.” For Phase 2, the interviewer began with an open-ended
invitation about the evidence pertaining to the suspect’s crime
Phase A (e.g., “Please tell me everything you have done at the
forecourt next to the Habelscherdter Allee. Start with your arrival
at the forecourt.”), and a follow-up question. For Phase 3, the
interviewer asked questions about the evidence pertaining to the
suspect’s crime Phase B. The procedure of Phase 4 was identical
to those used for the SUE conditions.
Post-Interview Questionnaire
After the interview, the experimenter came into the room,
explained that the role-play was over and asked the participants
to fill out a questionnaire. The first part of the questionnaire
consisted of questions about demographic information (age,
sex, and occupation). Then, the participants rated on 7-point
scales how motivated they were to carry out their role as a
mock criminal during the crime and interview (1 = Not at
all motivated, 7 = Very motivated), and how diﬃcult it was
to understand the instructions of the study (1 = Not at all
diﬃcult, 7 = Very diﬃcult). Next, they answered the following
two questions about their perceptions of the interview on 7-
point scales: “How respectful was the interviewer to you?”
(1 = Not at all respectful, 7 = Very respectful); and “How
friendly was the interviewer?” (1 = Not at all friendly, 7 = Very
friendly).
Afterwards the experimenter played to each participant the
audio recording of the interview conducted with him or her. The
recording was paused four times: (1) after Phase 1, (2) after Phase
2, (3) after Phase 3, and (4) after Phase 4/ the full interview. At
each pause, the participants were asked the following question:
“When you think back at this point of the interview and consider
the interviewer’s case-related knowledge, did you think that the
interviewer held information that you had not told him or her?”
If the participants confirmed this, they were asked to mark, on a
checklist with 17 pieces of information, the pieces they perceived
the interviewer to know at that specific point of the interview.
Six of these 17 pieces were the evidence held by the interviewer
(about Phases A and B of the crime). The remaining 11 pieces
of information concerned the critical phase of the crime that was
actually unknown to the interviewer and which were coded as
new information (see below). For the analysis, we used only the
participants’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge about the
critical phase of the crime. As the interviewer actually lacked
any information of this critical phase of the crime, the suspects
could only overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge (and not
underestimate it).
Codings
The suspects’ statements were coded concerning the number
of statement-evidence inconsistencies in Phases 2 and 3.
Contradictions and omissions were counted as inconsistencies.
The number of inconsistencies with the evidence for both
Phases 2 and 3 varied between 0 (no inconsistency) and 3
(inconsistent with all 3 pieces of evidence); thus, the total
number of inconsistencies was between 0 and 6. Two persons
blind to the experimental hypotheses coded a random 33% of
the interviews and on this basis the inter-rater reliability was
calculated (Cohen’s κ = 0.907). Furthermore, for the SUE-IPR
condition, the two persons coded these interviews with respect to
the number of inconsistencies that were explained by the suspects
(explaining means that the suspect clarified the presented
inconsistency); inter-rater reliability was assessed (Cohen’s
κ= 0.696).
To measure new information the interviews were coded with
respect to the information revealed for the critical phase. The
actions that each suspect had performed during this particular
phase were broken down into a total of 11 pieces of critical
information. These 11 pieces of information were: (1) walking
through Street-29; (2) standing at the lockboxes; (3) taking
something from a lockbox; (4) walking over a ramp; (5) being
on the first floor; (6) standing at a bulletin board; (7) taking
something from the bulletin board; (8) walking over the forecourt
Fabeckstraße; (9) walking on a path next to the building; (10)
standing next to a ventilation machine; and (11) depositing
something under the ventilation machine. Hence, the total
number of new pieces of information that a suspect could reveal
could vary between 0 (no new information revealed) and 11 (all
new information revealed). The same two coders who were blind
to the experimental hypotheses rated the 33% of the interviews
with respect to the new information revealed and inter-rater
reliability was calculated (Cohen’s κ = 0.879). All disagreements
were discussed, and then one of them coded the remaining
interviews.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
The participants were highly motivated to perform their role
as mock criminals (M = 5.92, SD = 1.05); no diﬀerence
was found between the three interview conditions, F(2, 85) =
1.63, p = 0.202, ηp2 = 0.04. Furthermore, the participants
reported that it was rather easy to understand the experimental
instructions (M = 2.28, SD = 1.24); no diﬀerence was found
between the three interview conditions, F(2, 85) = 0.87, p= 0.421,
ηp
2 = 0.02.
Statement-Evidence Inconsistencies
A mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Interview
condition as the between-subjects factor and Phase (2 and 3)
as the within-subjects factor was conducted (see Table 1 for the
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descriptive statistics of the suspects’ verbal responses). We found
amain eﬀect of Interview condition, F(2, 85)= 6.10, p= 0.003, ηp
2
= 0.13. In line with Hypothesis 1, Bonferroni tests showed that
the SUE-C condition, p = 0.009, and the SUE-IPR condition, p
= 0.011, resulted in more inconsistencies compared to the Early
disclosure condition. No diﬀerence was found between the two
SUE conditions. There was a significant main eﬀect of Phase,
F(1, 85) = 15.12, p< 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.15, indicating that Phase 2 (M
= 1.17, SD = 0.09) resulted in more inconsistencies compared
to Phase 3 (M = 0.78, SD = 1.00). Examining this further, we
found that the SUE-C condition, F(1, 85) = 4.64, p= 0.034, ηp
2 =
0.05, and the SUE-IPR condition, F(1, 85) = 12.85, p = 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.13, resulted in more inconsistencies in Phase 2 compared to
Phase 3. No such diﬀerence was found for the Early disclosure
condition, F(1, 85) = 0.99, p = 0.322, ηp
2 = 0.01. Finally, no
interaction eﬀect was found, F(2, 85) = 1.69, p= 0.192, ηp
2 = 0.04.
New Information Elicited
A one-way ANOVA with Interview condition as the factor
showed a significant eﬀect on the amount of new information
elicited during Phase 4, F(2, 85) = 3.60, p = 0.032, ηp
2 = 0.08.
Bonferroni tests revealed that the SUE-IPR condition resulted
in more new information in comparison to the Early disclosure
condition, p = 0.037. No significant diﬀerences were found
between the SUE-C condition and the Early disclosure condition
or between the two SUE conditions.
Next, we combined the two SUE conditions (hereafter SUE
combined). A one-way ANOVA showed no significant diﬀerence
between the SUE combined (M = 4.88, SD = 2.82) and the
Early disclosure condition (M = 3.79, SD = 2.48) with respect
to the new information revealed, F(1, 86) = 3.12, p = 0.081, ηp
2
= 0.04. Overall, Hypothesis 2a found partial support; Hypothesis
2b found no support.
Suspects’ Overestimations of the
Interviewer’s Knowledge
We conducted a mixed-design ANOVAwith Interview condition
as the between-subjects factor and Phase (1, 2, 3, and 4) as
the within-subjects factor. The test of sphericity was significant;
hence, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied (see Table 2
for the descriptive statistics on the suspects’ overestimations).
There was no significant interaction eﬀect, F(3.24, 137.84) = 2.18,
p = 0.088, ηp2 = 0.05. Furthermore, no main eﬀect of Interview
condition was found, F(2, 85) = 1.80, p = 0.171, ηp
2 = 0.04.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for the suspects’ verbal responses.
Condition Statement-evidence inconsistencies New information
Phase 2
M (SD)
Phase 3
M (SD)
Phase 2 + 3
M (SD)
Phase 4
M (SD)
SUE-C 1.37 (0.93) 1.00 (1.05) 2.37 (1.59) 4.20 (2.54)
SUE-IPR 1.48 (0.91) 0.86 (0.83) 2.34 (1.47) 5.59 (2.97)
Early disclosure 0.66 (0.81) 0.48 (0.83) 1.13 (1.55) 3.79 (2.48)
Total 1.17 (0.95) 0.78 (0.93) 1.95 (1.63) 4.52 (2.75)
However, there was a significant main eﬀect of Phase on the
suspects’ overestimations indicating that the extent to which the
suspects overestimated the interviewer’s knowledge about the
critical and unknown phase of the crime changed during the
course of the interview, F(1.62, 137.84) = 45.54, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.35. Figure 2 illustrates that the suspects’ overestimations of
the interviewers’ knowledge about the critical phase of the crime
increased slightly in Phases 1, 2, and 3, and more markedly so in
Phase 4. Furthermore, it shows that for the SUE conditions the
suspects’ overestimations of the interviewer’s knowledge about
the critical phase of the crime (a) were higher at each interview
phase, and (b) increased to a higher extent during the course of
the interview, compared to the suspects in the Early disclosure
condition.
Next, combining the two SUE conditions, we conducted a
mixed-design ANOVA with Interview condition (SUE combined
vs. Early disclosure condition) as the between-subjects factor
and Phase (1, 2, 3, and 4) as the within-subjects factor.
Again, the test of sphericity was significant, and we therefore
used a Greenhouse-Geisser correction. There was a marginally
significant main eﬀect of Interview condition, F(1, 86) = 3.64, p
= 0.060, ηp2 = 0.04, indicating that the suspects in the SUE
combined (M = 1.91, SD= 0.29) overestimated the interviewer’s
knowledge about the critical phase to a higher extent, compared
to the suspects in the Early disclosure condition (M = 0.96, SD=
0.41). Furthermore, there was a significant main eﬀect of Phase,
F(1.62, 139.70) = 32.42, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.27. Finally, there was a
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics for the suspects’ overestimations of the
interviewer’s knowledge about the critical phase of the crime.
Condition Overestimation of the interviewer’s knowledge
Phase 1
M (SD)
Phase 2
M (SD)
Phase 3
M (SD)
Phase 4
M (SD)
SUE-C 1.07 (2.83) 1.33 (2.95) 1.53 (3.13) 3.77 (3.65)
SUE-IPR 0.80 (1.50) 1.28 (2.42) 1.62 (2.58) 3.93 (3.45)
Early disclosure 0.55 (1.64) 0.66 (1.65) 0.72 (1.67) 1.90 (2.27)
SUE combined 0.92 (2.27) 1.31 (2.68) 1.58 (2.85) 3.85 (3.47)
Total 0.80 (2.08) 1.09 (2.40) 1.30 (2.54) 3.20 (3.25)
FIGURE 2 | The course of the suspects’ overestimations of the interviewer’s
knowledge about the critical phase of the crime.
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significant interaction eﬀect, F(1.62, 139.70) = 4.12, p = 0.025, ηp
2
= 0.05. Simple eﬀect tests showed that for the SUE combined
the suspects’ overestimations changed during the course of the
interview F(3, 83) = 20.26, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.42. Specifically, the
suspects overestimated the interviewer’s knowledge to a higher
extent during Phase 3 compared to Phase 1, p= 0.013, and during
Phase 4 compared to Phase 1, 2, and 3, ps < 0.001. For the
Early disclosure condition, no such change over the interview
was found, F(3, 83) = 2.20, p = 0.094, ηp
2 = 0.07. Simple eﬀect
tests at each Phase showed that only during Phase 4 the suspects
for the SUE combined (M = 3.85, SD = 3.47) overestimated the
interviewer’s knowledge to a higher extent than the suspects in
the Early disclosure condition (M = 1.90, SD = 2.27), F(1, 86)
= 7.54, p = 0.007, ηp2 = 0.08. Overall, Hypothesis 3a was not
supported, and Hypothesis 3b found support.
In general, the degree of the suspects’ overestimation of
the interviewer’s knowledge was positively correlated with the
amount of new information elicited (r = 0.255, p = 0.016).
However, no significant correlations were found for the SUE-C
condition (r = 0.151, p = 0.427), the SUE-IPR condition (r =
248, p = 0.194), the Early disclosure condition (r = 0.281, p =
0.140), or the SUE combined (r = 0.199, p= 0.132).
The Suspects’ General Perceptions of the
Interview
A one-way ANOVA showed a significant eﬀect of Interview
condition on how respectfully the suspects felt that they were
treated, F(2, 85) = 3.66, p = 0.030, ηp
2 = 0.08. Bonferroni tests
revealed that the suspects in the SUE-IPR condition (M =
6.38, SD = 0.86) felt that they were treated with more respect
compared to the suspects in the SUE-C condition (M = 5.37,
SD = 1.88), p = 0.025. No diﬀerence was found between the
Early disclosure condition (M = 5.79, SD = 1.37) and the SUE
conditions. Thus, Hypothesis 4a was partially supported.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant eﬀect of Interview
condition on the suspects’ perceptions regarding the interviewer’s
friendliness, F(2, 85) = 3.50, p = 0.034, ηp
2 = 0.08. The suspects
in the SUE-IPR condition (M = 5.07, SD = 1.41) found the
interviewer to be friendlier compared to the suspects in the SUE-
C condition (M = 4.07, SD = 1.62), p = 0.030. No diﬀerences
were found between the Early disclosure condition (M = 4.62,
SD= 1.32) and the SUE conditions. Hence, Hypothesis 4b found
partial support.
Exploratory Analysis
Previous studies have shown that suspect who were forthcoming
before entering the critical interview phase revealed more new
information subsequently (Tekin et al., 2016). Therefore, we
examined the eﬀects of the two ways of disclosing inconsistencies
(SUE conditions) on the suspects’ forthcomingness in
Phase 3 more closely. Specifically, we mapped the suspects’
forthcomingness in Phase 3 when responding to the interviewer’s
questions and when explaining the inconsistencies. Furthermore,
we examined the influence of the forthcomingness in Phase 3
(i.e., “being in the game”) on the new information revealed in
Phase 4.
First, mapping the suspects’ forthcomingness in response to
the interviewer’s questions in Phase 3, forthcoming suspects
were defined as suspects who generated no statement-evidence
inconsistency when asked questions on the evidence. Conversely,
withholding suspects referred to participants who generated a
minimum of one statement-evidence inconsistency in Phase 3.
A pairwise z-test showed no diﬀerence in the proportions of
forthcoming suspects between the SUE-C condition (40.0%; n
= 12) and the SUE-IPR condition (37.93%; n = 11), z = 0.16,
p = 0.873. This shows that the elicitation of inconsistencies
resulted in a similar number of forthcoming suspects. Further
analysis showed that across both SUE conditions, the suspects
who were forthcoming at the time when responding to the
interviewer’s questions in Phase 3 revealed significantly more
new information during Phase 4 (n = 23; M = 6.22, SD =
2.88) compared to the suspects who were withholding at that
time (n = 36; M = 4.03, SD = 2.47), t(57) = 3.12, p =
0.003.
Second, wemapped the suspects’ forthcomingness in response
to the interviewer’s questions and when explaining the disclosed
inconsistencies (i.e., during the complete Phase 3). Forthcoming
suspects were defined as participants who generated no
statement-evidence inconsistency or explained at least one
inconsistency in Phase 3. In contrast, withholding suspects
referred to participants who generated a minimum of one
statement-evidence inconsistency without explaining at least one
inconsistency in Phase 3. This procedure aimed to examine a
possible influence of the two ways of disclosing inconsistencies
on the suspects’ forthcomingness. A pairwise z-test showed
that the proportion of forthcoming suspects was significantly
larger for the SUE-IPR condition (75.9%; n = 22) compared
to the SUE-C condition (40.0%; n = 12), z = 2.79, p = 0.005.
This shows that for the SUE-IPR condition the elicitation and
disclosure of statement-evidence inconsistencies resulted inmore
forthcoming suspects compared to the SUE-C condition. Again,
across both conditions, the suspects who were forthcoming
during the Phase 3 (n = 34) revealed significantly more new
information during Phase 4 (M = 5.94, SD = 2.79) compared to
the suspects who were withholding during Phase 3 (n= 25;M =
3.44, SD= 2.20), t(57) = 3.72, p< 0.001. This indicates that it was
crucial that the suspects were “in the game” in Phase 3 in order to
reveal new information in Phase 4.
DISCUSSION
This study was on guilty suspects in denial and examined the
eﬀects of three modes of evidence disclosure. Overall, we found
that when the principles of the SUE framework were used in a
non-judgmental manner comparatively more new information
was elicited.
Suspects’ Verbal Behavior
Evidence can be disclosed in diﬀerent ways. An important factor
is the timing of the evidence disclosure. It was found that
asking questions about the evidence before disclosing it (SUE
conditions) resulted in more statement-evidence inconsistencies
compared to when the evidence was disclosed before asking
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questions about it (Early disclosure condition). This result is
in line with previous studies (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016), and
can be explained by acknowledging the SUE principles. The
suspects in the SUE conditions initially employed withholding
counter-interrogation strategies as they perceived the interviewer
to be unaware of the evidence that s/he was asking about.
In contrast, the suspects in the Early disclosure condition
were made aware that the interviewer had knowledge about
the evidence, and therefore used more forthcoming counter-
interrogation strategies. Also consistent with previous findings
(Tekin et al., 2015, 2016), for the SUE conditions the
number of inconsistencies declined from Phase 2 to Phase
3. This suggests that after being faced with inconsistencies
in Phase 2, the suspects in the SUE conditions might have
been revising their perception of the interviewer’s knowledge.
Based on this revised estimation they might have decided
to use a less withholding counter-interrogation strategy for
Phase 3.
The elicited statement-evidence inconsistencies can be
handled in diﬀerent ways. This study examines two modes
of how to introduce and disclose the in/consistencies. The
first was a confrontational way, where the interviewer started
in a business-like manner and disclosed the in/consistencies
without giving the suspects the opportunity to comment on
them (SUE-C condition). The second was a non-accusatorial
way, where the interviewer started in a non-guilt-presumptive
manner, presented the in/consistencies in such a way that the
suspects could comment on them, and then responded to their
comments; critically, all steps were used in a non-judgmental
manner (SUE-IPR condition). This non-judgmental presentation
of the inconsistencies (SUE-IPR condition) resulted in a higher
proportion of forthcoming suspects during Phase 3, compared
to the confrontational approach (SUE-C condition). This is
important as previous findings have shown that suspects need
to be willing to discuss the evidence with the interviewer in
order for the interviewer to subsequently elicit new information
(Tekin et al., 2016). Diﬀerently put, it was crucial that the suspects
used more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies when
discussing the evidence in Phase 3 before entering Phase 4, in
which the interviewer asked about the critical phase of the crime.
The SUE-IPR condition resulted in significantly more new
information about the critical phase of the crime compared to
the Early disclosure condition. Diﬀerently put, for the SUE-
IPR condition 48% of the suspects told half or more of all
information they held on the critical phase of the crime (i.e.,
6 pieces or more), whereas the corresponding figure for the
Early disclosure condition was 27%. In contrast to previous
studies (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016), the SUE-C condition did
not result in more new information compared to the Early
disclosure condition. A possible explanation for this is that the
SUE-C condition resulted in a lower proportion of forthcoming
suspects during Phase 3 compared to the SUE-IPR condition.
In support of this reasoning, we found that across the two SUE
conditions the suspects who were forthcoming during Phase 3
revealed more new information in Phase 4, compared to the
suspects who had been withholding in Phase 3. This indicates
that the non-judgmental interviewing style in the SUE-IPR
condition promoted (a) the suspects’ forthcomingness to discuss
the evidence with the interviewer in Phase 3, and (b) the amount
of new information elicited in Phase 4.
Suspects’ Perceptions of the Interviewer
In previous studies the suspects’ overestimations of the
interviewer’s knowledge about the critical and unknown phase of
the crime were captured by Likert scale ratings (Tekin et al., 2015)
or by completing a checklist (Tekin et al., 2016). These studies
found that the suspects in the SUE conditions overestimated the
interviewer’s knowledge about the critical phase of the crime
to a higher degree than the suspects in the Early disclosure
condition. For the present study the suspects’ perceptions of the
interviewer’s knowledge about the critical phase of the crime
were captured at four points during the interview. This novel
way of mapping suspects’ perceptions resulted in a more detailed
examination and advances our understanding of the eﬀects of the
SUE-tactics. Three outcomes are outlined below.
First, an argument for disclosing the evidence early in the
interview may be to demonstrate the strength of the evidence
and that “it is meaningless to deny any wrongdoing” already at
the outset (Leo, 1996). This study found no support for such
an argument, as in Phase 1 the suspects’ overestimations in the
Early disclosure condition were even slightly lower than the
suspects’ overestimations in the SUE conditions (see Figure 2).
Second, in Phase 2 and 3 the suspects’ overestimations in the
SUE conditions increased slightly compared to the previous
phases. This indicates that the disclosure of inconsistencies (SUE
conditions) increased the suspects’ overestimations to a rather
small extent. Third, in Phase 4 the suspects’ overestimations in
the SUE conditions (a) increased significantly compared to the
previous interview phases, and (b) were higher compared to the
suspects’ overestimations in the Early disclosure condition. An
explanation for this is that in the SUE conditions the suspects are
believed to have read the interviewer’s tactic in Phase 2 and 3 (i.e.,
asking questions about the evidence before disclosing it). Based
on this, the suspects in the SUE conditionsmight have anticipated
the interviewer to use the same tactic also in Phase 4.
When relating the suspects’ overestimations of the
interviewer’s knowledge about the critical phase and the
amount of new information elicited, we found a weak positive
correlation over all conditions. In contrast to previous results
(Tekin et al., 2016), no significant correlations were found within
the individual SUE conditions. From this it seems that the
suspects’ overestimations about the critical phase of the crime
were not the sole reason behind the amount of new information
elicited. Instead, as outlined above, the suspects’ forthcomingness
during Phase 3 may also have played a crucial role.
Examining the suspects’ general perceptions of the interview,
we found that the suspects in the SUE-IPR condition felt
that they were treated with more respect, and perceived the
interviewer as friendlier compared to the suspects in the SUE-
C condition. That is, the non-judgmental SUE protocol resulted
in a fostering interview atmosphere. Evans et al. (2014) showed
that such a fostering interview atmosphere “that facilitates
kindness, cooperation, and respect” (p. 871) resulted in an
increasing amount of information elicited. Critically, Alison
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et al. (2013) also found that a neutral and non-judgmental
disclosure of inconsistencies was positively associated with an
adaptive interpersonal behavior, which in turn reduced the
suspects’ resistance and increased the amount of information
gathered. This speaks to that the non-judgmental elicitation
and presentation of statement-evidence inconsistencies (SUE-
IPR condition) resulted in a fostering interview atmosphere that
facilitated—for some suspects—a shift of counter-interrogation
strategy from less to more forthcoming in Phase 3. The
interviewer profited from this shift in Phase 4 by collecting new
critical information.
Limitations and Future Directions
A non-judgmental interviewing style is particularly important
in cases for which the evidence indicates (but does not prove)
the suspects’ involvement in a crime. Then the interviewer
needs to be open-minded. However, a risk of an explicit non-
guilt-presumptive approach could be that the interviewer only
pretends to be open-minded in order to influence the suspect’s
decisions; for example, the decision to waive his or her right
to silence. Importantly, we clearly distance ourselves from such
manipulative use of the presented non-judgmental SUE protocol.
The present study comes with some limitations. First, we
limited the sample to guilty suspects in denial and focused only
on new incriminating information. For future studies, it may be
worthwhile to examine the SUE framework (and especially the
non-judgmental implementation of it) by interviewing innocent
and guilty suspects mapping incriminating as well as exonerating
new information. Second, the study is based on a sample that
might not be representative of the usual suspects. We assume
that in real-life guilty suspects in denial would be comparatively
more motivated to develop and employ counter-interrogation
strategies. In line with this, field studies have shown that real-life
suspects devise and use verbal counter-interrogation strategies
(e.g., “Providing well known information”; Alison et al., 2014),
and do not generally deny everything. As the SUE tactics
are tailored to counteract such verbal counter-interrogation
strategies, they might be even more eﬀective in real-life settings
compared to laboratory settings. Third, the participants were
stipulated that they would waive their right to silence and claim
to be innocent after talking to their lawyer. According to the
German Code of Criminal Procedure this process is practically
possible. However, in real-life suspects can decide themselves
whether they use their right to silence or not. The participants in
this study did not have this chance, as for the examination of the
interview protocols it was vital that all participants stated to be
innocent. Fourth, in the present study both contradictions and
omissions were counted as statement-evidence inconsistencies.
For future, it may be worthwhile to examine the eﬀects of
contradictions and omissions on the suspects’ perceptions and
verbal behavior separately. Fifth, we mapped the suspects’
perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge by playing back the
interview to the participants and asking them questions about
their perceptions. In brief, such a method runs the risk that the
participants are influenced by their previous verbal responses.
We aimed to counteract this by carefully instructing them to
answer the questions only based on their perceptions at that time
of the interview. Overall, we consider this approach as a feasible
way to map the suspects’ overestimations of the interviewer’s
knowledge across an interview.
CONCLUSIONS
In suspect interviews the evidence can be used in diﬀerent ways.
This study showed that the interviewer can use the evidence
to “keep the suspect in the game” and as a result of this
collect new critical information at a later stage of the interview.
However, this requires more than just disclosing evidence. In
fact, the interviewer needs to elicit and present statement-
evidence inconsistencies in a non-judgmental manner. In turn,
this will foster a positive interview atmosphere, and aﬀect the
suspects to overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge and to use
more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies. The non-
judgmental SUE protocol can be described as an information-
gathering interviewing style that views the suspect in a non-guilt
presumptive manner, and thereby our information-gathering
approach fits with more general frameworks for investigative
interviewing such as the PEACE model (e.g., Milne and Bull,
1999).
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APPENDIX B: German Summary (Deutsche Zusammenfassung) 
Das Sammeln von Informationen in Befragungssituationen5 ist ein wichtiger Aspekt für die 
Aufklärung und Verhinderung von Straftaten (Memon et al., 2003; Redlich, 2007). Polizeiliche 
Beschuldigtenvernehmungen zielen oftmals darauf ab, Informationen über zurückliegende 
Straftaten zu erhalten, um den Verdacht einer Straftat gegen eine Person zu bestätigen bzw. zu 
beseitigen (Vrij & Granhag, 2014). Nachrichtendienstliche oder polizeiliche Befragungen von 
menschlichen Quellen zielen hingegen auf das Sammeln von Informationen zur Aufklärung 
von Straftaten und auch zur Gefahrenabwehr (Evans et al., 2010 Vrij & Granhag, 2014); 
menschliche Quellen sind dabei Personen, die eine Nähe zu terroristischen/extremistischen 
Vereinigungen, organisierter Kriminalität oder anderen Kriminalitätsfeldern aufweisen. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt eine bestimmte Form der Informationssammlung in 
Befragungen, nämlich das Hervorarbeiten von Informationen. Dabei handelt es sich um eine 
spezifische Art der Befragung, die neben dem Aussageverhalten der Befragten auch deren 
Ziele, Einschätzungen und Strategien berücksichtigt. Aufbauend auf diesen kognitiven und 
verbalen Prozessen der Beschuldigten/Quellen kann der Befrager seine bereits vorliegenden 
Erkenntnisse strategisch einsetzen, um neue sachverhaltsrelevante Informationen zu gewinnen. 
Denn während in Beschuldigtenvernehmungen per se belastende Erkenntnisse vor den 
Befragungen vorliegen (ansonsten sollte die Person nicht als Beschuldigter vernommen 
werden; Eisenberg, 2015), gibt es auch bei Quellenbefragungen oftmals Vorkenntnisse, die 
mittels anderer menschlicher oder technischer Quellen gewonnen wurden (persönliches 
Gespräch mit polizeilichen/nachrichtendienstlichen Mitarbeitern, 2016; Soufan, 2011).  
																																																						
5 Zur besseren Lesbarkeit wird für den Vernehmungskontext und die Interaktion mit menschlichen Quellen meist 
der Begriff Befragung verwendet (bzw. entsprechend Befrager und Befragter). Außerdem werden 
Personenbezeichnungen aus Gründen der besseren Lesbarkeit lediglich in der männlichen Form verwendet, 
schließen jeweils aber auch das andere Geschlecht mit ein. 
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Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, wie Befrager in polizeilichen und 
nachrichtendienstlichen Interaktionen solche bereits vorliegenden Erkenntnisse einsetzen 
können, um neue sachverhaltsrelevante Informationen zu gewinnen. Neue Informationen 
bedeutet, dass die gewonnenen Erkenntnisse dem Befrager zuvor nicht bekannt waren. 
Inspiriert von Granhag und Hartwig (2015) wurde deshalb in der vorliegenden Arbeit ein 
zweistufiges Befragungsgerüst zum Hervorarbeiten neuer Informationen entwickelt. Die 
konzeptuelle Stufe enthält Annahmen zu den kognitiven und verbalen Prozessen der Befragten 
in der Interaktion (siehe Abbildung 8). Durch Perspektivübernahme kann der Befrager 
Annahmen zu den kognitiven und verbalen Prozessen der Befragten machen und diese 
strategisch verwenden, um neue Informationen zu gewinnen. Die taktische Stufe umfasst 
dagegen konkrete Mittel, um Subziele in der Befragung zu erreichen. Befrager können die sich 
ergänzenden konzeptuellen und taktischen Stufen nutzen, um neue Informationen 
hervorzuarbeiten. 
 
 
Abbildung 8. Kognitive und verbale Prozesse von Quellen/Beschuldigten in der Befragungsinteraktion. 
 
Die konzeptuelle Stufe nimmt an, dass sich Quellen und Beschuldigte – wie Menschen 
im Allgemeinen (Arts, 2012) – zielorientiert verhalten. Dabei verfolgen manche Quellen und 
Beschuldigte konträre Befragungsziele; so etwa bei Beschuldigten: „Ich will meine Unschuld 
zeigen, obwohl ich die Handlungen tatsächlich begangen habe“ (Volbert et al., 2016). Ein 
konträres Befragungsziel für eine Quelle ist beispielsweise: „Ich brauche die Unterstützung der 
Polizei in einer Behördenangelegenheit, aber will meine Freunde in der [terroristischen] Gruppe 
nicht verraten“ (persönliches Gespräch mit polizeilichen/nachrichtendienstlichen Mitarbeitern, 
2016; Scherp, 1992). Konträre Befragungsziele implizieren, dass die Befragten sich in einem 
Informationsdilemma befinden und einige Informationen verraten, um ein Teilziel zu erreichen 
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wie etwa „Unterstützung der Polizei“, dass sie aber auch nicht ihr gesamtes Wissen preisgeben 
können, um das andere Teilziel zu erreichen wie etwa „Freunde in der Gruppe nicht verraten“.  
Allgemein zeigten Untersuchungen, dass sich Beschuldigte und Quellen im Vorfeld und 
während der Befragung mit den Sachkenntnissen des Befragers auseinandersetzen (bspw. 
Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010; Soufan, 2011). 
Diese Einschätzung der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers stellt eine wichtige Grundlage für das 
Entscheidungsverhalten von Quellen und Beschuldigten in der Befragung dar (Moston & 
Stephenson, 2011; Soufan, 2011). Im Einklang damit geht die vorliegende Arbeit mit ihrer 
konzeptuellen Stufe davon aus, dass Beschuldigte und Quellen, die konträrere Befragungsziele 
verfolgen und sich dadurch einem Informationsdilemma gegenübersehen, ihre Gegenstrategie 
entsprechend ihrer Einschätzung der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers auswählen. 
Allgemein beschreiben Gegenstrategien in dieser Arbeit die von Quellen oder 
Beschuldigten kognitiv ausgearbeiteten und angewandten Verhaltensweisen, mit welchen sie 
ihre Befragungsziele erreichen wollen. Dies entspricht jüngeren Untersuchungen, die zeigten, 
dass Beschuldigte und Quellen sich zielgerichtet solche Gegenstrategien überlegen und diese 
in der Befragung anwenden (bspw. Alison et al., 2014; Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; 
Soufan, 2011). Gegenstrategien unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich des Ausmaßes, 
sachverhaltsrelevante Informationen zu verraten. Sie lassen sich auf einem Kontinuum von 
zurückhaltend (bspw. „Ich werde es vermeiden, Belastendes zu sagen“) bis mitteilsam 
einordnen (bspw. „Ich werde bereits bekannte Sachen sagen“). Die konzeptuelle Stufe 
konzentriert sich auf verbale Gegenstrategien und geht davon aus, dass die Auswahl der 
Gegenstrategie das Aussageverhalten der Befragten beeinflusst (siehe Abbildung 8).  
Aufgrund der beschriebenen kognitiven und verbalen Prozesse wird auf der 
konzeptuellen Stufe also angenommen, dass Quellen/Beschuldigte, die konträre Ziele 
verfolgen, die Einschätzung der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers zur Auswahl ihrer 
Gegenstrategien heranziehen. Davon lässt sich beispielsweise Folgendes ableiten: Eine Quelle 
	 124 
schätzt eine Information A als dem Befrager bekannt ein („Der Polizist spricht über B, somit 
weiß er auch von A“). Aufgrund dieser Einschätzung wird die Quelle bezüglich der Information 
A eine eher mitteilsame Gegenstrategie wählen wie etwa „Ich werde bereits bekannte Sachen 
sagen“. Die Auswahl dieser eher mitteilsamen Gegenstrategie führt dazu, dass sie Information 
A verrät. Ist diese Information A dem Befrager zuvor aber unbekannt, überschätzt die Quelle 
die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers und verrät ihm so neue Informationen. Im Gegensatz dazu 
könnte beispielsweise ein Beschuldigter eine belastende Information C als dem Vernehmer 
unbekannt einschätzen („Der Polizist spricht nicht über C, also weiß er es auch nicht“). 
Entsprechend wählt der Beschuldigte eine eher zurückhaltenden Gegenstrategie wie etwa „Ich 
werde es vermeiden, Belastendes zu sagen“. Die Auswahl der eher zurückhaltenden 
Gegenstrategie führt wiederum dazu, dass der Beschuldigte Information C nicht erwähnt oder 
falsche Angaben dazu machen.  
Auf der konzeptuellen Stufe wird weiterhin beschrieben, wie der Befrager die zuvor 
beschriebenen Annahmen über die kognitiven und verbalen Prozesse von Befragten strategisch 
nutzen kann. Hierzu soll er im Einzelfall versuchen, die Perspektive des Befragten 
einzunehmen, um so dessen Verhaltensweisen und Reaktionen zu antizipieren (Galinsky et al., 
2008). Diese Perspektivübernahme kann dem Befrager helfen, die Befragung zu planen, 
durchzuführen und auszuwerten. 
Die taktische Stufe des hier entwickelten zweistufigen Befragungsgerüsts beschreibt 
hingegen konkrete Mittel, die der Befrager nutzen kann, um Subziele zu erreichen. Sie hilft 
somit eine spezifische Befragung vorzubereiten und durchzuführen: Nachfolgend werden mit 
der Scharff-Technik zur Befragung von Quellen und Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE)-Technik 
zur Vernehmung von Beschuldigten zwei Gruppen von Taktiken vorgestellt, die darauf 
abzielen, neue Informationen hervorzuarbeiten. 
Die wissenschaftliche Untersuchung der Scharff-Technik knüpft an dem freundlichen 
und gesprächsorientierten Befragungsansatz von Hanns Scharff (Toliver, 1997) und der zuvor 
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dargelegten konzeptuellen Stufe an. Die Scharff-Technik umfasst fünf Taktiken (bisherige 
Studien zur Scharff-Technik siehe bspw. Granhag et al., 2015). Die Freundlich-sein-Taktik6 
gibt vor, dass der Befrager während der gesamten Befragung eine angenehme, respektvolle und 
gesprächsorientierte Atmosphäre herstellt. Die Nicht-drängen-Taktik instruiert den Befrager, 
nicht nach Informationen zu drängen, deshalb möglichst wenige Fragen zu stellen und wenn 
überhaupt, dann offene und nicht geschlossene Fragen zu verwenden. Die Illusion-Taktik gibt 
vor, dass der Befrager bereits vorliegende Erkenntnisse präsentiert und der Quelle dann die 
Möglichkeit gibt, Informationen zu ergänzen. Die Behauptungen-Taktik beschreibt, dass der 
Befrager unreliable Informationen in Aussagesätzen präsentiert und der Quelle dabei die 
Möglichkeit gibt, spezifische Informationen zu bestätigen oder zu widerlegen. Die Neues-
übergehen-Taktik instruiert den Befrager, neu gewonnene Informationen zu übergehen, indem 
er sie als uninteressant oder bekannt abtut, nicht kommentiert und so allgemein seine 
Informationsabsichten verheimlicht.  
 Die SUE-Technik lässt sich in Frage- und Beweisdarlegungstaktiken aufteilen. Ein 
Vernehmer sollte verschiedene Fragearten wie beispielsweise offene Fragen oder 
Erzählaufforderungen (bspw. „Erzählen Sie mir alles, was Sie gestern gemacht haben.“) und 
geschlossene Fragen kennen (bspw. „Haben Sie gestern mit Ulf gesprochen?“). Außerdem 
sollte der Befrager wissen, dass verschiedene Fragearten unterschiedliche Antworten erwarten 
lassen. Beispielsweise wird mit Erzählaufforderungen eher ein freier Bericht gewonnen als mit 
geschlossenen Fragen. Die Beweisdarlegungstaktiken beschreiben, wann und wie der Befrager 
die vorliegenden Informationen offenlegt. Er kann Beweise beispielsweise früh, spät oder 
schrittweise in die Vernehmung einbringen. In Abhängigkeit des Zeitpunkts der 
Beweisdarlegung ändert sich auch deren Darlegungsform: Gibt der Vernehmer die Beweise 
preis, bevor er Fragen dazu stellt, werden die Beweise in einer eher reinen Form dargelegt 
																																																						
6 Zur besseren Lesbarkeit wurden die Taktiken sinngemäß und nicht wortwörtlich aus dem Englischen übersetzt. 
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(bspw. „Wir haben Videoaufzeichnungen, dass Sie gestern am Bahnhof waren“). Stellt der 
Vernehmer hingegen zunächst Fragen zu den Beweisen und gibt sie erst anschließend preis, 
werden sie zu „verstärkenden“ Übereinstimmungen (bspw. „Ihre Aussage, dass Sie gestern am 
Bahnhof waren, stimmt mit uns vorliegenden Videoaufzeichnungen überein“) oder 
„bestrafenden“ Widersprüchen (bspw. „Ihre Aussage widerspricht allerdings 
Videoaufzeichnungen, die zeigen, dass Sie gestern am Bahnhof waren“). In der Vergangenheit 
wurde mit der SUE-Technik versucht, Lügenhinweise in Form von Widersprüchen 
hervorzuarbeiten (siehe Meta-Analyse von Hartwig et al., 2014). Dabei erwies es sich als 
vorteilhaft, wenn der Befrager zunächst Fragen zu Beweisen stellt ohne diese offenzulegen. 
Jüngere Studien zur SUE-Technik zielen darauf, mittels dieser Widersprüche neue 
Informationen hervorzuarbeiten. Erste Untersuchungen zeigen, dass eine konfrontative 
Darlegung der Widersprüche, bei der die Beschuldigten die Widersprüche nicht kommentieren 
konnten, zu bevorzugen ist (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016). 
 Im Rahmen der vorliegenden Arbeit wurden zwei Untersuchungen zur Scharff-Technik 
(Studie I und II) und eine Untersuchung zur SUE-Technik durchgeführt (Studie III). Die 
Studien untersuchten einerseits spezifische Befragungstaktiken, lieferten aber andererseits auch 
allgemein Erkenntnisse zur Eignung der konzeptuellen Stufe. 
Studie I untersuchte, wie sich die Illusion-Taktik und Behauptungen-Taktik der Scharff-
Technik kombinieren lassen, um die Einschätzungen der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers und die 
Anzahl neu gewonnener Information zu beeinflussen. In zwei Scharff Bedingungen wurde 
deshalb nach der Illusion-Taktik (a) entweder zunächst eine offene Frage gestellt und dann die 
Behauptungen-Taktik verwendet oder (b) zunächst die Behauptungen-Taktik verwendet und 
dann die offene Frage gestellt. Als Vergleichsbedingung diente der direkte Frageansatz, der 
offene und geschlossene Fragen umfasste und in den USA angewendet wird (Redlich et al., 
2011; Semel, 2013). Alle Versuchsteilnehmer (N = 93) nahmen die Rolle einer Quelle ein und 
verfolgten folgendes konträres Befragungsziel: „Ich brauche die Unterstützung der Polizei in 
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einer Behördenangelegenheit, aber will meine Freunde in der Gruppe nicht verraten“. Die 
Quellen befanden sich also in einem Informationsdilemma und sollten nicht zu viele, aber auch 
nicht zu wenige Informationen verraten. Insgesamt übertraf die Scharff-Technik den direkten 
Frageansatz bezüglich aller relevanter Maße: Die Quellen in den Scharff Bedingungen verrieten 
mehr neue Informationen, fanden es schwerer, die Informationsabsichten des Befragers zu 
erkennen, schätzten die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers größer ein und unterschätzten, wie viele 
neue Informationen sie verraten hatten. Weiterhin zeigte sich, dass in beiden Scharff 
Bedingungen die erste offene Frage, die unmittelbar oder verzögert nach der Illusion-Taktik 
gestellt wurde, zu mehr neuen Informationen führte als die erste offene Frage beim direkten 
Frageansatz. Die Behauptungen-Taktik führte hingegen nur dann zu mehr neuen Informationen 
als die spezifischen Fragen des direkten Frageansatzes, wenn sie vor der ersten offenen Frage 
präsentiert wurde. Schließlich zeigte sich, dass die Quellen die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers 
hauptsächlich aufgrund der Behauptungen-Taktik überschätzten und nicht aufgrund der 
Illusion-Taktik. Aus letzterem ließ sich ableiten, dass die Quellen durch die Illusion-Taktik die 
Sachkenntnisse des Befragers eher zutreffend einschätzten.  
Beispielhaft soll mit der konzeptuellen Stufe nun erklärt werden, wie in Studie I die 
Behauptungen-Taktiken der Scharff Bedingungen zu mehr neuen Informationen als die 
spezifischen Fragen des direkten Frageansatzes führte: Die Quellen verfolgten ein konträres 
Befragungsziel und wollten einige Informationen verraten, um die Unterstützung der Polizei zu 
erhalten. Sie wollten aber auch nicht all ihr Wissen preisgeben, damit sie ihre Freunde in der 
Gruppe nicht verraten. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, überlegten sich die Quellen verschiedene 
Gegenstrategien und wählten diese dann entsprechend der Einschätzung der Sachkenntnisse 
des Befragers aus. Aufgrund der Behauptungen-Taktik überschätzten die Quellen in den 
Scharff Bedingungen die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers. Entsprechend wählten die Quellen in 
den Scharff Bedingungen eher mitteilsame Gegenstrategien aus wie etwa „Ich werde bereits 
bekannte Sachen sagen“ und verrieten als Reaktion auf die Behauptungen-Taktik neue 
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Informationen. Im Vergleich zur Behauptungen-Taktik, überschätzten die Quellen beim 
direkten Frageansatz die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers aufgrund der spezifischen Fragen eher 
nicht. Entsprechend wählten die Quellen beim direkten Frageansatz eher zurückhaltende 
Gegenstrategien und verrieten vergleichsweise weniger neue Information als Antwort auf die 
spezifischen Fragen. Die konzeptuelle Stufe erklärt somit, warum die Quellen mehr neue 
Informationen als Reaktion auf die Behauptungen-Taktik verrieten als in Reaktion auf die 
spezifischen Fragen. 
 Studie II untersuchte, wie bei der Scharff-Technik die Illusion-Taktik einzuleiten ist, 
damit Quellen sich auf die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers fokussieren und nicht auf seine 
Sachverhaltslücken. Hierzu wurden die vorliegenden Informationen entweder mit einem 
extrem überzeugten Einleitungssatz präsentiert („Also ja, was ich meine ist, dass ich die 
meisten, der für uns wichtigsten Informationen schon habe und ich möchte Ihnen diese zunächst 
einfach mal mitteilen“) oder im Gegensatz dazu unmittelbar und ohne Einleitungssatz 
dargeboten. In zwei Experimenten wurden diese beiden Einleitungen der Illusion-Taktik 
untersucht, wobei entweder die Einschätzung der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers (Experiment 1; 
N = 60) oder die Einschätzung der Sachverhaltslücken des Befragers erfasst wurden 
(Experiment 2; N = 60). Alle Versuchsteilnehmer nahmen wie in Studie I die Rolle einer Quelle 
ein, konnten diesmal aber keine Informationen verraten. Wenn die Informationen ohne 
Einleitungssatz präsentiert wurden, schätzten die Quellen die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers 
allgemein als größer ein und suchten weniger nach Sachverhaltslücken beim Befrager, als wenn 
die Informationen mit einem extrem überzeugten Einleitungssatz präsentiert wurden.  
 Wie beschrieben, wird auf der konzeptuellen Stufe angenommen, dass Quellen ihre 
Gegenstrategien entsprechend der eingeschätzten Sachkenntnisse des Befragers auswählen. 
Studie II lieferte Erkenntnisse dazu, wie Befrager mit der Illusion-Taktik die Einschätzungen 
der Quellen bezüglich der eigenen Sachkenntnisse beeinflussen können. Wenn der Befrager 
seine Sachkenntnisse ohne Einleitungssatz präsentierte, suchten die Quellen vergleichsweise 
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weniger nach Sachverhaltslücken. Dies könnte Gegenstrategien entgegenwirken wie „Ich 
werde versuchen herauszufinden, was er wissen will und es ihm dann nicht verraten“. Das 
Verzichten auf einen extrem überzeugten Einleitungssatz führte auch dazu, dass die Quellen 
das Sachwissen des Befragers vergleichsweise größer einschätzten. Dies wiederum könnte 
Gegenstrategien entgegenwirken wie „Ich werde bereits bekannte Sachen sagen“. Da die 
Quellen in dieser Studie allerdings keine Informationen verraten konnten, sind Rückschlüsse 
auf das Aussageverhalten nicht möglich. 
 Studie III untersuchte, wie man mit vorliegenden Beweisen in 
Beschuldigtenvernehmungen neue Informationen hervorarbeiten kann. Die zwei SUE 
Bedingungen unterschieden sich hinsichtlich der Einleitungsphase und der Darlegung der zuvor 
hervorgearbeiteten Übereinstimmungen/Widersprüche. Die konfrontative SUE Bedingung 
begann sachlich und die Beschuldigten wurden mit ihren Übereinstimmungen/Widersprüchen 
konfrontiert, ohne die Möglichkeit zu haben, diese zu kommentieren. Hingegen startete die 
unvoreingenommene SUE Bedingung mit einer nicht-schuldannehmenden Einleitung, dem 
Beschuldigten wurden die Übereinstimmungen/Widersprüche unvoreingenommen präsentiert 
und zudem hatte er die Möglichkeit, diese zu kommentieren. Als Vergleichsbedingung diente 
eine frühe Beweisdarlegung, bei der alle Beweise in der Einleitungsphase offengelegt wurden, 
bevor der Befrager offene Fragen dazu stellte. In allen drei Bedingungen stellte der Vernehmer 
am Ende der Vernehmung Fragen zu unbekannten Tathandlungen. Alle Versuchsteilnehmer (N 
= 88) führten ein Scheinverbrechen durch und sollten in der Vernehmung folgendes konträreres 
Befragungsziel verfolgen: „Ich will meine Unschuld zeigen, obwohl ich die Handlungen 
tatsächlich begangen habe“. Die Beschuldigten befanden sich also in einem 
Informationsdilemma und sollten nicht zu viele, aber auch nicht zu wenige Informationen 
verraten. Die Beschuldigten in den SUE Bedingungen machten mehr Widersprüche und 
überschätzten die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers stärker als die Beschuldigten in der frühen 
Beweisdarlegungsbedingung. Allerdings verrieten nur die Beschuldigten in der 
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unvoreingenommenen SUE Bedingung mehr neuen Informationen als die Beschuldigten in der 
frühen Beweisdarlegungsbedingung. Vergleicht man die beiden SUE Bedingungen, schätzten 
die Beschuldigten in der unvoreingenommenen SUE Bedingung die Gesprächsatmosphäre als 
positiver ein und wählten eher mitteilsame Gegenstrategien aus, bevor sie zu den tatsächlich 
unbekannten Verbrechenshandlungen befragt wurden.  
Betrachtet man diese Ergebnisse auf der konzeptuellen Stufe, verfolgten die 
Beschuldigten ein konträres Befragungsziel und erarbeiteten sich Gegenstrategien für die 
Vernehmung, die sie entsprechend der Einschätzung der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers 
auswählten. Die Beschuldigten in den SUE Bedingungen waren unwissend bezüglich der 
vorliegenden Beweise, als ihnen Fragen dazu gestellt wurden, und unterschätzten das 
diesbezügliche Sachwissen des Befragers. Aufgrund dieser Unterschätzung wählten sie in den 
SUE Bedingungen eher zurückhaltende Gegenstrategien aus wie etwa „Ich werde es vermeiden, 
Belastendes zu sagen“. Infolgedessen führten die SUE Bedingungen zu mehr Widersprüchen 
als die frühe Beweisdarlegungsbedingung, bei der die Beschuldigten die dem Vernehmer 
vorliegenden Beweise schon seit Beginn der Vernehmung kannten und entsprechend eher 
mitteilsame Gegenstrategie bezüglich dieser Beweise auswählten wie etwa „Ich werde bereits 
bekannte Sachen sagen und entlastend darstellen“. 
Aufgrund des Hervorarbeitens und Darlegens von Widersprüchen überschätzten die 
Beschuldigten in beiden SUE Bedingungen die Sachkenntnisse des Vernehmers. Allerdings 
verrieten nur die Beschuldigten in der unvoreingenommenen SUE Bedingung mehr neue 
Informationen als in der frühen Beweisdarlegungsbedingung. Eine Erklärung dafür ist, dass 
durch das Darlegen von Widersprüchen den Beschuldigten in den SUE Bedingungen ein 
Feedback vermittelt wurde, dass sie ihre Gegenstrategie ändern müssen, um ihr Teilziel 
„unschuldig zeigen“ zu erreichen. Daraufhin änderten aber mehr Beschuldigte in der 
unvoreingenommen SUE Bedingung ihre Gegenstrategie hin zu eher mitteilsam (vgl. mit der 
konfrontativen SUE Bedingung), da nur sie aufgrund der positiver wahrgenommenen 
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Gesprächsatmosphäre überhaupt die Möglichkeit für eine solche Änderung sahen. Aufgrund 
dieser Änderung der Gegenstrategien verrieten die Beschuldigten in der unvoreingenommen 
SUE Bedingung anschließend vergleichsweise mehr neue Information. Die Ergebnisse von 
Studie III führte zur Aufnahme des Feedbacks und der Gesprächsatmosphäre in die graphische 
Darstellung der konzeptuellen Stufe (siehe Abbildung 9). 
 
 
Abbildung 9. Modifizierte Darstellung der konzeptuellen Stufe. 
 
Insgesamt liefern die drei Studien der vorliegenden Arbeit Erkenntnisse für beide Stufen 
des Befragungsgerüsts: Auf der taktischen Stufe konnten konkrete Mittel entwickelt werden, 
um Einschätzungen und Aussageverhalten von Quellen und Beschuldigten zu beeinflussen. Die 
konzeptuelle Stufe zeigte sich geeignet, die Studienergebnisse und Mechanismen der Taktiken 
zu erklären. Sie kann somit helfen, Befragungen strategisch zu planen und durchzuführen. 
 Das entwickelte Befragungsgerüst zum Hervorarbeiten neuer Informationen ergänzt 
bisherige Forschungen zu Befragungstechniken. Denn abgesehen von experimentellen Studien 
zur SUE-Technik (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016) wurde bisher in Feldstudien nur untersucht, wie 
sich der Zeitpunkt der Beweisdarlegung auf den Aussageumfang des Beschuldigten auswirkt 
(bspw. Walsh & Bull, 2015). Bei Quellenbefragungen gibt es – außer den Studien zur Scharff-
Technik – keine Untersuchungen zur Verwendung vorliegender Informationen. 
Forschungsschwerpunkte sind in beiden Befragungskontexten bislang vielmehr Frageansätze 
wie das Kognitive Interview, das aus abrufunterstützenden Taktiken zur 
Informationsgewinnung von völlig kooperativen Personen besteht (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). 
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Außerdem wurden beispielsweise emotionsbeeinflussende, anklagend/vorwurfsvolle oder 
informationssammelnde Frageansätze bei der Befragung verdächtiger Personen untersucht 
(Evans et al., 2013; 2014).  
Das entwickelte Befragungsgerüst zum Hervorarbeiten neuer Informationen kann somit 
das Repertoire von polizeilichen und nachrichtendienstlichen Befragern erweitern. Dabei lässt 
sich beispielsweise die SUE-Technik in umfassendere Vernehmungsansätze wie das PEACE-
Modell integrieren (bspw. Milne & Bull, 1999). Eine solche Integration ist grundsätzlich auch 
für die Scharff-Technik denkbar; allerdings gibt es bis jetzt noch keine umfassenden Ansätze 
für die Befragung von Quellen. Die zweistufige Herangehensweise des entwickelten 
Befragungsgerüsts erscheint nützlich für Forschungs- und Trainingszwecke, da die 
konzeptuelle Stufe die Mechanismen der Befragungstaktiken erklären kann. Dies ist für eine 
strategische Verwendung der Taktiken sinnvoll.  
 133 
Appendix C: Curriculum Vitae (Lebenslauf) 
 
Lennart May 
Geburtsdatum: 02. 09. 1986  
 
Bildungsweg 
Seit 2014   Gastwissenschaftler am Institut für Forensische Psychiatrie, Charité – 
Universitätsmedizin Berlin 
2013-2017  Promotionsstudium in Psychologie an der Universität Kiel  
2013 Diplom in Psychologie an der Universität Kiel  
2009   Vordiplom in Psychologie an der Universität Tübingen 
2006/2007  Zivildienst 
2006 Abitur 
 
Berufliche Tätigkeiten  
Seit 2014   Vorträge und Lehrveranstaltungen zu Beschuldigtenvernehmungen, 
Zeugenvernehmungen und nachrichtendienstlichen 
Befragungstechniken 
Seit 2015  Aussagepsychologische Sachverständigentätigkeit (Zentrum für 
Aussagepsychologie Berlin) 
2013  Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Universität Göteborg, Schweden 
(Research unit for Criminal, Legal and Investigative Psychology) 
